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Preface 
It can be date back to 1993 when the idea of writing a paper as the one below 
came to my mind. It is now 1998. Hong Kong has changed a lot, for good or for 
bad, over these five years. And so did 1. I clung to my past experience as a social 
worker at the outset of the paper (by that time I was not very fiiendly to the 
estabUshment), but upon the conq)letion of tMs work, I work in the Hong Kong 
government service. Sometimes one cannot stop things transforming into their own 
opposites, even if one is conscious of every single step that leads to the final change. 
That said, I am stiU surprised by how far I have gone away from the very starting point 
and how easy I feel in accepting the status quo. 
StiU then, I should confess I owe a lot to the Society for Community Organization 
(SOCO), the NGO I had worked for nearly three years. My contributions to SOCO 
was infinitesimal during those three years but I had gained a lot from my ex-coUeagues, 
Ho Hei-wah, KaHna, Rebecca, Bing, Yung and Tung, who guided by immovable sense 
of justice, have worked for the under-privilege in Hong Kong for years. The 
humanistic values promoted by SOCO are stiU with me. I wish every success of 
SOCO,s works, and wish those who have left SOCO, including myseH^ should find the 
right ways ahead. 
Without the guidance ofProf. Kuan Hsin-chi, my supervisor, this thesis would not 
have been corqjleted. Prof Kuan is not only incredibly leamt but also one of the few 
professors who is wiUing to squeeze his akeady tight schedule to spend time helping 
students to develop their own themes of research and perspectives. The tough but 
inspiring comments given by other two panel members Prof Lo M C and Prof. M 
Davies also help giving this paper a better shape. Needless to say, constrained by my 
Hmited talent, aU the mistakes in the paper are made by the author. 
The Lions Club kindly gave an award to me under the Lions Club of Kowloon 
Scholarship for Post-graduate Research in Public Administration and Affairs of Hong 
Kong in 1996. This award has help me get through a niunber of practical obstacles 
during the course of conducting this research. Here is my cordial thanks to Lions 
Club for their generosity and support. 
This paper is dedicated to Echo. Although she stiU thinks my research paper is 
too boring to read, her tenderness and patience given to me during when I was always 
late home were indispensable, otherwise I would not have eventuaUy concluded my 
study. 
S.H. 
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Abstract of Dissertation 
This paper pursues the question ofhow the institutional character of the criminal 
justice system reacting to social action in Hong Kong evolved from the end of World 
War II to 1980. The talk of evolution implies that the categories of crime against the 
so defined civil strifes are products of social and political interactions and therefore 
change over time. Having considered the colonial state building process in Hong 
Kong as parameter, the evolution of the categories of crime against civil strifes in 
Hong Kong is conceptualised into three modes of criminalisation, namely, the deport-
mode, the societies-mode and the disorder-mode. The deport mode of criminalisation 
was frequently used by the colonial state from the end of World War II to mid-1950s 
to expel people who were considered undesirable. Border control was intensified. 
Ordinances enabling the Governor, the police and the court to deport trouble-makers 
were enforced. Personal registration system was developed for the state to supervise 
the geographical movements of residents in Hong Kong. The societies-mode of 
criminalisation was put to full use after several incidents of disturbances in mid-1950s. 
The state stepped up its supervision and control over domestic organisations and trade 
unions. A societies registration system was established to help depolitizise the 
political affiliated organisations. Membership to unlawful or unregistered societies 
became since then a criminal liability. The disorder-mode of criminalisation was the 
product of 1966-67 riots. Public processions and assemblies were the foci of control. 
Laws empowering the police to react to sporadic civil outbursts were enacted. The 
police organisation was also reformed to make prompt and tactful responses to public 
gatherings possible. For supervision sake, a licensing system for public gatherings 
was then created. These three modes of criminalisation against civil strifes have their 
own historical origins, loci of changes and institutional characters. This paper fluther 
differentiates these modes of criminalisation into phases and the relationship among 
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them is sorted out that subsequently produces a schema of institutional repertoire that 
could be used by the state against civil strifes at any specific time. The availability of 
institutional repertoire at certain time may have bearings on the choice of policing 
style against social actions. Therefore an exploratory investigation of interaction 
between institutional repertoire against civil strifes and policing style is also attempted. 
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Introduction 
In 1992 when I was working as a social worker, I once accompanied three men 
to the Westem Magistracy of Hong Kong. They were the husbands of the so called ‘ 
illegal mothers', the female illegal immigrants who came from mainland China and 
were married to men in Hong Kong. Li order to ask for a right of abode for their 
wives, they joined a protest at the Government House. Police set up a cordon line to 
prevent the protesters from reaching the rear gate of the Government House, which 
was at that time an unusual arrangement. Confrontation between the police and the 
protesters took place when they pushed and pull along the rails cordoning off the area. 
Although no participants were injured O3rotesters and police included) and no f 
properties were damaged out of the collision, the three I accompanied were later 
charged withjoining an 'unlawful assembly'. All of them were found guilty and were 
sentenced to two months' imprisonment, albeit one of the accused was at that time 
undergoing liver cancer treatment. I was shocked. I could not since then get rid of the 
feeling that an acceptable level ofjustice had not been achieved in this incident. 
This petty incident did not attract much media attention, but it kicked off my 
reflection on the criminality attributed to social actions. Textual criticism on the 
Public Order Ordinance (which is the legal instrument mainly used for regulating 
collective actions) was of course my first logical response to the incident mentioned 
above. However this line of critique was proven to be fruitless. The Court of Hong 
Kong ruled in 1994 that this piece of law does not infringe civil right of any kindsJ 
The police, the Court said, should be given effective power to carry out their duty of 
maintaining law and order. It is impractical to add a clause to the ordinance which 
states that those people behaving in such a way as outlawed by the ordinance but with 
good causes should be exempted from being accused. No one would be given license 
to intimidate, insult or to provoke others even if they thought they are acting in such a 
1 R V To Kwung Hang and Choi Yiu Cheung (Appeal), 1994. 
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way with righteousness.2 
Legal rules are functional because they are instmmentally formulated as 
abstractive and inclusive as possible with a foresight to make them useful under a 
wide range of unpredictable circumstances. The Public Order Ordinance is no 
exception. This makes life very difficult for social activists and protesters, however. 
Collective social actions are nearly by definition disturbing and disruptive to the 
existing ‘law and order，. Li a serious strike the strikers may occupy the factory; in a 
serious protest the protesters may paralyze the traffic. To follow all laws is not an 
option for protesters otherwise they would fail to exert any pressure on the authority. 
When the protesters disobey the laws they will find themselves defenseless before the 
Court. The criminal justice system will take action to pass on punitive measures to 
the law-breakers. Substantive justice can be guaranteed in the instrumentally rational 
legal stricture because its strength lies in its being non substantive. 3 
This picture is hardly satisfactory. Subsequently, I turned my attention to the 
evolution of the criminality attributed to social actions in Hong Kong in order to have 
a better understanding of the issue. Once started, I was surprised by the fact that 
social action being treated as a kind of public disorder had been a recent development. 
Needless to say, the legal concept of public disorder has its own long history in 
common law. The mere existence of this concept, however, does not simultaneously 
lead to the conclusion that the behavior falls within the boundary of the definition of 
public disorder is punished or contained as such. The match between behavior and the 
punitive legal concept is not automatic. At this juncture, the state intervenes. The 
intervention may take many forms. The state may choose to tolerate the seemingly 
law-breaking behavior by taking other political considerations into account. It may 
2 
see Public Order Ordinance 1992. s 18(1)，Hong Kong Law, Chapter 245, under which "unlawful 
assembly" is defined as three or more persons assembled in a "disorderly, intimidating, insulting or 
provocative manner intended or likely to cause any person reasonable to fear that the persons so 
assembled will commit a breach ofthe peace,...." 
2 
Sam Hui, ‘The relevance of the Bill of Rights to community organisations', in W. Fong, A. Bymes, 
• G.E.Edwards, ed., Hong Kong's Bill ofRights: Two Years On. HK: HKU, 1994, p.89-94. ， 
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undermine such behavior with administrative measures rather than taking legal actions. 
When determined to punish such behavior with its legal arm, the state may choose 
among a number of legal instruments pertinent to combat collective strifes of which ‘ 
public disorder' is only one of the stock. This observation takes me to attempt to 
conceptualise the criminality against social action as a variable concept and the role of 
the state attributing criminality to specific instances of social actions under specific 
circumstances also worth a second thought. 
This paper is a preliminary survey trying to describe the historical construction 
of criminality against social actions in Hong Kong, and an attempt to correlate other 
political processes to such a construction. Chapter one is a literature review. 
Literature is not reviewed for review's sake. They are selectively chosen and 
discussed to produce an analytic framework that can guide the empirical works in later 
chapters. In chapter two I proceed to develop a substantive empirical framework and 
an interpretative strategy that may capture the political processes involved in that 
framework. Chapter three and four provide data on the construction of the criminality 
against social actions in Hong Kong. These two chapters rely mainly on library works 
and indirect evidence retrieved from law books and newspaper clippings. Not 
unaware of the problem of validity of the findings in these two chapters, I have tried 
my best to get the most out of these limited materials in order to open up a new 
possibility in understanding the subject matter. How far this paper has gone in 
achieving this objective is reviewed in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 1 Literature Review and Theoretical Orientation 
This chapter aims to lay down the theoretical framework of which later chapters 
ofthis paper will follow. A selected number of theoretical perspectives pertinent to 
the concem of this paper will be reviewed hereafter. It is of course impractical to 
draw together all works concerning criminal justice system and social actions. It is 
pointless to do it as well. The choice of literature itself reflects the theoretical 
preference of the author. I will therefore spend some words explaining briefly my 
theoretical interest first before we proceed to the body ofliterature review. 
1.1 Key concepts 
As the title of this paper suggests, the focus of this paper is the interaction 
between the criminal justice system and social actions in Hong Kong. This title, 
however, may invite some false expectations. Readers expecting a detailed analysis of 
how social actions were organised (or regulated and suppressed) in Hong Kong may 
be disappointed by the chapters below. The see-saw movements between social 
actions and the criminal justice system of course constitute part of this paper. Yet the 
key word here is 'interaction'. The concept of interaction is used not only as 
description o f h o w events took place resulting from the actions of two or more parties. 
Interaction itself has its 'configuration'. Deducing from the contingent incidents of 
'interaction' between social actions and criminal justice system in Hong Kong, I will 
try to capture the configuration of the interaction by looking for whether there are any 
stabilised patterns running through the contingent phenomena of 'interaction'.^ 
Some definitions of concepts first. 
Criminal justice system in its usual sense comprises of organisational parts 
including at least the police (or other law enforcement agencies), the court, the prison, 
the rehabilitative agencies and the body of criminal statutes. Nevertheless the sum of 
f In the remaining part of this paper readers will be shown that by 'configuration' I mean actually the 
institutional dimension underpinning the contingent incidents of interaction. 
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parts does not equal to the total Criminal justice system is one of the coercive arm of 
the state (the other being the military). If we adopt the classical definition of state as 
being the totality of the sole legitimated coercion over a limited boundary of people 
and territory, then the criminal justice system obviously constitutes a core component 
of the state. Therefore, in addition to its organisational parts, the character of the 
criminal justice system as part of the state should be given due emphasis in the 
following. 
Understood in this way, criminality is the domain falls at one side of the 
boundary drawn between the permissible and the impermissible by the state which is 
defined and enforced by the criminal justice s y s t e m . 5 
In this paper, 'social action’ refers to the incident of collective and explicit act of 
a group of people having explicit claims to another group. Whether the participants 
are organised is not a concem here. ‘Strife’ is a sub-set of social action which is 
classified and defined as criminal (or potentially criminal) by the state. Therefore, a 
strife is an incident of social action plus criminality attributed by the state. The 
process of which a social action tums into a strife is the process of 'criminalisation 
against social action'.6 
Sometimes 'public disorder' is used interchangeably with 'strife' in this chapter. 
It is done so in order to cater for the usage of other literature. Readers should be 
reminded that these two concepts are not identical when used in other chapters7 
5 By this definition I want to emphasize that criminality is not anything inherent in behavior, rather it is 
an attribute defmed and enforced by state machinery. 
6 Some may argue that a social action tums to civil strife not because the state attributes the so-called 
criminality' to the former, but because the behavior of the participants of a social action tums violent 
that makes it becoming a strife. I have no in-principle against this argument. However, as the 
following chapters of this paper will show, the changing attitude of the state regarding what should 
constitute criminality is a more illuminating factor then the behavioral changes of social actions in 
|mderstanding civil strife. 'Criminalisation against social action, is used interchangeable with 
'criminalisation against civil strife, in this paper although I generally tend to use the latter concept to 
refer to real incidents taken place in Hong Kong and the former used when conducting theoretical 
discussion. . 
7 
Roughly speaking, 'public disorder' is only a subtype among the criminalities attributed to civil strifes. 
It will be clearer when we come to discuss the modes of criminalisation of social actions. See chapter 
three and four ofthis paper for details. 
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Then we can come back to the concept of interaction again. When talk about the 
interaction between social actions and criminal justice system in Hong Kong, I refer 
mainly to the configuration of the processes of which the state attributes criminality to 
incidents of social actions through the criminal justice system, and which 
subsequently tums a social action into a civil strife. 
My formulation of the research problem in this way is not self-explanatory 
enough. It presumes that the state does react to specific instances of social action by 
changing the boundary of criminality. The literature review given below will 
therefore serve two purposes: First it will provide theoretical backup to my research 
problem; second, through a critical review of the existing literature, I will try to 
sharpen the theoretical orientation of this paper. 
Ted Gurr,s often ignored work provides a good starting point. He and his 
colleagues surveyed the recent 200 years' history of four cities (London, Stockholm, 
New South Wales and Calcutta) to see if there were patterns underlying changes in the 
phenomena of public disorder in these cities. They try also to "assess the relative 
importance of political and institutional factors in the creation and maintenance of 
public order."8 They calculated the number of civil strifes and common crimes and 
then measured them against the growth of criminal codes and police. The result is 
stimulating. It is found that the legal definitions of common crimes (like assault or 
theft) have changed little throughout two hundred years. Most of the modifications in 
the statute book took place in redefining the boundary of permissible collective 
behavior. They therefore boldly conclude that, "the changing fears and sympathies of 
the political elite and the rising political influence of new classes are traced in 
legislation governing collective behavior, as surely as a seismograph records 
earthquakes and tremors."9 
Gurr et.al.'s findings are recapped in further studies. Crimes are often 
g "" 
Ted R Gurr, Peter N Grabosky, Richard C Hula, The Politics ofCrime and Conflict: a Comparative 
History ofFonr Titi^c Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977, p.5-6. 
9 Ibid., p.692-697. 
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classified in two subcategorises, namely, mala in se and mala prohibita. Mala in se 
contains criminal acts that are bad by the nature of the acts themselves. Examples are 
conventional crimes such as murder, rape, theft, and on. Some crimes, however, 
contain no obvious harmful elements but are prohibited by the state because of various 
reasons. It is the category of mala prohibita. These two kinds of crimes evolve in 
different ways historically. “By and large the types of crimes classified as mala in se 
have remained static and those known as mala prohibita have greatly expanded. 
Modem legislatures have added three major groups to the traditional offences: crimes 
without victims, political crimes, and regulatory o f f e n c e s . " l O 
As regards the growth of police, a similar phenomenon also can be observed. 
Contrary to the usual justifications given by states when police force are expanded, it 
is found that the speed of police expansion echoes waves of civil strifes instead of 
increase in common crimes.” 
The work of Gurr et.al. establishes not only the empirical evidence that state does 
react to social actions through the criminal justice system, it also proposes that such a 
reaction is the result of the state's perception (or the state elites') of possible threat 
posed by 'rising political influence of new classes'. The implications of the work of 
Gurr et.al. regarding the dynamics among the state, the criminal justice system and 
social actions will be further explored below. 
1.2 State and social actions 
In his From Mobilisation to Revolution, Charles Tilly explores extensively into 
the factors determining the ups and downs of incidents of social actions. Drawn from 
lOGeorge F Cole, 'Politics and the Administration ofJustice", in George F Cole, ed., Criminal Justice: 
Law and Politics, 6th e d , California: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 7-8. 
11 Numerically, for the 16 periods identified by which police manpower increased faster than 
population powth, "in only two cases had there been no prior or concurrent increase in civil strife or 
recorded crime, ln three other instances police manpower was increased following an increase in crime .. 
alone, and in six cases manpower was strengthened during or immediately after a period of increased 
sfrife. ln the five remaining instances the manpower increase followed or coincided with a 
simUtaneous rise in crime and strife." See Ted R Gurr, et.al, The Politics ofCrime and Conflict, op cit., 
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a synthetic analysis of classic theories on collective actions, Tilly proposes that the 
mere existence of common interest among participants would not lead automatically 
to collective actions. A number of intervening factors, including such as the 
organisational form containing the common interest and the threat/opportunities 
structure of which the participants of collective actions are facing, determine very 
much the level and scale of mobilisation that would be resulted.l2 
Among the concepts proposed by Tilly, the threat/opportunities structure has 
special relevance to this paper. The threat/opportunities structure maps out the 
backdrop of which the state and participants of collective actions interact. Echoing 
Gurr et.al.'s thesis, Tilly also suggests that the perceived threat on the part of the state 
is a salient factor that determines the threat/opportunities structure. 
Tilly has no explicit theory of state in his book quoted above. However, working 
from the interaction about the threat/opportunities structure he has advanced a 
framework that links up the 'form of state’ and collective actions. When collective 
action emerge, the state may categorise the collective action in two dimension. First 
in terms of kind: the state may allow certain kinds of collective action but reject others 
(for example, petition is allowed but strike is outlawed). Second in terms of the 
category o f the participants: the state may give licence to certain segment of its subject 
and impose tougher restriction on others (for example, collective actions of white 
male are tolerated but others banned). These two dimensions, the acceptability of the 
12 Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to Revolution. California: Addition-Wesley, 1978. Tilly reviewed 
||ie theories of J S Mill, E Durkheim, M Weber and K Marx and summarises his review as follow, 
,theories in the tradition ofMill deal mainly with exchange system (those in which the incentive for one 
person or group to act is the desirable retum someone else will give them in response). Durkheimian 
theoriw deal mainly with integration system…“Weber's line emphasizes threat system…“The Marxian 
line of|hinking deal mainly with threats and exchange..…"(p.49). Base on this review Tilly advocates a 
,cat-net, approach which contains the theoretical constructs ofthe following (p.56 and after): 
Repression/facilitation > Power > 
IntereM > V Mobilisation > Collective action 
Organisation > Opportunities/threat > 
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action-in-kind and the acceptability of the participant-in-category, make up the 
following diagram:l3 
H 
Repression Toleration Toleration 










Tilly notes that the diagram above can be used to locate 'forms of state' by 
looking at how the state responds to collective actions. I have modified his diagram 
by putting corresponding forms of state onto the diagram. A state located at the south-
west comer of the diagram cannot tolerate any groups to participate in any kinds of 
collective actions, therefore approaching an oligarchy. When it proceeds horizontally 
to the south-east comer, the subjects under its rule although are not allowed to 
participate in a high mobilisation level but all subjects are treated on the same footing. 
If it proceeds vertically upward the state explicitly discriminates against certain 
segment o f t h e subjects, which I will call it a divided state (of which the most typical 
form is colonial polity). 
In chapter two of this paper I will use some of the concepts here to locate how 
the colonial state in Hong Kong responded to social actions in the two aspects of 
action-in-kind and participant-in-category. 1^  
13 _ • 
See ibid., p.l07 and after. Please note I have made some modifications on the diagram therefore 
there is a little bit difference between the diagram here and that of Tilly. However the essence of the • 
argument remains the same. 
14 These two concepts are some of the building blocks making up the "mode of criminalisation against 
social action". Please see chapter two for details. 
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Tilly's approach to the problem of interaction between state and social action 
from mainly the side of the study of social action. Therefore in spite of having the 
above theoretical aspirations, Tilly has not dwelled very deep into the development of 
state with regard its response to social action. At this juncture, the polemic works of 
T H Marshall seems just fitting in the theoretical puzzle. 
Just like the opposite of Tilly, Marshall has no explicit theory on social action. 
However he has an elaborated theory on development of state, hi his historical study 
of the state development in Europe, or in Britain in particular, he suggests that forms 
of state do change in response to social actions. This correspondence is captured in 
his concept of 'citizenship'. Citizenship is the "status bestowed on those who are full 
members of a community. All those possess the status are equal with respect to the 
rights and duties with which the status is e n d o w e d " l 5 While I do not want to get 
involved in the discussion of whether Marshall's trilogy of civil, political and social 
rights best captures the development of citizenship, I would rather focus on the 
principle of universality embedded in citizenship. Marshall notes that the universality 
principle of citizenship has intrinsic contradiction with how the society is really 
organised. People are organised in social classes and social classes are inevitably 
systems of inequality.l6 "lt is therefore reasonable to expect that the impact of 
citizenship on social class should take form of a conflict between opposing 
principles."l7 The conflict then induces changes in both s i des . l 8 
One aspect of the development of state (in terms of growth of citizenship) can 
therefore be understood as the result of the state's reaction to the challenges presented 
15 T H Marshall, Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class. London: Pluto Press, 1992, p.l8. 
Marshall's essay was originally published in 1950. 
16 It does not really matter whether Marshall is adopting the Marxian sense of structural contradiction 
among social classes. Social classes are only types of stratification among society and it is the inherent 
inequality within the stratification that matters. 
17 
T H Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, op cit., p.l8. 
18 ” • 
:'In summary then, Marshall sees the development of citizenship and ofthe class system in terms of 
the interactions between them. Through their antagonistic relationship citizenship and class inequality 
=ach contribute to change in the other." see J M Barbalet, Citizenship. Minneapolis: University of 
Minneata Press, 1988，p.lO. 
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by the inequality inherent in the society. The resultant is a changed boundary of 
inclusion (or recognition of the subjects having full membership within the polity).l9 
Ifthis argument makes sense, the threat/opportunities structure proposed by Tilly 
should not only reflect the costA)enefit attributed by the state to the participants of 
collective action. It also should reflect to some extent the boundary of inclusion the 
state would have recognised. Before we can really find citizenship being 
institutionalised in the state structure, we should be able to locate the tracks of which 
the institutionalisation process gradually takes shape by looking at how incidents of 
social actions and the state interact through the criminal justice system, or the main 
component of the threat/opportunities structure. 
That should be enough for this topic for the time being. Following sections will 
review the literature in criminal studies with a view to gathering more theoretical 
constructs in the more micro level of analysis. 
1.3 The consensus and conflictual model 
There are many ways to approach the literature on criminological studies. 
Among them, the contrast drawn between the consensus and conflictual view of 
criminal control may be the most popular one.20 
William Chambliss, himself a proponent of the conflict approach to criminal 
phenomenon, provided a succinct summary of these two views. See Table 1.1 below. 
19 A . 
A study in similar vein can be found in R Bendix, "The extension of citizenship to the lower classes", 
j n ^ Bendix et.al., State and Society, California: University ofCalifomia Press, 1973，p.233-57. When 
tal^ijjg about 'nation building, process, Bendix says, ”a core element…,.is the codification ofthe rights 
, ^ t i w of all adults who are classified as citizens. The question is how exclusively and inclusively 
citizenship is defined." Ibid., p.233, italic mine. 
f^r general introduction, see John Hagan, Modem Criminology： CrimP f>iminal Behavior and iK 
J^mm’ Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1987，especially chapter one and two. 
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Table 1.1 The contrast of functional and conflict paradigms2l 
Criminal Law Criminal 
Behavior  
Cause Consequence Cause Consequence 
Conflict ruling class provide state class divisions Crime serves the 
P a r a d i g m interests coercive force to which lead to interests of the 
repress the class class struggle ruling class by 
struggle and to reducing strains 
legitimise the use inherent in the 
of this force capitalist mode of 
production  
Funct ional customary beliefs to establish inadequate to establish the 
P a r a d i g m that are codified procedures for socialisation moral boundaries 
(nr rnne^r.oi,c m State law controlling whose of the community 
^ consensus who do not 
approach) complywith 
customs  
A cursory look on the above table should note the followings: (1) both 
approaches avoid reducing criminal behaviors and creation of criminal control into 
individual choices. Structural factors (class struggle and ruling class interest, 
socialisation and social values) are used instead. (2) the conflictual approach pays 
more attention to the role of state (even if it is understood as tool of class rule), 
consensus approach emphasizes more on social processes other than state. (3) it is not 
clear in both approaches whether criminal categories are universal or not. The 
universality of criminality depends on whether particular theorists take 'class interest' 
or 'social moraIity' as universal.22 
Emile Durkheim is the early contributor to the consensus approach. Durkheim 
does not have an elaborated theory on criminological studies, but he has proposed a 
social theory of laws and sanctions. From the comparison between primitive and 
modem societies, Durkheim distinguishes between two types of social solidarity, 
21 
from William J ChambIiss, "Functional and Conflict Theories of Crime: the heritage of Emile 
^url^emi and Karl Marx", in William J Chambliss, Milton Mankoff, ed.. Whose Law? WhatOrder^A 
j^Onmct Appro?.r.h tn Pr;m;nr^iTi' NY: John Wiley & Sons’ 1976, p.7 “ 
22 
By universality of criminality I mean the beIiefthat there are some common social wrongs among all 
i = t i e s at different time that impose an obligation on the authority to make laws in order to constraint 
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namely, the mechanical and organic sol idari ty.23 The former holds community 
members together through common values and sanction systems while the latter 
through interactive exchange among members. Correspondingly, Durkheim 
differentiates two kinds of laws. The 'repressive sanction' resembles the modem 
criminal laws and the 'restitutive sanction' the civil codes. Durkheim's 'repressive 
sanction' best reflects what is meant by the consensus approach in table 1.1. It is 
noted that "repressive law is associated with the existence of strong and enduring 
social sentiments; its violation gives rise to sanctions that impinge upon the fortune, 
liberty and life of the individual and also upon his honor. Since repressive law is 
diffiise its existence is not dependent upon the existence of any special judicial 
machinery but rather, as he [Durkheim] sees it, enforced by the collective as a whoie” 
24(ItaUc mine) It follows that the society as a whole should impose legal sanctions on 
those harmful acts that violate collective moral feelings {the social sentiments). 
Modem textbook definition of crimes, although may not be inspired by Durkheim, 
actually adopts a similar approach .25 Crime is defined not as only a hamiful act 
against this or that person, but is harmful to the society as a whole. Following the line 
of thought, we can easily arrive at what Hunt called the 'disintegration thesis', "that 
unkss society reacts to violations of norms through the imposition of sanctions 
otherwise] social solidarity itself would be t h r ea t ened . "26 The state acting in the 
name o f the whole defines the public order proper and penalises the norm breakers to 
23 see Emile Durkheim,胡偉譯，社會研究方法論(The Rules of Sociological Method),北京：華夏， 
1=88. To Durkheim sociological enquiry is the enquiry of social facts. The objectivity 'of collective 
phenomena distinguishes sociological enquiry from other micro-level-oriented disciplines like 
psychology therefore it is nothing surprising to find Durkheim enchanted with the problem of social 
order, the most obvious social fact. 
24 
Alan Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law. London: Macmillan, 1978，p.68. 
25 Take one example, it is defined in a best-seller textbook that "crime is a crime because it consists in 
wongdomg which directly and in serious degree threatens the security or well-being of society and ' 
^ecausj it is not safe to leave it redressable only by compensation of the parts injured." J.C.Smith 
onan Hogan, Criminal Law. 6th edition, Buttenvorths: ELBS, 1988, p. 18. ’ 
26 
Alan Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law, op cit., p.76. 
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order to preserve the moral boundary.27 
Durkheim approaches the problem of criminalisation from the angle of the 
collectivity, that is, from the society in solidarity. However, if there are some 
universal wrongs, why some people choose to break the collectively supported norms 
(laws)? The mere existence of criminal behavior indicates that the incorporation of 
individuals into collective norms is never total. Further pursuit of this problem gives 
rise to the deviancy theory, hi all, deviancy theory tries to understand why some 
people choose to do wrongs. Robert K Merton proposes that social deviance is a 
response to the structural gap between socially defined goals (which define what one 
should achieve in his/her life) and the unequal distribution of means (which define 
what one could really achieve). When faced with the frustration of being 'failed', 
individuals may either conform to, retreat from or rebel against the existing norms. 
The individual choice of rebellion gives rise to one aspect of the socially defined 
phenomenon of 'crime'28 The way to eliminate crime then, logically, is to either 
adjust individual aspirations, or to enhance individuals in using institutionalised 
Oience legitimated) means. That is why deviancy theory tums the emphasis from 
punishment to rehabilitation. This twist helps humanise the criminal justice system in 
many ways. However, this 'rehabilitative ideal, also draws people's attention away 
from casting doubts on the universality of the existing social norms. 29 it is not 
27 From this 'disintegration thesis' the areas of which the state find an interest to impose control 
gradually enlarged. After Durkheim's notion of 'social sentiments', it is stated in another textbook on 
criminal law that the function of criminal law is “to preserve public order and decency, to protect the 
citizen from what is offensive or injurious and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation or 
corruption of others, particularly those who are specially vuberable because they are young, weak in 
body or mind or inexperienced or in a state of special physical, official or economic dependence." see 
Wolfenden Committee, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1957) 
Cmnd 247, quoted from Michael J Allen,, Textbook on Criminal Law. 2nd ed., London: Blackstone 
Press, 1991,p.3. 
28 David Lee, Howard Newby, The Problem of Sociology, London: Unwin, 1983，p.238^0. The 
original scheme includes another two strategies, namely, to innovate new norm or to ritualise the 
existing one. I would consider them as only two sub-types under rebellion and conformity. 
29 "It can fairly be said that the political dimensions of criminal justice were not of primary concem to 
most of those professionally or academically involved in the study and administration of American 
criminal justice during the years preceding the mid-1960s. The main interests and 
commitments....involved with problems of crime and corrections was commitment to the rehabilitative 
ideal." See Francis A Allen. The Crime of Politics: Political Dimensions of Criminal Justice. 
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surprising at all to find theorists criticizing the consensus view of crime as being 
methodologically ahistorical and static, and normatively conservative and reactive. 
Practically, there are also evidence that this approach does no good to reduce crimes.30 
Although fiercely criticized, the consensus model has its merits. The consensus 
model highlights a very important component in the criminological studies: the 
presence of consensus. When penalised, many people feel or even agree to the norms 
underpinning the social rejection of their behaviors. When choose to penalise certain 
behaviors through legal sanction, the state (or the law makers in particular) finds itself 
obliged to appealing for support from some socially accepted norms. In doing so, the 
state actually to a certain extent ties its own arms because as argued by Allen that 
when those in power really want to suppress oppositions, "deliberate decision was 
made by public officials to employ administrative decision because the obligations of 
proof and the other resistance built into the criminal process incapacitated it for use 
in such a sweeping program of repression……This is not intended to suggest that the 
criminal law is incapable of being used as a device to achieve repressive political 
objectives.....It is important to be aware, however, that the choice to exercise political 
power through the established agencies of criminal justice has often meant a 
moderation of oppression, not its exacerbation''^^ (Italic mine) 
Therefore criminalisation, if understood as kind of social control, is an attempt 
of the authority to regulate through a specific set of institutions and such institutions 
are characterised by their strong appeal to social consensus. The problem of 
consensus model is not its emphasis on the presence of consensus in criminalisation 
process. The problem is that the consensus is taken as given. 
Gurr et.al. have already found that different criminal categories change 
differently over time, and the changes are largely result of political events. If social 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974’ p.5. 
二 see Richard Quinney, Critique of Legal Order: Crime Control in Capitalist Societv. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1974，for a concise critique on the 'mainstream' of criminology. 
3lprancis A Allen, The Crimes ofPolitics. op cit., p. 18-9. 
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consensus underpinning criminal phenomenon is universal, how can it come to term 
with Gurr et.al's findings? Two possibilities: either some criminal categories have 
nothing to do with consensus, or consensus changes as well, bi both cases, consensus 
is no longer understood as given. 
Labeling theory tries to explain how the consensus is itself constructed. Differs . 
from Durkheimian theory which approaches criminological phenomenon from starting 
at the social fact of collective solidarity, labeling theory set out at the interactive 
processes of which the criminal label is ascribed to people. The most general 
presumption of this theory runs as follow, "crime is essentially a label attached to a 
person's behavior by others. Behavior may be defined or labeled as crime, but it is 
not this behavior in itself that constitutes crime. Rather, the behavior is criminalised -
- transformed into criminal behavior by a process of social ascription."32 This 
quotation brings out the important concept of process ofcriminalisation. 
If being criminal is a label ascribed by others, who ascribes the label on whom? . 
On the surface, the law-makers, who lay down the statute book of criminal laws, 
ascribe the label on deviants. However it is often the case that there already exists a 
social demand (although may not be supported by all) for outlawing certain behavior 
when the law-makers tries to initiate changes in criminal law. ki other words, law-
makers merely use the laws to 'stabilise' an already accepted label. Therefore, in 
terms of origin, labeling process should precede the emergence of a corresponding 
legal definition of crime. 
This takes us to focus on the processes that take place before the emergence of 
criminal categories. We can hence roughly distinguish between two phases: in the . 
first phase the interaction of certain parties help constructing a criminal label, and in 
the second phase such label is institutionalised into practice. The dyad nature of 
criminalisation process will be further elaborated when we come to the conclusion of 
this chapter. 
22 
Clayton A Hartjen, Crime and Criminalisation. 2nd ed., New York: Robert E Krieger, 1978’ p.6. 
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When figuring out which parties are involved in the label construction process, 
the police, or other law-enforcement agencies, should of course play a salient role. 
Police are front line workers in maintaining public order. But they do more than 
maintaining it, they define it as well through the discretion given to them. Literature 
on police research generally agrees that (a) police rarely follows the laws giving them 
power consistently; (b) police usually simplifies through grouping the policed into a 
few categories to facilitate policing. The policed are described in stereotypical ways 
{the criminals) and are then selectively policed.33 
Clayton Hartjen，a labeling theorist, neatly summarises his observations that "we 
can define crime as a socially recognised role constructed by societal members or their 
authorised agents in the cause of labeling someone a lawbreaker and thereby placing 
him or her in the status of criminaL"34 No doubt the processes involved here are 
actually very complicated. We have noted that during the processes, a rigid legal 
category defming the application of power on the policed may not be readily available. 
Even if some pertinent legal concepts are existing in the statute book, they may be 
subjected to reinterpretation when applied. Therefore instead of following strictly the 
legal definition of a crime, theorists of labeling approach remind us that the 
construction of the criminal label depends on the situation and the definitions ofthe 
situation. The situation and its definition are usually negotiated among the interacting 
parties.35 
So far we are focusing on the discussion of whether criminality and the common 
values underlining such criminality is given or universal or not. Now we tum to the 
composition of criminality and its relationship to the state through a review of the 
conflictual approach to criminality. 
= T o m Bowden. Bevond the T.imit^  ofthe Law: a Comparative Study ofthe Police in Crisis Pniitin<; 
^ew York: Penguin, 1978’ p.19-39. For an updated review ofrespective literature on police research' 
, f ^ comprehensive work of Robert Reiner, The Politics ofthe Police 2nd ed.，London: Harvester 
wheatsheaf, 1992 
34 
Clayton A Hartjen, Crime and Criminalisation. op cit., p. 9. 
35 
David Lee, Howard Newby, The Problem ofSociologv.. op cit., p.326. 
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The studies on white collar crimes provide a starting point. White collar crimes 
are usually crimes committed by middle or higher classes in areas where more 
knowledge-laden tact are needed to commit the crimes. What distinguishes them from 
conventional crimes committed mainly by lower classes is not the difference of 
• 
physical effect produced by the criminal acts. White collar crimes also damage 
property'(e.g., cheating shareholders) and human lives (e.g., intended negligence of 
industrial safety standard). The difference lies on the social treatment of the convicted. 
White collar crimes are usually understood as less serious, often less policed and 
hence more invisible before the public's eyes. Even convicted, the infringers are 
usually punished through civil suite rather than criminal proceedings therefore paying 
fines could save the infringers from further l iabi l i ty .36 No doubt the society is more 
lenient toward white collar crime convicts. Chambliss therefore argues that "in fact it 
seems very clear that criminal acts are widely distributed throughout the social classes 
• 
in capitalist societies, that the rich, the ruling, the poor, and the working classes all 
engage in criminal activities on a regular basis. It is in the enforcement of the law that 
the lower classes are subject to the effects of ruling-class domination over the legal 
system, which results in the appearance of a concentration of criminal acts among the 
lower classes in the official records, ]n actual practice, however, the class differences 
do not exist."37 
It is the reason why leftist criminologists take laws as merely the "ideological 
facade of 'universal justice' set up to protect the powerful's permits of their own 
particular interests."38 
• 
It is hence argued that the existing legal norms ~ the consensus of control -- are 
not universal at all. Their existence and contents cannot be explained, like the 
^. Harold E Pepinsky, "Introduction", in Harold E Pepinsky, ed., Rethinking Criminology. Beverly 
J^“ls: Sage, 1982, p.7-16. Needless to say the contrast drawn here should be understood as a very 
broad brush description. 
37 --
William J Chambliss, ed., Whose Law? What Order?, op cit , p.24. 
38 
I “ r T ^ o r ’ Paul Walton’ Jock Young, ed., Critical Criminology. Boston: Rouledge and Kegan Paul, 
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• ^ • 
deviancy theory or labeling theory, in terms of collective moral feelings or the 
interactive consensus building process. Legal control should be interpreted against the 
uneven distribution of power among social groups. Donald Black postulates that the 
distribution of legal sanctions is correlated with social stratification. According to his 
formalistic 'legal grammar', the correlation between the two can be summarised as (a) 
the amount of laws will be larger in a more stratified society; (b) the lower the social 
class, the greater the amount of legal sanctions directed toward them; (c) it is easier 
for the higher classes to subject the lower classes under legal sanctions if the class 
distance between them is greater; (d) it is more difficult for the lower classes to 
subject the higher classes under legal sanctions if the class distance between them is 
greater.39 in a word, legal sanctions and norms are more favorable to the upper 
classes under whatever conditions. 
A conflictual perspective obliges us to conceptualise the phenomenon of 
criminality in a different way. As I have argued before, criminalisation is a specific 
type of social control of which the state is involved. The controlling agency and the 
controlled are interacting through the institutional set-ups of the criminal justice 
system. If we, say, take the criminal justice system not as a bundle of ‘actors, (the 
police, the judges, the legislators, etc.), but a pool of institutionalised resources, then 
we can hypothesize from Black's statements that not everybody have the same access 
to mobilise such resources. If the access to the criminal justice resources are not 
evenly distributed, it follows that the criminal justice system may be ‘captured’ by 
certain social groups. After this conceptual adjustment, the theoretical components of 
deviancy and labeling theory can be retained and radicalised. Deviancy is no longer 
taken to be a spontaneous collective response to harmful acts, but a series ofprocesses 
attributing the criminal labels to some of the social members. The creation of the 
criminal labels do not have to be underpinned by an interactively constructed 
jSgg^nald J Black,唐越、蘇力譯’法律的運作行爲(The Behavior of Law),北京：中國政法大學’ 
，p« 12"42. 
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consensus, but are selectively created by the powerful social groups. 
Hartjen has advocated that, “the creation of crime, thus, is a successful result of 
the interaction of two groups - law violators and law enforcers. The study of crime 
from a labeling perspective requires that we address the actions and forces behind the 
actions qf both groups. Two conditions appear to be essential for criminalisation. 
These are perceived threat and relative power We must also account for when and 
^hy persons or groups perceive threat and how they (and how they are able to) 
exercise the necessary power to criminalise those whom they perceive to be a threat” 
40 (Italic mine) 
The concepts of perceived threat and power proposed by Hartjen remind us of 
the previous discussion on Tilly and Marshall. Hartjen, and most of other 
criminologists as well, commits a common mistake of taking the state as merely an 
aggregate of organisations (for example Hartjen explains the emergence of Omnibus 
Crime Bill in US as the result of the power struggle among the three branches of the 
US government), or an instrument for social groups to compete against each others. 
They do not, like Tilly and Marshall, explore into the possibility that the state can also 
feel 'threatened'. To say that the state can 'perceive' and 'act' does not equal to saying 
that the state is an autonomous actor having its own interest and will. State is an 
organised entity. Longitudinally, it accumulates past practice to accommodate new 
political experience. Horizontally, it links together more or less interdependent state 
organisations to arrive at apparent consistency. Over its subjects and territory, it is 
compelled to keep them in line for ruling's sake. The interest to maintain general • 
order within the society when facing external or internal threat cannot be reduced into 
interests of social groups.4l State is hence not identical to this or that ruling class or 
party. It is the nexus of the flow of authoritative rules. It organises and is organised 
40 Clayton A Hartjen, Crime and Criminalisation. op cit., p.l7-8. 
41 T“. 
ims autonomous character of state is highlighted by Theda Skocpol, in her introduction to Theda 





Leftist criminologists usually commit the same fallacy as well. Marxist 
assumption on crimes is correlated to the capitalist mode of production. Early 
proponents of leftist criminology argue that "breaking with individual (that is，with 
genetic, psychological and similar) explanations into social explanations has thrust 
upon us the political economy as the primary determinant of the framework. We shall 
argue that the processes involved in crime-creation are bound up in the final analysis 
with the material basis of contemporary capitalism and its structure of /flvi,.，，43 (Italic 
mine) By 'material basis' they mean of course modes of production. Many 
researches on formation of labor laws and poverty laws are thus conducted, bi every 
• 
research it is found that codified criminal laws originated mainly from capitalised 
urban centres. These laws were used to regulate urban disturbance and workers' 
disturbance. We cannot probably find a better explanation other than class analysis to 
explain the origin of poverty laws that incriminated unemployed workers, or laws 
regulating (actually preventing) strikes, processions and trade union formations. 
However most proponents of conflict theory recently have admitted that class 
hypothesis cannot explain everything.44 After many a attempts to rescue the Marxist 
assumptions, Chambliss finally reflected on his earlier classism and admitted that 
most conflictual theorists have committed the fallacy of reductionism.45 Other 
• 
proponent of leftist criminologists tried some other ways out but were largely not very 
fruitful.46 Some eventually turn to the state. A group of British radical 
42 see Bob Jessop, State Theorv: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, 
P.l-23. ‘ 
43 Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, Jock Young, ed., Critical Criminology, op cit., p.20. 
^ The most outstanding reasons for this change may be (a) some conflicts cannot be reduced into 
�lasses, for example, laws against homosexuality, women and aliens; (2) some criminal laws are 
avourable to working classes, for example, laws criminalising industrial negligence; (3) some criminal 
aws in effect serve working class better because most victims of criminal acts like murders and rapes 
are working class members. 
45 William J Chambliss, ed., Criminal Law in Action. 2nd ed., New York: John Wiley & Sons 1984 
P-i-12. ， ， 
• 
A originally fierce proponent of conflictual model, Richard Quinney, has seemingly abandoned the 
• 
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criminologists including Phil Scraton tries to twist the emphasis on classes to the 
antagonism between the state and the marginal groups. Scraton proposes the concept 
of ‘social authoritarianism'. What he means by "social authoritarianism……relied 
heavily on regulation via the rule of law. Also it required other pragmatic changes in 
order to carry through an authoritarian programme. These included massive pay rises 
for the police and the military, a much-publicised calm down on welfare fraud and the 
development of special claims control units to investigate the 'scroungers'; the 
introduction o f t h e openly punitive 'short, sharp, shock', regime for young offenders; 
and eventually, the expansion ofBritish prisons, longer sentences and restricted parole. 
"47 Hence criminalisation of marginal groups is only part of a larger programme for 
the social-state complex to exercise control. This change proved to be fertile. A wide 
range of modem theories, including mainly those of Antonio Gramcsi and Michel 
Foucault, have been induced into formulating new paradigms of legal control that 
inject new meanings to their concepts like 'hegemony' and ' g o v e m m e n t a l i t y ' 4 8 
It is now time to conclude what has transpired from this brief review of the 
consensus and conflictual models of criminal laws. Firstly, we find that definitions of 
crimes are not universal at all. They are created and attributed. Secondly, 
criminalisation is not completed in a single instance. It involves a series of processes, 
including at least a constructing and an institutionalising phases. Thirdly, consensus 
underpinning legal control may present but it is constructed and articulated through 
interactions. Fourthly, real and perceived conflicts characterise the origins of laws 
aimed to control civil strifes. Fifthly, society-centred explanations are not sufficient. 
The fact that the criminal justice system is a kind of institutionalised state organisation 
Marxist premises and made a metaphysical tum to what he calls the universal ignorance of human 
sufferings as the basic reason why crime persist in society. Richard Quinney and John Wildeman, The 
Emblem ofCrime: a Peace and Social Justice Perspective. 3rd ed., California: Mayfield, 1991. 
47 Phil Scraton, ed., Law. Order and the Authoritarian State. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 
1987,p.vii-viii. 
48 An aspiring discussion of what is the to-the-day position of legal and criminological studies can be 
found in Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Societv: toward a constitutive theory of law. London: 
Routledge, 1993. 
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should be given due attention. 
1.4 The refined framework 
k this section, I will try to incorporate the lessons drawn from the previous 
sections to construct an analytical model that could give due attention to the processes, 
institutional set-ups and the state function of the criminal justice system. 
My framework draws quite a lot from the work of Stuart Hall et.al.'s Policing 
the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and OrderA^ Hall et.al. adopt a revised 
Gramscian approach to criminal phenomena. They focus on the cycle of hegemony 
formation, exhaustion and reformation. Specific criminal phenomenon (in his study 
'mugging') is taken to be the iceberg of a more complex social-political dynamic. They 
try "to examine why and how the themes of race, crime and youth - condensed into the 
image of 'mugging' - come to serve as the articulator of the crisis, as its ideological 
conductor. It is also about how these themes have functioned as a mechanism for the 
construction of an authoritarian consensus, a conservative backlash: what we call the 
slow build-up towards a ‘soft’ law and order society"50(Italic mine) Hence, the 
authors do not limit themselves to the substantive content of a kind of crime, but pay 
attention to the complexities of social processes circumscribing it and its relevance to 
the paramount importance of maintaining law and order as perceived by the state. 
It follows that the very first question we have to ask about criminalisation is why 
certain kinds ofbehavior suddenly become problematic (to the society and to the state). 
Hall et. al. suggest that, "if you look at this relation (i.e., relation between crime and 
tiie reaction to crime) in terms of the social forces and the contradictions accumulating 
一 
49 Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, 
fe^te. and 1 ,aw anH OrHpr London: Macmillan, 1978. 
50 Stuart Hall et.al., ibid., p.viii. Stuart Hall et.al's study itself draws insight from the concept of 'moral 
^ i c ' proposed by Stanley Cohen. To me, their main difference (or the main contribution made by 
J^all et.aI) is that Stuart Hall et.al have given considerable attention to the role of state (and the 
egemonic formation process accompanying the state) while Cohen's work has been basically a society-
^ntered approach (although his has also paid attention to police and court). See Stanley Cohen, Folk 
^g^dkand Moral Panir.Q New York: St Martin's Press, 1972. 
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within it or in terms of the wider historical context in which it occurs, the whole 
terrain of the problem changes in character. The pattem of crime, but also the nature 
of the social reaction, has a pre-history: conditions of existence, strikingly absent from 
all the publicity concentrated on the single incident. Both have a location in 
institutional processes and structures, apparently far away from the ‘scene o f the crime 
' ."51 
ki the quotation a number of concepts are relevant: 'pre-history', 'social forces 
and the contradictions' and the 'institutional processes and structures'. The notion of 
'pre-history' means that a new criminal phenomenon is not emerging out of a sudden. 
Its has a constituting process. The threshold of emergence of such a criminal 
phenomenon has something to do with contradictions experienced by the state. We 
can hence hypothesize that state should have a perception of trauma before 
criminalisation process takes place. The trauma may be real or unreal, but it is 
definitely perceived to be real by the state because it involves some inherited 
contradictions within the society.52 
Once kicked off, the state (partly through the criminal justice system) proceeds 
to define the challenges laid before it. I would call it the process of definition of 
situations. We can use three parameters to conceptualise it. First the perceived 
severity of the challenge. Severity is not only a matter of degree, but it also 
incorporates a hierarchy of qualitative difference. A situation defined as interpersonal 
conflict invites much different response from that defined as a challenge to state 
authority. Therefore, thresholds may be identified along the hierarchy of severity that 
indicate the qualitative difference.53 
51 Stuart Hall, et.aL，Policing Crisis, op cit., p.viii-ix. 
52 
For Hall et.al., the inherent contradiction behind the 'mugging' phenomenon is the worsening 
reladonship between the Black youth and the police in British. The moral boundary defined by the 
White (and enforced by the police) lost its credit because of the deteriorating living standard of the 
marginal population. When talking of the inherent contradiction in Hong Kong, the colonial setting is 
certainly relevant. In many cases those social actions taken place in Hong Kong directed their explicit 
challenges to the colonial state. 
53 
5½ the last section of Chapter 4 for reference. 
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The second is the institutional novelty of the challenge. The criminal justice 
system is bound by institutions. The presence of institutional constraint implies that 
the criminal justice system has a specific value of capacity at a certain moment. It is 
not subject totally to the arbitrariness of the highest authority. If the state has to react 
through the criminal justice system, it may find the capacity of the system fall short of 
the demand imposed by the challenge.54 Under this situation, the state may either 
resort to extralegal measures to combat the challenge, or it may create new 
institutional instruments to cope with it. Li the latter case, the new institutions, once 
created, become part of the repertoire for further use.55 Hence we can hypothesize a 
diminishing need for institutional innovation for the criminal justice system in a 
specific society if the polity manages to institutionalise its form of social control. This 
hypothesis is supported by Gurr et.al.'s study. It is found that institutional changes in 
criminal justice systems of London, Stockholm and New South Wales for containing 
civil strifes gradually mute out after some episodes of high-tides. On the contrary, 
Calcutta experienced much larger scale of fluctuation because the colonial regime 
found it very difficult to institutionalise its mle over the nationalist movements.56 
The third is the degree of specific novelty of the challenge. Not all challenges 
are new experience to the state. Analogies could be drawn from existing criminal 
categories to capsulate the new challenge. The degree of novelty as perceived by the 
state therefore depends on how the existing institutions in the criminal justice system 
are interpreted. Old criminal categories and old definitions of power of law 
enforcement agencies can be stretched to cover new experience. Stretching the 
54. For example, the police may not have experience to control large-scale riots; and the codified 
cnminal laws may not have the legal concept of'organised crimes'. 
55 Stanley Cohen observes that, "the courts and the police, as officially designated agents of social 
”trol，have to operate in terms of a socially sanctioned role. They could not opt out ofthis role; they 
ad to take some action. Their action was also limited to rule enforcement, rather than the creation of 
new rules. The fact that these limits are often exceeded, is attributed not to their absence, but to the 
perceived innovatory aspects of the behavior itself,."..Rationalisations such as 'a new situation need 
new remedies' account for those elements exclusively directed at the particular deviance being 
controlled." see his Folk Devils and Moral Panic, op cit, p. 111. 
Ted R Gurr, et.al.., The Politics ofCrime and Conflicts, op cit., p.619^8. 
29 
meanings of existing institutions would therefore to a certain degree changes their • 
original meanings. The new match between old institutions and new challenge is 
conceptualised as 'convergence'. Hall et.al have this concept as well, ‘“ 
[c]onvergence' occurs when two or more activities are linked in the process of 
signification so as to implicitly or explicitly draw parallels between them�••This 
indicates the manner in which new problems can apparently be meaningfully 
described and explained by setting them in the context of an old problem with which 
the public is already familiar…,.Another, connected, form of convergence is listing a 
whole series of social problems and speaking of them as 'part of a deeper, underlying 
problem"'57 In terms of our terminology of institutionalisation, it means an effort to 
institutionalise new challenge by defining away the perceived novelty of the challenge, 
lt can be done in two ways. Horizontally, new experience is defined as falling within 
existing criminal categories. Longitudinally, new experience is defined as the 
aftermath of previous crisis. Old stories are hence given new lives to serve as 
signifiers incorporating (at the same time accommodating) crises. The matching, 
interpretation, and re-interpretation of the signifier (a label representing political 
discourse of the past) and signified (new criminal phenomenon) are the basic 
processes involved. Turk indicates that, "conventional crime laws have been used 
politically wherever subjects have struggled against the terms of their subjection --
ec0n0mi9, racial, or political, as these appear in various complex blends……Labor 
history is filled with instances in which either conventional crime laws or specially 
invented laws have been invoked to justify the rejection of demands for a less 
inequitable allocation of economic resources and d e p r i v a t i o n s . " 5 8 
Degree of severity, degree of institutional novelty and the degree of specific 
novelty of the new challenge together constitute the process of definition of the 
situation. 
57 Stuart Hall, et.al.., Policing Crisis, op cit., p.323. • 
58 
Austin 丁 Turk. Political Criminalitv: the Defiance and Defence of Authority. Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1982,p.42, 
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Then comes the process of action and reaction. The way how a challenging 
situation is defined would determine to a certain degree how the state reacts to the 
challenge. For example, researches on terrorism indicate that early definition of the 
counter-movements as terrorism restrain some criminal or administrative repertoire 
from being used. The resultant conflict might have been exacerbated by the undue 
response o f t h e state.59 Therefore the initial definition of situation is also the starting 
point of the subsequent action and reaction process. 
However, the process of action and reaction in criminalisation cannot be reduced 
into the process of definition of situation. The latter pays attention to how the state 
perceives challenge while the former focuses on the visible strategic exchange 
between the criminal justice system and the 'trouble-makers'. Empirically we may 
actually conjecture retrospectively the initial definition of situation from the resultant 
observable actions and reactions. Yet the two are anyway conceptually 
distinguishable. It is not easy to give here a typology of the possible combinations of 
actions and reactions. Turk advocates a scheme to conceptualise the strategies 
involved in the action-reaction cycle. The resisters, or trouble-makers, have mainly 
four kinds of strategies, namely, dissent, evasion, disobedience, and violence.60 The 
reaction o f the state to such strategies may either be legal or extralegal, mild or severe, 
and direct or indirect.6l However,. a sound typology should be constructed from 
empirical data. Here I just want to spend a few words on the role of mass media in 
this process. Hall etal. and Cohen both support the thesis that mass media is a key 
player in constructing hegemonic interpretation over specific instances of collective 
strifes. The reason why it is the case is that, "[i]n the area of crime news, the media 
刃 Anderson-Sherman in his study of Mau-mau movement finds that, "[H]ere is a case where 
government and press worked togeAer to label a movement as terrorism.....Means other than force are 
available: these include mediation, negotiation and arbitration. What is clearly counterproductive is the 
blindness created by premature labeling and classification." see Amold Anderson-Sherman, "The Social 
Construction of "terrorism"', in Harold E Pepinsky, ed., Rethinking Criminoloev. op cit., p.87. 
60 Austin T Turk, Political Criminality, op cit, p.99-108. 
61 I suppose the names of the attributes themselves are self-explanatory enough. Details please be 
referred to Austin T Turk, ibid, p.llO. 
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appear to be more heavily dependent on the institutions of crime control for their news 
stories than in practically any other area. The police, Home Office spokesmen and the 
courts form a near-monopoly as sources of crime news in the media..…What this 
amounts to, where there seems to be a very wide consensus, and counter-definitions 
are almost absent, is that dominant definitions command the field of signification 
relatively unchallenged. What debate there is tends to take place almost exclusively 
within the terms of reference of the controllers. And this tends to repress any play 
between dominant and alternative defmitions."62 From this long quotation one should 
not be led to conclude that we cannot rely on the mass media to gather information 
about social actions/civil strifes. Exactly because the media is structurally biased, we 
can to some degree infer from the media reporting what is the authoritative 
interpretation of the incidents being reported. We can also measure empirically how 
an incident of conflict reported in the mass media matches with the official defmition 
of the incident given in government reports and statements. The interplay between the 
two would give us some ideas how the hegemonic consensus is being articulated.63 
When a contingent incident of crisis dies down, the process of criminalisation 
cannot be said as concluded yet. Then comes the process of redefinition of situation. 
During the previous processes, new legal concepts may have been created, old 
concepts may have been stretched, new policing style may has emerged, new police 
organisations may took shape. At the end, all these changes have to be justified 
retrospectively. A redefinition of the conflictual situation may be needed. The 
redefinition of situation serves at least the following ftmctions: (a) all the contingent 
experience can be fitted into the backdrop of the confrontation, from which the 
authority can pick up a story line and articulate a consistent story of the confrontation 
that has an origin, a development and an end. The new experience can thereby 
incorporated into the old discourse. It is to arrive at a discursive consistency, (b) 
62 Stuart Hall, et.al., Policing Crisis, op cit., p.68-9. 
63 
An attempt to capture the action and reaction through a survey over media report of civil strifes can 
be found in Chapter 4. 
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some actions the state has taken during the previous processes may induce further 
reorganisation of the law enforcement agencies or forther law-makings. A 
redefinition of situation helps identify what are going to be done in order to prevent 
similar incidents from taking place in future. It is to arrive at an institutional 
consistency, (c) a consistently narrated story can serve as a signifier, a symbol that 
underpins the newly generated (and hegemonic) consensus about the incident. No 
story can represent all aspects of a complex incident. Story is articulated with 
perspective. Once articulated, the story can be cited again and again to justify an 
existing or changing institutional arrangement of the state (or the criminal justice 
system in specific). Labels like ‘double tenth incident', the '67 riots', the 'Kowloon 
turmoil, are convenient examples in Hong Kong. 
Last of all, we can say the criminalisation process is completed when we can 
identify the process of normalisation. The former processes highlight what are 
involved during when conflictual experience is collaborated into a hegemonic 
consensus. The process of normalisation echoes these processes. When a new 
consensus is successfully articulated, the once extraordinary arrangements become 
institutionalised. The law enforcement agencies may dispose their enlarged power in 
an everyday manner and nobody would bother to question. The courts pass on 
sentence to those alleged by an once controversial criminal category in a professional 
and regular way. Old crimes and new crimes are calculated and reported in the crime 
rate reviews without inciting any sick feelings among members of public. The 
confrontation and its criminalisation have then been digested into the institutional set-
ups of the criminal justice system. 
The processes described above: the perception of trauma, the initial definition of 
situation, the strategic action-reaction dynamics, the redefinition of situation and the 
normalisation are five conceptually distinct processes. No one would be so naive to 
think that real things take place in that order. They are analytical concepts that 
establish links between conflict and consensus, structure and action and social forces 
^ d political institutions. They form a dynamic cyclic model of institutionalisation of 
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criminalisation against social actions as presented in Table 1.2 below. 
Table 1.2 Cvclic model of institutionalisation of criminalisation against social actions 
Crisis 1: Perceived Trauma (structural contradiction within the society) 
Definition of Situation 
---->Action and reaction 
—>Redefinition of situation 
__„>Normalisation 1 new institutional 
repertoire 
Crisis 2: Perceived Trauma < 1 
——> Definition of Situation 
——>Action and reaction 
—>Redefinition of situation 
Degree of Criminal Institutionalisation --->Normalisation > 
The model is not totally new. It has been presented by Allen in a less-elaborated 
but succinct manner. Allen says, "typically, laws proscribing political behavior are 
enacted in periods of strong public feeling, sometimes bordering on hysteria. 
Typically, too, such periods, although recurrent, are short-lived. Nothing is so dead as 
yesterday's red scare; but the steering of public attention away from the subject that 
earlier produced hysteria weakens the impetus to repeal or modify the legislation 
passed in a state of public excitement. The result is to confer a kind of immortality on 
such laws, making some available for continued application by an unobserved 
bureaucracy, and maintaining all for use in the next recurring period of public 
agitation. When the next period arrives, not only are the old laws likely to be applied, 
but they may also simulate new legislative adventures in repression and crime 
definition."64 
This concludes what have transpired through the literature review. We will 
eome back to the cyclic model again in the last concluding chapter. 
I 
^ Francis A Allen, The Crimes ofPolitics. op cit., p.48. 
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Chapter 2 Research Problem and Empirical Framework 
Ln the previous chapter I argue that criminalisation against social actions should 
be understood as a bundle of processes that are constituted by the continuous 
interaction between the state (the criminal justice system in particular) and the society 
(the participants of civil strifes in particular). I have advanced a five-step process 
model to conceptualise the processes of criminalisation. Now I would tum to the 
specific context of Hong Kong. This chapter aims to take the specificity of Hong 
Kong experience into consideration and import empirical constructs to the theoretical 
skeleton. 
One thing should be reminded at the outset: this paper is an exploratory one and 
as constrained by the scale of researches conducted in the following chapters I have no 
ambition to generalise the findings of this paper too much. This paper has nothing to 
do with discovering any general laws. Rather, specificities of Hong Kong experience 
will be the main focus here. The task given in the subsequent chapters is to arrive at a 
consistent interpretation of the institutional evolution of the criminal justice system in 
Hong Kong in respect of its interaction to incidents of social actions. We are going to 
have a diagnosis of the sedimentary-rock-liked institution that is accumulated from 
result of incidents of strifes during the last few decades ending 1980. The diagnosis 
aims to reorganise the pre-history of the present and to recap the values and meanings 
embedded in the institution.65 An interpretative approach does more than describing 
the account of the old days, but also attempts to put the hard facts into perspective, bi 
order to achieve this objective, we need some intermediate constructs that can bridge 
tiie gap between unorganised facts and the abstract theoretical perspective that I have 
advanced in the previous chapter. At the end of this chapter, three ideal-typical modes 
of criminalisation against civil strifes will be advocated, namely, the deport-mode, the 
societies-mode and the disorder-mode. Further data will be simplified and organised  
6^  see Max Weber, Methodology of Social Science. New York: Free Press, 1949, for a general 
discussion on difference between causation and interpretation. Note that the present paper operates on 
a different level of analysis than that ofWeberian framework (which is anchored on action analysis). 
35 
• 
around the conceptual boundaries of these three modes ofcriminalisation. • 
2.1 Research Method 
This thesis focuses on processes and institutions. This focus has its merit. 
Processes and institutions are relational concepts that link up individuals and events, 
therefore we can avoid reducing phenomena into specific intents of some agencies or 
organisations. We can put aside the subjective status of the actors concerned and 
focus on the pattem found in acts that have been performed, words that have been 
uttered and meanings that have been attached some objects. The institutional . 
dimension is a distinct level of analysis apart from individual intentions and actions.66 
Standardised survey research methods are not readily applicable to this approach. 
In order to reorganise past events, textual analysis is chosen instead. However, since 
it is an exploratory research, traditional content analysis is not of much help. Well 
designed content analysis can satisfy most research requirements in quantitative 
research. If explicitly stated hypotheses are at hand, content analysis can be used to 
convert texts into quantified variables which can further be used to test the hypotheses. 
The categories used in content analysis should be universally and apriorily defmed to 
prevent interpretative arbitrariness.67 . 
The setting of task given to this paper, however, does not satisfy the pre-• 
conditions of traditional content analysis. The problem lies mainly on categories 
construction, ln content analysis, a pre-test over a portion of the sample texts can help 
constructing and clarifying the use of categories and codes. But it is applicable if and 
66 One should note that institutional analysis differs from structuralist paradigm. Where structuralism 
attempts to reveal the hidden logic under the manifested phenomena, 1 do not assume there has any 
'meta' or 'deterministic' structure guiding the evolution of the criminal justice system. The meanings of 
the system are not hidden but embedded in the same phenomenological dimension of the institution 
itself, ln this sense 1 am deviated from most of the Marxist criminologists who have tried to reduce law 
and order as the tools of domination and intermediation between and across classes (or other 
deterministic social cIeverages). Along all the chapters of this thesis, the institutional set-ups are simply 
assumed to be having their own logic of operation. Albeit the risk of assuming a hyper-reality of a • -
mysterious institutional world, it can be justified by the fact that legal institution is installed with 
internal logic that accommodate the inherent inconsistencies. 
f^ 7 • 
Earl Babbie, Practice ofSocial Research. 7th ed., Balmont: Wadsworth, 1995，p.306-321. 
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only if the sample texts are fundamentally homogeneous which allows the same 
principle of coding to be used across the texts. An interpretative approach usually 
comes across various kinds of texts. It is very unlikely that a comprehensive scheme 
of coding categories can be developed at the outset. When the researcher meets new 
texts, twists and redefinitions of categories are always necessary. Therefore, the 
construction of categories for interpretative analysis is part of the process of the 
research from the beginning until end, not something that can be settled at the very 
beginning. Secondly, in order to quantify the categories, content analysis remarkably 
simplifies the qualitative difference among texts. Usually, only key word or at most 
single sentence can be constructed as a count for coding. Even words and sentences 
are further synchronised by developing a thesaurus. It will be too great a loss for 
interpretative analysis when the interpretation is mostly text-specific. 
Therefore, we have to look for a research method that can be used for qualitative 
analysis but at the same time dynamic and text-specific. The grounded theory 
advocated by Anselm Strauss is chosen as the research strategy of this r e s e a r c h . 6 8 
The grounded theory was developed by scholars mainly in ethnographic studies. 
It was designed to satisfy the need of fieldwork but can be applied to situations in 
which a definite and homogeneous sample for study carniot be easily identified. The 
most salient feature of grounded theory is that it does not take the theoretical 
constructs as given. The constructs also cannot be designed before data are made 
available. They have to be created, redefined and reorganised as the research proceeds. 
Procedurally，the grounded theory can be summarised into the following long 
quotation, "after some data collection and reflection in relation to a general issue of 
concem, the researcher generates 'categories' which fit the data. Further research is 
^dertaken until the categories are 'saturated', that is，the researcher feels assured 
about their meaning and importance. The researcher then attempts to formulate more 
general (and possibly more abstract) expressions of these categories, which will then 
68AnseUn L Strauss, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
l987. 
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be capable of embracing a wider range of objects. This stage may spur the researcher 
to further theoretical reflection and in particular he or she should by now be concerned 
with the interconnections among the categories involved and their generality. 
Hypotheses about links between categories will need to be formulated and tested in 
the field (or next set of text in my case). Links with other theoretical schemes are then 
explored and as further revisions ofhypotheses are carried out, as a result o fboth data 
collection and theoretical reflection, the emerging theory is tested once again in the 
field."69 
In this research, I would proceed from the general information first, that is, the 
reported crime rates of HK from the end of W.W.II to 1980. A preliminary 
interpretation and categorisation is tried which serves subsequently as a guide for 
another round ofdata collection. Police reports from post-war era up to 1980 are used 
to assist and confirm the interpretation gathered from observing changes in crime rates, 
to the second round I would survey the ordinances made during the same period in 
order to locate the legislative changes and organise the changes into the previously 
developed constructs. In the last round, a number of incidents of civil strifes are 
selected under the theoretical light and a careful reading of the official reports and 
newspaper clippings relating to these incidents are attempted. 
Before we proceed to the history between 1946 and 1980,1 have to explain why 
this period is chosen. The next two sections will try to accomplish this task by 
looking both from top-down (from the angle of colonial state building) and bottom-up 
(from the pattem of incidents of social unrest). The sections following them are 
devoted to a preliminary coding attempt. 
，Alan Biyman and Robert G Burgess, "Developments in qualitative data analysis: an introduction", in 
I Bryman and R G Burgess, edited, Analysing Qualitative Data. London: Routledge, 1994，p.2. See 
^Iso，Udo Kelle; Gerald Prein, edited. Computer-aided Qualitative Data Analvsis: Theorv. Methods； anri 
^actice, London: Sage, 1995, part 1. 
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2.2 HK history: looking from the top 
Obviously, the specificity of Hong Kong is her status as being a colony for over 
150 years. Being a colony means that the machinery of state is imported and imposed 
by an alien force. The configuration of the state-society relation in Hong Kong did not 
'evolve，endogenously. Before the imposition of UK's rule, Hong Kong had been 
virtually non-govemed albeit Hong Kong was nominally ruled under the Ching 
Dynasty. When UK force came to Hong Kong, the little island had only about 5000 
inhabitants. To compare with the now over 6 million Hongkongese, we can imagine 
how turbulent the process of community building has been. In the absence of an a 
prior state machine, the criminal justice system was also built from almost nothing. 
The evolution of the criminal justice system can therefore be taken as accompanying 
the colonial state building p roces s .70 
However, the interlocking process of colonial state building and criminal justice 
system building present a double problem in analytic terms. That is, we have to locate 
the state building process first before we can locate the specific function the criminal 
justice system is serving in state building. Although there was a definite date ofwhich 
Hong Kong acquired the status of a 'colony', it does not mean that the colonial state 
was established right at that moment. State building is itself a continuous process. To 
recap my previous argument that criminalisation is also a bundle of processes, we are 
faced with the problem of matching two categories of processes and exposed to the 
risk that we simply cannot anchor the research. 
Austin Turk has provided a theoretical framework that can fit the criminal 
justice system into the process of state building. State building process is basically a 
ProcMs in which power turns into authority. It is a "historical movement toward 
realisation of the following conditions: military dominance, established jurisdiction, 
70Some scholars tried to argue that the notion that Hong Kong was a barren island when UK came in 
g=s a myth created by the colonists. They said Hong Kong was at that time under the protection of 
hmg dynasty which set up militao' bases in the territory. However, there has no evidence that the 
society of Hong Kong was at that time penetrated and policed by any effective state machine. For two 
1 , ^ ofview, see Frank Welsh, A U m r y ofHong Kong, Glasgow: HaperColins, 1994 and 余繩武’ 
劉存窝編，十九世紀的香港，香港:麒麟，1993. 
institutionalised policing, demographic continuity, and ideological hegemony." 71 
Military dominance is the universal premise for state building. Hong Kong 
Island was ceded formally to UK in 1843, 72 but it was not until 1898 when UK 
acquired the present boundary of the territory (ceded or leased). It is hard to judge if 
the jurisdiction of the state had been fully established all over the territory at the 
moment of receiving New Territory in 1898 because the traditional community 
structure and legal relations were to a certain degree left intact in the countryside.73 
The court and the police team were established in the colony early (1843), but their 
jurisdiction might have covered only the Victoria part.74 Military dominance and the 
established jurisdiction were interrupted during Japanese occupation. When Japan 
surrendered, the state machinery in Hong Kong was under the command of the 
military authority o f U K before returning to the Hong Kong government. 
The next condition of state building is institutionalizing police. Although both 
policing and military dominance have authorized coercion over the territory, they are 
essentially different in terms of the relationship between the state and the society. In 
the words of Turk, "occupation is characterized by maximal social distance between 
controllers and controlled, primary reliance upon the threat and use of deadly 
violence.....ki contrast, policing is characterized by minimal social distance, primary 
reliance upon techniques of 'coercive persuasion' employed by individuals or small 
units trained to minimize the use of violence, extensive and intensive monitoring, and 
a major concem with legitimation. Occupation confirms power; policing transforms 
71 Austin Turk, Political Criminalitv: the Defiance and the Defence of Authority, op.cit.. p.l7. 
^^  Although the British Plenipotentiary, Captain Charles Elliot physically occupied HK in 1841，the 
Treaty ofNanking, which formally ceded HK Island to UK, was signed in 1843. See G B Endacott, A 
History ofHong Kone. HK: Oxford, rev. edition, 1973, p26-34. 
乃 It was a conscious choice on the part of Britain to keep the English and Chinese in HK separated. 
The first government ofHK, Sir Henry Pottinger was instructed in 1943 by the British Colonial Office 
that, "the Chinese in HK were to have Chinese law and custom, with a Chinesejury as resident in HK." 
G B Endacott, ibid., p.41. 
74see Norman J Miners, "The Localisation of the Hong Kong Police Force 1842-1947", in Joumal of 
toerial and Commonwealth History, vol.l8, no.3, 1990，p.296-315. 
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power into authority "75(italic mine) 
View in this light, the police in Hong Kong before W.W.II actually behaved 
more like an internal military than police in the ordinary sense. It is in this sense that 
the colonial police was usually be described as para-military76 The pre-war police 
were composed mainly of aliens and were heavily armed. Their relationship with the 
community was minimal.77 It seemed that the European community and the Chinese 
community were policed by two separated systems. In 1878, a Chinese public 
meeting was organized at the first time during the colonial history to express Chinese 
views on the problem of deteriorating law and order conditions. The Chinese elites 
were received coolly by the British community. It was argued that, "in retrospect, the 
colonists justified exclusion on the ground that the meeting had been called to 
consider the rising tide of crime and lawlessness in the colony, by which they meant 
crime committed by the Chinese against the 'foreign devils'. Therefore a determined 
reluctance to allow the participation of the Chinese in general was in this instance 
heightened because the Chinese were held responsible for l awlessness . ' ' 78 Law and 
order was characterised heavily by racial discrimination. The police function was 
installed to protect the pre ponderous race against the trouble caused by the subjected 
race, rather than to provide civilian protection colony-wide. This conception was 
reinforced when the Sikh police proved effective in putting down strikes and labor 
riots during late 19 century among Hong Kong Chinese. The Sikh were armed with 
rifles and drilled and were never hesitated to fire on trouble-makers. To compare, the 
Chinese police officers behaved 'badly' in their reluctance of fighting the 1922 
ne 
�A u s t i n Turk, Political Criminality, op cit., p.22. 
冗 For theoretical exposure of paramilitarianism, see Mike Brogden, "The Emergence of the Police--the 
colonial dimension", in British Journal of Criminology, vol.27, no.l, 1987, p.4-14; P A J Waddington, 
1987，"Towards Paramilitarism? Dilemmas in policing civil disorder”，ibid., p.3746; Tony Jefferson, 
1987, "Beyond Paramilitarism", ibid., p.47-53. 
77 
see Lowe and McLaughlin, "Sir John Pope Hennessy and the *Native Race Craze’： colonial 
government in Hong Kong 1877-1882", in the Joumal of Imperial and Commonwealth Historv. vol.20, 
no.2，1992, p.223-47. The early police was characterised by its brutality. 
78 ibid, p.233 
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Seaman strikes with determinations. 79 Even in the immediate post-war era, the 
function of the police had still been far from that of a civilian force. The first post-
war police commissioner D W Madntosh wrote an article in the Police College 
Magazine in 1952 describing the work of Hong Kong police that, "nothing is what is 
seems, and the policeman, responsible for both immigration and public order, has to 
be something of a politician and diplomat. He has, as well, to be something of a 
soldier and sailor to fulfill his intimate role with the Fighting Services"80(italic mine) 
The idea of community police was basically inapplicable to the context ofHong Kong. 
Besides, until late 1960s, the policing function in many areas of Hong Kong was 
partially fulfilled by the District Watches rather than the colonial police. District 
Watch was the traditional Chinese institution (but having some recognition from the 
colonial state) that combined quasi-judicial and law-enforcement functions. There 
were incidents that when met with deteriorating crime condition, local Chinese elites 
sought to expand the District Watch function rather than resort to the colonial 
government. Judged by Turk's criterion of the 'minimal distance', the District Watch 
looked more like indigenous community police in Hong Kong. The colonial police 
could not be said as institutionalized before it could replace the District Watch 
function, which was not accomplished until mid-1960s.8i 
All of these point to one fact. Although colonial police force was there in Hong 
Kong well before W.W.II, it was not an institutionalized one. It looks somehow 
strange that a colony could be ruled without an institutionalized police for nearly a 
hundred years. But if we compare the development of the Hong Kong police system 
with that of British, it is not that astonishing. When Hong Kong Island was ceded to 
UK, UK had its first cosmopolitan police for only 6 years .82 Policing was itself a very 
乃 Miners, "The localisation ofHong Kong Police Force", op cit. p.307-9. 
80 quoted in Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Police. London: Max Parrish, 1952, p.87. 
8lH. J. Lethbridge, "The District Watch Committee : The Chinese Executive Council of Hong Kong，， 
in the Joumal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Roval Aisatic Societv. vol.ll，1971，p.116-141. 
幻 For an overview of the relationship between the British police and its colonies, see David M 
Anderson, David KilIingway, "Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: policing the empire, 1830-
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modem phenomenon. It was not until early 1940s when the British government tried 
to reorganize the colonial police service with standardized criteria. Most of the 
colonies of UK had their elaborated (although might not be the first piece) Police 
Force Ordinance in 1940s, and so was Hong Kong. Combining with the fact that 
ruling a colony was not identical to ruling her homeland, all colonial police system 
evolved in particular trajectory. Jeffries has proposed a three phases model for 
colonial police transition. "The first phase was one of more or less improvised 
arrangements for securing the basic essentials of law and order..…The second phase 
was the establishment of semi-military constabulary forces modeled upon the RIC [the 
Msh police] and organized mainly with a view to the suppression of crimes of 
violence and mass outbreaks against the peace The third phase of police 
development in the Colonies is the modem trend towards the conversion of these 
semi-military constabularies into civilian police forces, following in most essentials 
the British pattem of police organization, but still retaining certain continuing 
supplementary functions of a military charac te r . "83 It is exactly the para-military 
character of the colonial police makes it very difficult to be really institutionalized. 
The gradual institutionalization of police in Hong Kong can be looking at how 
the police functions were diffused to all over the colony and whether the personnel of 
the police force were manned and mixed eventually with locals.^ Although when 
reorganised in 1946, the police had been already composed mainly of Cantoneses, the 
recruitment of Chinese policemen was not a conscious policy before that time. After 
the war, many pre-war Chinese policemen simply disappeared and quite a number of 
expatriate police officers went back to UK. British government found a general 
difficulty in recruiting enough young men joining the force all over her territories, 
including the British police as well. The trouble water in India made further reliance 
' 
1942”，in their edited work, Policing the Empire. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991，p.l-
15 • 
83 Charles Jefferies, The Colonial Police, op cit., p.32-3. 
fti 
Mark S Gaylord, Harold Traver, "Colonial Policing and the Demise ofBritish Rule in Hong Kong", 
lsigmational Joumal ofthe Sociology ofLaw. no.23, 1995, p.23>43. 
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參 
on Punjah and Shik police suspic ious .85 As a remedy, standardized police training and 
promotion arrangements were introduced. From that time on, local people in the 
colonies were recruited and trained to replace the original 'aliens policing aliens' 
policy.86 
That is why I choose the immediate post-war era as the starting point for my 
research. In 1946 the criminal justice system was only a child if measured in terms of 
its institutionalisation into the colonial polity. It gradually gained sophistication in the 
1960sand 70s.87 
• 
The third condition, the concept of demographic continuity, describes not only 
the number of the people moving in and out of the territory. It deals with the problem 
of boundary of a state as well. No community can be built without 'confining' a 
steady population and providing conditions for which the population reproduces itself 
within the given territory. To confine people within a boundary means physically the 
border has to be drawn and patrolled; legally the populace have to be classified and 
registered. Hong Kong, as often been told, was a refugee society. The population was 
highly in flux, The situation of the population in Hong Kong at the tum of the end of 
W.W.II is given below: "Before 1941, there was almost complete freedom of 
• 
movement across the international frontier with China. No records of migration were 
kept other than those under the Asiatic Emigration Ordinance, which regulated the 
passage of indentured Chinese laborers to Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The 
censuses taken in 1921 and 1931 recorded large proportions of men relative to women, 
particularly in the younger age groups. This was the result of the inflow of male 
niigrants, many of whom retumed later to their native villages..…Li April, 1949，free 
85Miners，"The Localisation ofthe Hong Kong Police Force 1842-1947", op cit, p.311. 
86 
see_Hong Knno Rppr>rt lQ46 Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer, p.6. It was under this 
context that the Hong Kong government stated, "with the intention of reducing as soon as possible the 
jjumber of subordinate European officers in the Police Department the number of local officers has • 
j®^ increased. Facilities by way of scholarships in the UK and elsewhere to enable suitable persons of 
Qeal domicile to obtain additional qualifications to fit them for his;her posts have been made 
available..:...，， 
87 
5½ Mark S Gaylord, Harold Traver, "The Royal Hong Kong Police", in Harold Traver, Jon Vagg, 
ed.，1994, Crime and Justice in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: OUP, 1994，p.98-110. 
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entry into Hong Kong was stopped and immigrant controls were introduced."88 It is 
pretty obvious that before the W.W.II the Hong Kong society was completely rootless. 
Few people bother to have permanent family lives here and the populace did not 
reproduce its own younger generation in the territory. 
When the population is defined and stabilized, then all kinds of internal 
classification will be made. Criminal justice system is usually used to qualify the 
boundaries of such classifications. Who have to be received and deported? Who 
should be identified and supervised? Who needed to be detained and confined? ki 
order to regulate a stabilized population, the criminal justice system flourishes. Not 
only laws are made to defme boundaries and sub-boundaries, bistitutionally, internal 
differentiation of the criminal justice system takes place to monitor the boundaries. 
The implication of this argument will be clearer when we come to the comparison of 
different modes of criminalisation at the end ofthis chapter. 
Criminal justice system is the tool for the state to penetrate, differentiate and 
regulate a society. Therefore it plays an important part in the process of state building. 
I have tried to reorganize the colonial state building processes in Hong Kong by using 
Turk's model. It would be pretty clear now the post W.W.II era was the real starting 
point for the criminal justice system in Hong Kong to start institutionalising. The next 
section looks at the same period from another angle, the angle of social turmoil. 
2.3 Viewing from bottom 
Recall the framework I have described in chapter one. I have argued that the 
beginning of the change in criminal justice system is usually a traumatic experience 
perceived by the state. This section tries to locate the particular impact of traumatic 
experiences in Hong Kong. 
If trauma means encountering some crises, then crises erupted several times in 
the history of Hong Kong. Ian Scott attempted to reframe the history of Hong Kong 
• — — 
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into successive crisis experiences in order to explain the political changes in Hong 
Kong, His analysis can be tabulated as follow, 
Table 2.1 Legitimacy Crisis experienced in Hong Kong 
Period Origin of crisis Government response  
Beginning ofthe colony Merchants complained to The Hong Kong government 
London that Hong Kong always care for the Value for 
government did not serve their money’ of its governance 
_ interest  
1890s Merchants and traditional Absorbed those elites into 
Chinese elites sought to participate government • 
directly in decision-making  
1960s Riois and disturbance Incorporating local level 
. heralded by the lower classes elites into new institutions and 
expanding social policy outputs 
1980 90s Transfer of sovereignty ？  
(tabulated from p.37-8)89 
Among these crises, it should be noted that the first two were crises within the 
elite classes. Only in the third one we see a direct confrontation between the state and 
the society. The first two crises had been overcome by restructuring the decision-
making setups of the state (basically including more objectors into the Executive 
Council and Legislative Council), the third one was defmed as broadly a matter of 
general law and order crisis. Scott has taken notes of some of the government • 
responses to the third crisis in those aspects like changes in local administration and • 
welfare policies, but he failed to note the changes in the criminal justice system as a 
response to the crisis of law and order. He has argued that the 1967 riots indirectly 
help establishing the creditability of the police among Hong Kong people. The police 
Was then further institutionalized after the fight over police corruption in the 70s had 
been completed. Although his observation is hardly disputable, Scott has not paid 
enough attention to the restructuring of police power after the 67 riots and therefore 
the confrontations between the police and the social activists in the 70s have not been 
mentioned at all in his analysis. The picture painted by Scott denotes the pre-67 era as • 
^onflictual but everything suddenly died down in the 70s. 
"^"^   
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Scott may be right if we read through the Hong Kong government reports over 
the years. For most of the time in the 70s, the annual reports characterized the social 
conditions in Hong Kong as free of social unrests. Incidents that attracted the 
attention of the government were only the labor movements in late 40s, the double 
tens incidents in mid-50s and the 1966-7 disturbances. 
For sure, Hong Kong in the 70s was relatively peaceful if peacefulness is 
measured in terms of incidents of street bombs and political murders. However, if we 
• 
measure the peacefulness in terms of protests against the authority, then the assertion 
that the 70s was more peaceful than the 60s needs further qualifications. 
Before the 70s, most social protests were organised on labor issues. Hong Kong 
experienced large scale labor movements in the 1920s. They died down during the 
war against the Japanese but emerged again at the end of the 40s. Social unrests that 
took place from 1946 to 67 were either mainly in the form of strike, or direct and 
indirect participation of labor organizations was involved. Did this landscape change 
after 1967? 
Table 2.2 records the number of man-day loss during the years. Except for the 
• 
few immediate years after W.W.II, the whole period from early 50s to 70s is 
characterized by ups and downs rather than a sharp decrease after the late 60s. If we 
look at the first column of number of strikes, the early and late 70s witnessed more 
strikes than previous years. 
How come then have we got the impression that most labor unrests took place 
before the 70s? The third column of the table tells the reason. If we calculate the 
intensity of strikes, which is measured in terms of man-day loss per strike, against the 
same period, we will find that all peaks of labor movements took place before the 70s. 




Table 2.2 Number of Strikes. Man-dav Loss and Intensity of Strikes (1946-80) 
Year Number Number of man-day Intensity of the strike*c 
of strikes*a loss*b  
~~ 1946 16 _ 124139 — 7759 
~~ 1947 10 — 278692 27869 
一 1948 — 13 79145 — 6088 
一 1949 — 12 182405 “ 15200 
195 0 22 ~ -
1951 12 ~" 53436 4453 
1952 -- 一 -- -
一 1953 2 一 137000 — 68500 
— 1954 ~ -- 2235 -
一 1955 10 — 33567 3357 
一 1956 ~~ 10 30052 3005 
1957 2 — 60540 — 30270 
一 1958 4 6999 1750 
• ~~ 1959 6 4500 750 
一 1960 29 54062 1864 
~~ 1961 — 10 29000 2900 
~~ 1962— - — 11831 --
~~ 1963 19 87199 4589 
“~~ 1964 16 — 46581 — 2911 
“ ~ 1965 7 62249 8893 
“~~ 1966 13 24355 — 1873 
7 1967 12 22525 1877 
~ 1968 24 一 8432 ~ 351 
: 1969 27 — 39911 — 1478 
~ 1970 46 ~~ 47243 1027 
: 1971 — 42 25600 610 
r 1972 46 “ 41834 909 
~ 1973 47 56691 1206 
二 1974 22 一 10708 — 487 ‘ 
IT 1975 17 一 17600 1035 “ 
Z7" 1976 15 ~~ 4751 317 
~ 1977 38 — 10814 — 285 “ 
: 1 9 7 8 51 ~~ 30927 606 
二 1979 46 39743 864 
Z T 1980| 37 21069 569 
Data from Hong Kong Report, various years. 
Occasion holes due to unreliable figures. 
*a. Data of 1946-1951，1961 from Lui，T L, and Kung, K S，(1985) 
*b. Data of 1946-1951 from Lui, T L, and Kung, K S, (1985) 
*c. Intensity of strike is measured as number of man-day loss per strike. 
However, if it is true, then the difference between the pre-67 and post-67 periods 
should not be characterized simply by turmoil vs peace. Strikes took place, with no 
l ^ s frequency in the 70s. Therefore, co-optive measures like expansion of welfare 
service could not have been effective in preventing strikes from taking place. We can 
Qnly say that the strikes in the 70s had been more self-restrained or constrained 
because in average they last for a shorter time or they involved fewer participants. 
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The difference in intensity implies that it was other factors that were effective to 
create a more peaceful 1970s, that is，when the strikes took place, they either 
proceeded with an self-instituted order that was absent in the 60s, or they were more 
skillfully handled after their last peak in the late 60s. 
The picture is more complicated if we bring other urban social actions into the 
picture. Labor movements were the main form of social action before late 60s, but 
those in the 70s were mixed. Lui and Kung have argued that when the labor 
movements generally 'subsided', the other type which can be characterized as housing 
movements generally emerged. After coding from the newspaper clippings, they have 
concluded that, in statistical terms, "1969 and 1977 are obvious dividing lines. 
Although the 1966 Kowloon riots can be taken as the first large scale urban social 
movement, but it was not until 1969 when this kind of social movements took place 
frequently. On the other hand, since 1977，the number of urban social movements 
increased into a new high Overall speaking, social confrontation concerning 
housing took place about once a year before 1969 which can hardly be characterized 
as movement. However, after 1969，the picture significantly changed ."90 (translation 
mine) The consecutive changes in the labor movement and housing movement have 
been further confirmed by Cheung and Louie's study of social actions during the 
period of 1975 to 1982.91 Can we still say that the Hong Kong society after 1967 has 
been basically more peaceful? Yes and no. Yes because all these social actions did 
not develop into an uncontrollable riots like that in the 1967. No because social 
confrontations with the authority took place in no less frequency. This 
characterization is important. Because intense social confrontations can be handled 
with ad hoc response，frequent social actions call for continuous surveillance and 
policing. The legislative and institutional responses of the criminal justice system to 
ad hoc social upheavals have to be institutionalized or transformed into continuous 
90呂大樂，襲啓聖，城市縱橫，香港：廣角鏡，1982,p.61-5. 





practices. The corresponding changes in the criminal justice system, particularly 
changes in policing style, will be better explored in chapter four. 
2.4 Crime trend in Hong Kong 
Until now we have not yet established the possible interactions between the 
criminal justice system and the social actions that took place in Hong Kong. This 
section tries to accomplish that by reviewing the official data on crime rates. First, I . 
will like to see if the incidents of social strifes coincided with conventional crime 
參 
waves. If yes, then the changes in the criminal justice system cannot be attributed to 
the specificities of social strifes. If no, then the impetus of change in criminal justice 
system during and after the strifes can be potentially taken as responses to such strifes. 
The second task in this section is to identify exactly what kinds of crime categories 
were corresponding to the social upheavals, so that we can take them as clues for 
further pursuit. 
Using official data on crime rates is not without troubles. The simplest reason is 
that we cannot take the reported crime rates as representing the 'real intensity' of • 
crime within a given society. Generally speaking, officially reported crime rates are 
參 
determined by the interaction of several factors: 1. Categorisation of crimes itself, 
which is not necessarily uniform and consistent; 2. Police attention. Police may not 
pay uniform attention to all sections of the society consistently. Their shift of 
attention may (for most of the time) push up the number of reported crime during 
certain intervals; 3. The public attention to crimes. The public may or may not 
classify some incidents as crime or even they know there are crimes they may not dare 
to report to the police when the reporting process seems embarrassing or costly to 
them. Therefore, we cannot assert that a change in the crime rate is the result of the . 
change in amount of criminal behaviors or that of a changed classification or attitudes • 
towards such behavior. It is generally agreed that victim survey may serve better for 
assessing the intensity of crimes. However, the Hong Kong government conducted its 




Even so, it does not mean that official data are not useful at all. The point is we 
have to be very careful in interpreting the data. As argued above, the numerical data 
of the official crime rates are products of the interaction among criminal 
categorisation, police attention and public attitude, Traditionally, criminologists 
calculate crime rates per 100 000 heads of the population to indicate crime trends. 
Here, we maintain the position that the real crime intensity cannot be meaningfully 
distinguished from other intervening and subjective variables. We will take the 
reported crime rates as the manifestations of the social constructs produced by the 
interactions of the above-stated factors. 
Another problem related to the use of official data is the fact that such data were 
not reported and organised in a longitudinally consistent manner. Sometimes new 
classifications of crimes emerged and thereby creating problems on the comparability 
of the longitudinal data. To remedy this problem, I will use, if possible, only the 
stable crime categories for comparison. If the crime categories were not consistent 
enough I will select a stable brand of crime as 'representative' instead of using the 
whole class of crimes. 
Before 1954，crimes are classified according to two criteria, first their 
seriousness, second, the substantial nature of the crime. For the later, only crimes 
against property and those against persons were reported in categories. All the others 
were put either in the category of minor or miscellaneous crime, bi 1954, more 
elaborated crime categories emerged. Beside the original categories of crime against 
property and person, four new categories were reported, namely the crime against 
lawfiil authority, the crime against morality, the crime against penal code and the last 
one the crime against local laws. Given the subject matter of this thesis, attention 
Would be paid to the crime against lawful authority. This category was made up 
mainly of, by proportion, the crime of unlawful society and assembly. In 1961, a new 
sub-category of crime against public order was differentiated within the category of 
crime against lawful order. Thereafter, crime of unlawful society made up an 
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independent sub-crime. This classification was used, although not presented in the 
same manner, up to 1980. 
The crime against morality was composed of mainly sexual offences. Once 
derived, this category was by and large stable throughout the years. Such a category of 
crimes touches on many social mores and therefore it is a good indicator for locating 
to what extent the members of the society is willing to tum to the authority for 
assistance (in other words, their willingness to recognise the authority as their 
authority). Crime rates on sexual offences are less affected by the selective attention 
of public authority because the total crime rate is basically dependent on the initiative 
of self-identified victims. Licreased policing for such crimes would not have changed 
the crime rate significantly. 
The category of the crime against penal code is interesting because of its high 
instability. When it was first included in the 1955 police report, it made up of 
basically unrelated crimes such as conspiracy, possession of arms and corruption. The 
most eye-catching subcategory was the crime concerning breach of deportation which 
made up 90 percent of the number of crimes in this category. Next year, this sub-
category was extracted to make up a new class of offence, namely, the 'deportation 
offences'. The category of crime against penal code was then replaced by the residual 
categoty of 'other serious crime'. However, in the 1961 report, the category of 
'deportation offences' suddenly disappeared and was collapsed into 'other serious 
crime'. 
Crimes against local laws included most of the minor offences. It was later 
separated from the previous categories to become another large class. I will not pay 
attention to this class due to its irrelevance for my thesis. 
These ups and downs of crime categories are important not because of the 
quantity of criminal instances within each categories, but their qualitative implications. 
The change in categorisation either marked a moment of emergence of a new piece of 
laws (or new amendment to existing laws) which created a new criminal category, or a 
change in the attention of public authority to various kinds of potential criminal 
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activities. Either implications are important clues for further interpretation. 
To summarise, the change in criminal categories in Hong Kong during 1945 to 
1980 is as follow: 
Table 2.3 Changes in Major Crime Categories in HK during 1945-80 
Before 1954 1954-5 l_956 I % ] 1980 
1 .Crime against Property > 
2.Crime against Person > 
3.Crime against 
Lawful Authority: 
3.1.Unlawful society and assembly ——> 3.11.Unlawful society 
3.12.Against Public Order 
4.Crime against Morality > 





l.Other Serious > 
Offences 
Now we can focus on the quantitative change of the above categories. 
Crimes against property and persons are the two categories that can be used to 
indicate the general law and order conditions. First, they are technically the only two 
categories that remain stable during the years under investigation. Second, the nature 
of such crimes are the most socially visible one and are embedded with the least 
psychological barriers for the victims to report to police. In certain sense, they are 
niore 'objective' than the other categories because their figures should be less affected 
by the perceptions of the police and the policed. 
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Table 2.4 Relative Number of Crime Against Person and Property H948-80) 
Total Number of Relative Change Total Number of Crime Relative Change 
Serious Assault per (1955 as base) Against Property per (1956 as base)  
100000 person*a 100000 person*b  
1948 ; [ ^ -86% 
1949 ‘ 0 ^ : ^i8% 
1950 4.81 -61% 
1951 5^ 94 ^ 5 ^ 
1952 6.14 -50% 
1953 9.21 -25% 
1954* “ 14.00 — 13% “ 
1955 Tl34 0% 
1956 15.32 一 24% — 617.5 0% 
1957 “ 13.01 6% 454.7 1 ^ 
1958 “ 14.97 21% 381.3 Isi% 
^ 1959 14.79 — 20% 一 335.6 ^ ^ 
^ 1960 18.60 — 51% — 342.6 lE% 
1961 22.46 — 82% — 343.7 Z^% 
1962 “ 20.65 67% 306.2 “ 1 ^ 
_ 1963 “ 18.73 52% 286.6 “ 1 ^ 
:1964 26.01 ~ 111% — 313.3 ： ^ 
1965 “ 25.09 103% 365.7 1 ^ 
1 1966 “ 27.98 ~~ 127% 364.0 ： ^ 
1967 ‘ 28.16 128% 352.6 “ ~• 1^3% 
1968 26.31 — 113% — 307.2 I50% 
=1969 32.48 — 163% 一 341.9 ： ^ 
^ 1970 33.60 一 172% 367.2 ： ^ 
r 1971 38.95 216% — 391.4 • ^7% 
1 1972 “ 43.96 ~~ 256% 350.1 ： ^ 
^ 1973 59.32 381% 480.6 ： ^ 
r 1974 97.95 — 694% — 540.2 TT^^ 
1 1975 “ 106.76 766% 5 0 i l ：?8% 
1 1976 “ 103.02 一 735% 530.6 ：？^  
I 1977 110.34 — 795% 一 530.2 I T ^ 
: 1 9 7 8 110.29 794% 6 ^ T% 
: 1 9 7 9 “ 115.81 — 839% 696.3 H% 
了 1980 122.65 894% 8^ 2 3^ % 
*a. Data from Hong Kong Police Report, various years. Crime of serious assault was used to represent 
the crime against person because total number of the latter could not be safely obtained after 1976. 
Estimated from the years where concrete data are available, serious assault contributes to around 75% 
oftotal cases in the whole category. 
*b. Data from Ian Dobinson, "The Measurement of Crime", in Mark S Gaylord and Harold Traver, ed., 
topduction to the Hong Kong Criminal Justice Svstem (Hong Kong: HKU), 1994, p.20. , , 
Because the immediate post-war data are not available, we can only plot a partial 
eurve starting from approximately 1948 and 50 respectively. According to the textual 
description of the Hong Kong reports, the years 1946-7 were not extraordinary 
haunted by crime problem. The total crime against property actually decreased 
gradually since 1950 and started to climb up again in about 1962 and did not increase 
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up to the 1950 level until late 70s. In the 70s, crimes against property increased 
remarkably which contributed to a real crime wave. 
The changes in the crime against person followed a similar pattem. Despite of 
the fact that the turmoil in the 50s and 60s had led to some incidents of deaths and 
serious assault, Hong Kong was relatively peaceful before 70s even thought the figure 
kept on climbing since the end of W.W.IL However, if we take the year 1955 figure 
of crime against person per capita as baseline, which magnitude is about double that 
of 1948，the figure increases by a bit more than one time in 1965，but 7 more times in 
1975. Generally speaking, Hong Kong experienced conventional crime wave in the 
wake o f the 70s. When large scale social strifes took place in the 50s and 60s, Hong 
Kong was actually relatively free of threat of conventional criminals. 
Table 2.5: Relative Number of Crime Against Moralitv (1955-76) 
Year Total Number of Crime against Public Relative Change 
Morality per 100000 person  
1955 3 ^ 0% 
:1956 3.399 — r^5% 
j957 — 4.469 n % 
j958 “ 5.905 一 48% 
:1959 5.292 一 ^ 
:1960 7.384 — ^ 
j961 9.815 146% “ 
]962 ‘ 7.291 — ^ 
j963 ‘ 5.859 — m 
1 ^ 7.424 86% _ 
j965 9.724 — M m 
j966 10.778 — r m 
I g 6 7 _ 10.676 167% 
j968 13.118 一 228% 
Ig69 19.209 3 ^ 
1 ^ 19.647 “ 3 ^ 0 
I g Z L _ 19.954 400% _ 
1 ^ 30.998 676% _ 
]2]2. 31.285 683% 
i ^ 33.715 744% 
i ^ 36.279 8 m 
j ^ 6 37.855 - 848% 
Source: Hong Kong Police Report, various year. 
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If the above two categories are more 'objective' kinds of crime, then as I said 
before, the crime against morality should be the one which is most affected by 
subjective conception of the victims or the policed. 
However, the changes in the crime against morality did not contrast a lot to the 
two categories of crime described above. Due to unavailability of reliable data, only 
those of 1955-76 were shown above. The peak of crime wave of this category, like 
the previous two, took place in the early 70s instead of 50s or 60s. 
What is really extraordinary is the change in the crime against lawful authority. 
While for this category of crime, like other categories, increased remarkably from 70s 
on，it has two more peaks (therefore having a 'W' shape) than the others (as shown by 
table 2.6). 
These two peaks of these crimes took place at around mid-50s and 60s 
respectively. If we know that the double-tenth Kowloon disturbance took place in 
1956 and 1966-7 were characterised by riots, then these result should not be too 
astonishing. It just confirms our previous thought that the crime against lawful 
authority was the one which categorised incidents of civil strifes. However, the table 
suggests something more. The average number of crime against lawful authority 
jumped in 1966-7 and retumed to the 1965 level in 1968. It fitted well with our 
suggestion that it might be so due to the 1966-67 riots. The 1966-67 unrests were 
contingent events and naturally they invited contingent responses from the state. 
However, the average crime against lawful authority following the jump in 1956 
Kowloon disturbance did not 'clam down，in the following year. Rather, it kept on 
increasing and retumed to the 'normal' level only in 1960. It should be reminded that 
all other categories of crime in 1957-9 were relatively at the low level. If the category 
of crime peaked in 1956 it could only be responses to the Kowloon disturbance. Why 
these two waves of urban disturbance (in 1956 and 1966-7 respectively) invited quite 
different response from the criminal justice system? 
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Table 2.6: Relative Number of Crimes against Lawful Authority (1949-80) 
Number of Crimes Against Lawfol Authority Relative Change Relative Relative 
per 100000 persons (1955=1) Change Change 
(1962=1) (1955=1) 
Unlawful society Public Total Unlawful society Public order Total  
order  
1949 “ 1.3 -57% “ “ “ 
— 1 9 5 0 ‘ 0.3 -91% “ “ “ 
1951 0.2 — — -92% 
— 1 9 5 2 “ 1.5 -51% “ -
~ ~ 1953 ‘ 0.0 -100% “ “ 
1954 “ 1.3 — -59% 
— 1 9 5 5 “ 3.1 6.1 0% “ 0% -
— 1 9 5 6 31.3 32.2 912% ‘ 431% “ 
1957 “ 64.2 — 66.7 1976% ~~999% 
1958 “ 119.5 ~ 122.0 — 3762% ~ r 9 0 9 % 
1959 117.6 118.1 — 3702% 1846% 
1960 — 24.7 一 “ 25.3 — 698% ~ ~ 316% 
1961 ‘ 9.5 ~ 12.9 — 207% ~ 1 1 3 % 
一 1962 “ 6.8 0.1 11.4 119% 0% “ 89% 
1963 5.9 0.3 — 11.5 89% 142% ~ " 8 9 % 
1964 “ 7.3 0.7 15.2 135% 468% 151% “ 
1965 5.7 0.7 ~ 14.4 ~ 85% 478% 138% 
1966 “ 4.6 22.9 — 33.6 — 50% 19613% 453% 
1967 “ 2.8 41.7 一 49.0 一 -8% 35768% 708% 
~ ~ 1968 “ 7.0 1.6 15.7 125% 1244% 159% _ 
1969 “ 17.2 1.4 — 24.2 — 456% 1072% ~ 2 9 8 % 
~~~ 1970 “ 22.9 2.1 31.0 642% 1693% 一 410% 
1971 “ 25.2 3.8 ~ 34.3 — 714% ~ 3 1 6 1 % ~ 4 6 5 % 
‘~~ 1972 27.5 7.6 42.6 788% 6465% 603% — 
1973 ‘ 37.3 17.5 ~ 65.3 — 1107% ~ f 4 9 9 5 % 977% 
“ ~ 1974 “ 72.3 26.2 — 110.4 — 2237% ~~22441% 1719% 
~~" 1975 “ 96.6 28.2 136.3 3024% 24188% — 2146% 
1976 “ 91.3 30.4 — 138.6 — 2852% ~ 2 6 0 8 0 % 2183% 
“ ~ 1977 “ 63.0 14.6 ~ — 1936% ~~f2489% 
“~~" 1978 ‘ 39.7 14.3 — — 1183% ~ f 2 2 0 8 % 
~ 1979 ~ 26.6 — 14.4 ‘ “ 760% 1 2 2 5 2 % ~ 
‘ ~ 1980 24.3 16.5 686% 14111% 
Source: Hong Kong Police Report, various year. 
Further breakdown of the crime against lawful authority suggests something 
interesting. Before 1961, this category included basically the crime of 'unlawful 
society and assembly'. It is composed numerically mainly of two sub-crimes, namely 
the crime of unlawful society and the crime against public order after 1961. At this 
point we do not know if the unlawful society and assembly approximated the 
numerical addition of the latter two sub-groups or not. Sufficient to say, the pre-1961 
process of criminalisation of civil strifes differed from the post-1961 one. Further, the 
1967 riots were responded to by mainly creating the sub-category of crime against 
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public order. In order to distinguish between these two phases, I will characterise the 
• 
one around 1956 as a 'societies-mode，and the 1967 one as a 'disorder-mode' of 
criminalisation. Their substantive difference will be clearer when the paper 
proceeds.92 
I use the concept of 'mode' here to denote possible alternative criminalisation 
processes that can be used to cope with similar circumstances. It suggests some 
degree of arbitrariness in criminalisation process. The arbitrariness lies in the fact that 
all human interactions are multi-faceted, it is up to the one who defines the interaction 
to highlight or ignore some of these facets. If a man is killed, what is the 'fact, o f th i s 
killing? If he is executed because the court has passed death sentence on him, he is 
• 
doomed to death. If he is shot when resisting arrest, he is lawfully killed. If he is a 
pedestrian killed by the misfired of police, it is a tragedy. If no state authority 
involves in the killing, he may be killed by other's lawful defence; or he is killed 
unlawfully through negligence; and finally he may be murdered where intention of 
the murderer is taken into account. The fact of the killing is organised first in the 
dimension of the involvement of state authority and then the dimension of the mental 
state of the killed and the killer. A principle runs through the definition of a crime, 
which determines what factors should be taken into consideration and suggests what 
kinds of response should be made. The principle is a mode. With a certain mode 
• 
under a certain jurisdiction, a husband stones his wife to death because of her adultery 
has committed a crime. Alternatively, the same act under a different jurisdiction with 
a different mode of conception of crime may be understood as lawful defence against 
damage to one's fame. 
Not all kinds of act have the same degree of easiness for alternative 
criminalisations. As a rule of the thumb, when identifiable victims are essential in the 
criminal conception, arbitrariness is greatly reduced. Somebody's belongings have to 
92please note that for the previous discussion of the change in crime rate, reported number ofcases are 
used. It makes no difference if we use the persecuted or the convicted number of cases to locate the • 
J^hange. Even if we use the absolute rather than the weighed crime rate, the loci of changes remain 
largely the.same except the relative heights of crime waves differ. 
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be stolen for a crime of theft; somebody have to be killed for a murder. When it is a 
crime against lawful authority, the room for alternative modes of criminalisation 
should be the greatest because the logical connection between the convicted, the 
victim and the criminal act is less obvious.93 
Since it is usually not up to the potential victims to define a situation of public 
disorder or to identify an unlawful society, the crime against lawful authority should 
also be the one most affected by police style and attention.94 Lncluding the three 
intervening factors determining the final crime rates across different crime categories, 
we should have the following table: 
Categories of Crime categorising policing social attitude 
effect attitude  
Crime against person 0 0 0  
Crime against property 0 0 0  
Crime against morality + 0 + 
Crime against lawful + + 0 
authority  
(0 denotes moderate effect, + denotes strong effect) 
Since conventional crime wave took place in the early 70s, it is hypothesized 
that legal and organisational changes in the criminal justice system before 70s had 
their impetus for coping with the intense social disturbance in the 50s and 60s. At 
least the official categories of crime of secret societies and public disorder were 
created in response to them. The only irregular change in criminal categorisation left 
unexplained is the emergence and disappearance of the crime ofbreach of deportation. 
Lti the previous section, it is argued that demographic continuity is salient for 
internal criminal justice system to develop and institutionalise. To establish a 
boundary over the territory is not an one and for all practice. The principle deciding 
93please note by saying this I do not imply criminalisation involves made-up evidence or conspiracy 
organised by the state. It simply suggests that there has no uni-linear causality among the convicted, the 
victim and the criminal act. 
94 
see Laurence Lustgarten, "The Police and the Substantive Criminal Law’，，in British Joumal of 
Criminology, vol.27, no.l, 1987，p.23-30. 
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who can stay and who should leave evolves over time. It is in this light that the 
irregularity of the deportation offence categorisation seems interesting. The average 
number of the breach of deportation is shown in the following table: 
Table 2.7: Number of Crime concerning Deportation 
Absolute Number of crime of Other Deportation  
breach of deportation  
1953 - ^ £ y 16 
1954 — 9289 ~ 2 ‘ 
1955 — 3369 一 362 
1956 — 1037 一 319 “ 
1957 — 659 — 496 “ 
1958 — 483 312 
1959 — 313 “ 230 
1960 ~ ~ 188 ‘ 152 
1961 — 84 - \ “ 
1962 ~ 84 一 “ 
1963 — 59 “ 
1964 — 43 一 “ 
1965 — 19 一 “ 
1966 — 16 “ 
1967 — 10 — “ 
1968 一 13 一 “ 
1969 “ 9 
1970 一 9 一 “ 
1971 — 18 
1972 — 9 一 “ 
1973 — 15 一 一 
1974 ~ 5 ~ “ 
1975 — 5 — -
‘ 1976 — 5 
1977 一 9 _ “ 
“ ~ 1978 — 13 — -
“ 1979 — 11 
“ ~ 1980 7 
Source: Data from Hong Kong Police Report, various years. Reliable data before 1953 not available. 
From the table, the decision of the authority to collapse deportation offence into 
the category of the 'other serious offence’ in 1961 seems obvious: few people 
infringed this offence. The interesting part is the sudden drop from the peak in 1953-
55. It took place exactly when the crime against unlawful society and assembly began 
to upsurge. Was it a coincidence? Learning the fact that the tightening of border 
control was enforced in early 50s, what is left for ftuther questioning is its relation 
with the rise of those crime against lawful authority. The termination of deport 
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practice coincided not with the increase in all other kinds of criminal behaviors but 
only those against lawful authority suggests, however weakly, a possible substitutive 
relationship between the two. I will denote the pre-1955 deportation peak as the 
deport-mode of criminalisation against civil strifes, adding to the aforesaid two modes. 
This may sound ungrounded at this point of time but its meaning will be better 
clarified after the following survey over the official reports ofHong Kong government. 
2.5 Official Descriptions of Social Unrest: a Quick Look 
General official comments on social strifes can be found in the Commissioner of 
Police Annual Reports. The scripts in the Hong Kong Reports were transcribed from 
them and therefore less detailed. But there are exceptions. From the period of British 
military take-over at the end of W.W.H to 1950, the Hong Kong police was poorly 
organised and therefore commentary on conditions of social unrest were found in the 
Hong Kong Reports and the British Military Administration Hong Kong Report 1946 
rather than the police annual report. The following accounts of official description on 
social unrest are drawn from all the three above sou rces .95 
Before the re-establishment of civilian government, Hong Kong was under 
British military tutelage for a period of eight months from September 1945 to April 
1946. During this period, the Military Administration was endowed with the 
responsibility of restoring social order and laying the groundwork for restoring the 
government. Given the social complications of the post-war period, an emphasis on 
law and order found in the official reports should not come as a surprise. What was 
really interesting was that conventional crimes were not identified as anything 
troublesome. "Armed robberies and piracies occurred but these were never out of 
95The reports were read through by looking at three rule-of-thumb questions: 1. What factors were 
identified as origin of social unrest? 2. What were the comments on the ability of the Hong Kong 
government to combat the social unrest? 3. What were the responses o f the government, in terms o f d e 
facto actions, to social unrest? 
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hand and never exceeded what might reasonably have been expected." 96 Foreign and 
Chinese firearms left in the colony were described as only a 'minor complication'. 
What really worried the administration was, unexpectedly, labor unrest. The report 
said, "the danger of widespread strikes was, nevertheless, ever present to the 
administration. It seemed inevitable that, once labor had recovered its nerve and 
absorbed the existing atmosphere and temper of the remainder to the Far East, • 
demands would be made which could not, in existing circumstances, be easily meL"’， • 
97 The challenge from labor unrest was perceived to be really severe because the 
administration expected that, "sooner or later the new unions and associations which 
were being fostered by the administration would be re-organised to take political 
direction from outside Hong Kong”98 The administration might have recollected the 
serious blow to the colony resulted in the 1926 Seaman Strikes, which had paralysed 
Hong Kong for nearly two years. The administration was later proven to have fore-
sights, since at that time modern trade unions were still largely absent and the political 
alignment of the leftist and rightist labor organisations did not yet take place in 1946. • 
Add to the worry was the disbanded police during the W.W.E. The police was • 
under-staffed and the military had to co-police with the poorly performed civilian 
police force. In order to prevent large-scale labor unrest, the administration, under the 
imperative of only performing the most urgent governmental functions, determined to 
make "some sacrifice to other branches of the administration, the strongest available 
team was assigned to labor duties of this and allied k i n d s . " 9 9 ]^i 1946, the first post-
war strike wave appeared, which affected most of the docks and public utility 
companies. Among them, "few instances of suspected sabotage and intimidation" was 
noted.lOO The first post-war civilian government was reviewing about the pre-war • 
0 




lO^Hong Kong Report 1946. p.l2. 
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voluntary registration of guilds and societies to see if new measures were needed or 
not.lOl Although the year 1947 was described timidly as "by no means so free of labor 
troubles as its predecessor", the annual report devoted four fiill pages to describe the 
details of labor disputes. The report attempted to posit the disputes as results of the 
unrealistic wage demand put forth by the workers. It did not let the unionist activities 
unnoticed, especially the intra-unionist struggle which usually complicated the 
i s sues . i02 The report recorded the eagemess of the government to differentiate labor 
organisations from other guilds and s o c i e t i e s l 0 3 . 
During the Chinese civil war in 1948，new form of social unrests which had 
intimate relationship with the confronting Chinese authorities was noted by the 
colonial state. The first incident was the "Kowloon City incident". The legitimacy of 
the British authority to nile over this little Chinese oasis was put under question when 
the government tried to evict the squatters at Kowloon City. 
The colonial state also noted the influx of Chinese political groups into the 
colony. The report commented, "there was a tendency for a certain number of these to 
abuse the hospitality granted to them by using the privileges of freedom of press and 
freedom of speech enjoyed in the colony to attack in immoderate terms the established 
government of China. It was therefore necessary for warnings to be given to them that 
they should not abuse the privilege of asylum they enjoyed."l04 The government was 
trying its very best to keep a clean hand from inviting foreign (Chinese) politics into 
the colony for the latter was identified as the major threat to the law and order of 
Hong Kong. Parallelly, in spite of the enforcement of Trade Unions and Trade 
Disputes Ordinance which laid down a compulsory registration system, it was too late 
for the government to prevent Chinese political groups from diffusing into labor 
disputes. In describing a dispute concerning Texas Oil Co. Installation, the report 
lOlibid.，p.l5-6. 
^Q^ong Kong Report 1947. p.l5-8. 
103ibid., p.22-3. 
lO^Hong Kong Report 1948, p.2. 
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sourly noted that, "unfortunately, the men appear to have been advised otherwise by a 
newly-formed so-called Federation of Unions, and two days after the matter had been 
reported to the Labor Office it was found that nearly all the men were on strike.，，l05 ln 
• 
the same year, anticipating the failure of barring the influx of political groups from 
China, a new Public Order Ordinance was enacted with objective to "curb the 
activities of political organisations which seek to advance their views by force..，，l06 
After a few years of low-tuned description of its work, the chapter on police gave a 
special remark to the border problem in the 1948 year report. It reads, "...with 
turbulent and unsettled China, posed political and other problems which frequently 
added to the difficulties of police action.，，l07 
The threads seemed knitting together. As perceived by the post-war colonial 
government, Hong Kong under a normal status should be free from social unrest. 
• 
Even labor disputes, if kept on pushing by pure economic drives, could be settled by 
• 
the government's tri-partisan mediation mechanism. All the problems originated from 
across the border. Political figures and groups kept coming to the colony. They 
disrupted the normal 'balance，of the employer-labor relationship by exploiting this 
potentially sensitive and political area. They organised themselves in trade unions and 
trade union federations. They might have other underground structures and they had 
to be discovered by the police arm of the colonial state. Here, the crucial matter was 
not the accuracy of such official account. It was the way how the problem was 
defined officially. The definition of the situation, as I have argued in chapter one, 
determines in a great extent how the criminal justice system evolves. When the 
拳 
Republic of China fled to Taiwan, a political tension across the Taiwan Strait was 
hereafter installed as the political setting faced by the authority in Hong Kong. 
All the above lines of thought were translated into the language of laws in the 
colony. In 1949，an Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance and an amendment of 
105ibid.,p.23. 
106 ib id . , p . 9 6 . 
107ibid., p . l04. 
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Deportation of Aliens Ordinance were enacted. An elaborated territory-wide 
population registration system was provided by the newly enacted Registration of 
Persons Ordinance. On the other hand, an Illegal Strikes and Lockouts Ordinance was 
made to compliment the freshly established trade union registration system. The 
Societies Ordinance, installed in the same year, was designed to control those 
organisational activities that fell outside trade unionism. The groundwork for 
criminalisation of social strifes were systematically laid downJ08 Can all these legal 
changes originate from other law and order problems? Just have a look on how the 
yearly report described the general law and order condition, "the figures for serious 
crime dropped from 11008 cases to 9329 cases. There was a slight decrease in 
robberies of all kinds,..."Burglaries and housebreaking cases also decreased Great 
credit is due to the Police Force for thus reducing the crime of the colony in spite of 
the increasing difficulties with which they have had to c o n t e n d . " l 0 9 Good order, no 
doubt. But in this year of good law and order, 11 824 persons were deported, 
increased from 5 017 of the previous year. Deportation measures were directed to real 
or potential source of social unrest, not for conventional criminals. I will come back 
to the substantive change of those laws and enforcement measures in later chapters. 
Here, let us complete the story first. 
The Tramway Union strike in 1950 was a good exercise for the newly installed 
mechanism to effect. The quarrel over special allowance for traffic staff led the 
workers to start a strike by not collecting fares for the company. The employer 
responded by threat of lockout. The official description of this incident provided by 
the Hong Kong annual report paid special attention to the unionist activities. "Few if 
any of the workers took advantage of this [to retum to work unconditionally to save 
their jobs] and the picketing was so thorough and severe that those workers who 
attempted to re-register experienced great difficulties. During January various union 
108The details of the changes in legal instruments related to the containment of civil strifes can be found 
in next chapter. 
109Hone Kong Report 1949. p.96. 
65 
meetings were held, 'comfort’ funds for the strikers were instituted by the Federation 
of Trade Unions and 'comfort missions' were organised which were made the 
occasion for inflammatory speeches broadcast to the public through l oudspeake r s . " l iO 
The police report simply described this incident as 'disturbance', "inspired agitation on 
an organised basis created several difficult situations with labor, culminating in a 
strike of tramway workers, a serious incident between workers and the police,....,'lll, 
and "....tact was of no avail and the police met organised resistance from an excited 
crowd..…The crowd was dispersed by tearsmoke and batons."U2 What was not told in 
these reports was that 13 tramway workers were arrested and deported. At the end of 
the year, 31 workers were fired by the company, all of them trade union members.U3 
The Tramway incident was not wholly settled and it resurfaced in 1954. This time the 
quarrel was over the company's decision to lay off redundant workers, including the 
chairman and vice-chairman of the leftist trade union. Obviously it was the aftermath 
of 1950 incident. The government report sympathised with the employer by stating 
that the practice had been proceeded for two years and it was only because the trade 
union activists involved in the redundancy list that ignited another round of 
disputes.ll4 
This exercise shows how the institutions of deportation and of control over 
societies worked. We can see a logic running through the incident. It defines the 
situation (the incident was manufactured by black hands who did not really care about 
the workers' welfare)，locates the potential offenders (politically affiliated trade 
unionists) and suggests a response (deported the trouble makers, prevented mainland 
trouble makers from entering the colony). This logic was used not only in labor 
disputes, but also in a similar way in other civil strifes, including barring the 'comfort 
110HongKongReportl950. p.23. 
lUpolice Report 1950. foreword. 
112ibid., p.33. 
113see chronological tables in 香港70年，香港:南華早報，1995. 
114Hong Kong Report 1954. p.31. 
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mission' organised in China for Tung Tau fire from entering Hong Kong in 1951 and 
the first Double tenth incident in 1952.U5 
In the previous section when we looked into the crime trend since the end of 
W.W.II, we realised that the number of people found convicted of deportation offence 
dropped suddenly after 1953. After this year, the number of people who were accused 
of unlawful societies suddenly reached a peak in 1955. The logic of institutional 
response that I have figured out just now seems to suggest that these changes in crime 
trend were not unrelated. When the Communist took over China, the subsequent 
Korean War and the hostility across the Taiwan strait invited an international boycott 
against mainland China. The relationship between UK and PRC deteriorated as well. 
The commissioner of police ofHong Kong said in 1953 that, not without sorry feeling, 
"it is not now possible to expel to China because such persons are not accepted by the 
Chinese authorities of the Mainland. As a matter of interest, they are equally not 
accepted in Formosa [Taiwan]. The only persons accepted by these territories are 
certain political deportees limited in n u m b e r . " H 6 When the enforcement part of 
deportation deemed impractical, the colonial state had to seek for new ways to put 
down social unrests. We can see the hint of this new way in the official description of 
the 1956 Double tenth incident (or the so-called Kowloon disturbance). This time, 
instead of condemning the political figures flooding across the border as "blackhands" 
behind the incident, the triads were highlighted. The 1955 police report devoted three 
pages long description to the problem of unlawful societies. In the following year, 
this problem was taken as the essential factor leading to the Kowloon disturbance, 
"increased triad activity in the colony in recent years has been a matter of grave 
concern, and any doubts as to the danger of these societies must have been dispelled 
during the Double tenth riots, when a comparatively minor fracas was seized upon by 
the triads and developed into a major threat against established a u t h o r i t y . ' ' U 7 This 
1 ^^Police Report 1951-2. p.44; Police Report 1952-3. p.45, see also later chapters for details. 
116police Report 1952-3. p.39. 
117police Report 1956-7. p.37. 
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definition of the situation was very interesting as every body knew the origin of the 
conflict in the double 10th incident was not some "minor fracas" but a lesser political 
conflict between the Communists and KMT. hi the same report, the colonial state 
noted that it was getting more difficult to deport the criminals and it concluded that 
deportation could no longer be a major instrument for the maintenance of law and 
order. The undue attention paid to unlawful societies (together with the conscious 
negligence of the political context of the disturbance) and the out-fading deportation 
mechanism signified a more subtle process in the criminalisation of social unrests. 
The origin of the unrests was no longer attributed to cross border factors. Although it 
was still argued that the triads were imported from China, origin of social unrest was 
becoming an internal problem. The government conceived that there was some 
"underground elements" who planted the seed for social upheavals. The double tenth 
incident could no longer be taken as an isolated incident but an iceberg of an 
undercurrent. Therefore a twist of the emphasis, or a new story, was told, out of the 
double tenth incident, "it is probable that these lawless men exploited the situation, 
not only for immediate gain, but also to put on a display of viciousness that would 
further cow those who come under their influence, and so increase their power over 
them even after the disturbance had ended''^^^ (italic mine) 
When a cross-border problem was now conceived as a domestic problem, and an 
individual disturbance became part of a lasting problem, then a very different form of 
criminal justice system response would be needed. Patrolling the border and sending 
undesirables back to China were no longer effective, rather, general surveillance over 
the society for such 'bad elements' had to be installed. Therefore, "it is hoped that as 
the police maintain their pressure against the triads, this flow will continue to increase, 
and to ensure that such pressure is maintained and such information properly 
exploited, additional manpower has now been deployed on a permanent basis both for 




defined as an action organised by "extreme Nationalists to tear down Communist flags 
”，and "...the crowds were not too excited by the disorders and the action was confmed 
to the active groups organised for the purpose.，，l20 The origin of this unrest in 1952 
had nothing to do with any internal factors in Hong Kong and therefore the colonial 
• 
state considered the deportation of 31 rightist ring leaders sufficient to tackle the 
problem*at that time. It was said in 1952 that "criminal gangs were not much in 
evidence as organised enterprise. Gang crime was more in the nature of loose 
association for the occasion."l2l 
Only within a few years, the first double tenth disturbance in 1952 and the 
second double tenth disturbance in 1956 were defmed in totally different manners and 
stimulated totally different modes of criminal justice responses. This change should 
better be understood as a change in interpretation rather than a change in 'fact'. 
It can be pretty safe to say that after 1956，the problem o f l aw and order was then 
• 
defmed as mainly an internal problem. This change in definition of the problem 
determined the locus of the subsequent development in the criminal justice system. 
Firstly, the duty for border control was gradually handed over to another specialised 
law enforcement agency. Police involvement in border control was reduced as it had 
taken up a new task to contain the social unrests (which were now considered as 
internally driven). Secondly, the internal surveillance power of the police was 
subsequently strengthened. The pre-war police was heavily armed and the post-war 
restoration of police was proceeded along a more civilian line. However, after the 
1956 experience, the role of police as a para-military organisation was again being 
• 
emphasized, ln the police report 1957-8, the police was said to be "designed to 
function ^s an efficient civil force in a sophisticated, cosmopolitan environment, as a 
sympathetic village constabulary and also as a highly disciplined gendarmerie, trained 
on para-military lines, should occasion a r i s e . " l 2 2 Hereafter, the scope of policing 
^ ^ l i c e Report 1952-3. p.45. 
12libid. 
l ^ Q l i c e Report 1957-8. p. 1. 
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covered the whole territory and the style of policing was para-military. It marked a 
new stage in the development of the Hong Kong colonial criminal justice system. In 
terms of changes in laws, a new Police Supervision Ordinance was enforced to allow 
police to detain suspect without charges, ki terms of law enforcement and 
adjudication, "the effects of the growth of the force with a higher proportion ofarrests 
and prosecutions, stiffer sentences by the courts" were said to have contributed to a 
downfall in crime r a te . l23 Ln the following year, with an conscious emphasis as the 
consequence o f the 1956 riots, a review o f the reorganisation o f the police force was 
proposed. Among the proposed reform items, combined police/military internal 
security exercise was conducted so that, "as a result police and military command at 
various levels will be integrated in an e m e r g e n c y . ' , l 2 4 The decentralisation o f the ‘999 
,emergency police service to the district level was proposed in the year after to allow 
prompt police a c t i o n s . l 2 5 The strengthening of police power had snowballed since 
then despite o f t h e fact that the government noted few incidents of social disturbance 
after 1956. (It should be reminded that the police reports usually categorised labor 
disputes as kinds of social disturbance.) It was not until the 1966 disturbance when 
social unrest emerged again. 
The 1966 disturbance stimulated the colonial state to have new thought on the 
origin of civil strifes. Young people, it was told in the police report, were the major 
participants in the 1966 disturbance. The rise of fares of the Star Ferry was only a 
pretext. The youth "joined in the disturbances for the excitement it offered and were 
not motivated by any other r e a s o n . , , l 2 6 Insufficient socialisation of the young people 
was the drive for deviant behavior. This characterisation marked a new phrase. 
Young people were definitely not the inherent 'bad elements' in the community but yet 
123ibid.，p.3. Remember that conventional crime rates (crime against persons and property) were 
relatively low in those years. 
124police Report 1958-9. p.3. 
l2 5Police Report 1959-60. p.3. 
126police Report 1966-7. p.2-3. 
70 
• 
they were capable ofbursting out into sporadic deviant and destructive behavior. Old 
logic accounting for social unrest did not work in this case. 
If young people as a category still exhibited 'group characters' (they were 
dangerous as a group, borrowed from a metaphor of secret society), the 1967 
disturbance exhibited a more complex picture. The government of course could not 
• 
afford not to put the blame on the extreme leftists. However, the igniting event o f the 
riots was a labor dispute (Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works) and the spread o f t h e 
riots was geographically located in the most populated areas, which suggested that it 
was the internal cleverages in Hong Kong provided the breeding ground o f the unrest. 
Unlike previous riots in 1956, the 1967 riots participants (except those who murdered 
and made bombs) were charged with crimes against public order. Raids were focused 
on communist premises and secret deportations were conducted. However, there was 
no 'secret society' to be uncovered. The riots were successfully agitated by the leftist 
unions even if they were already registered and put under supervision. Every year's 
� 
Hong Kong Report devoted a separate section on the development of the politically 
affiliated trade unions and since the 1952 'confrontation' with the leftists the leftist 
unions had been continually characterised as depoliticising (that they had turned to the 
welfare oftrade union members). Therefore, the high mobilisability ofparticipants in 
the 1967 riots should have unexpectedly striked the colonial state very much. 
It was, by accident, the policing institutions developed as result o f the 1956 riots 
that worked effectively to combat the 1967 disturbance. As the aftermath o f t h e 1967 
riots, laws maintaining public order were strengthened. A new implicit understanding 
of social unrests gradually emerged. Social unrests might not be imported from 
• 
outside, and they might not involve underground or secret organisations. Even i f they 
were imported or organised by some politically affiliated groups, the existing 
mechanisms could not have prevented them from taking place. Ordinary residents 
might sporadically involve in social unrests, like those youngsters. The welfare 
provisions and the labor laws reforms in the 70s were aimed to erase the root of such 
social unrests. Preventive policies were not enough, however. Prompt police actions 
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with enough regulative power had to be provided to tackle those social unrests which 
may be generated exogeneously or endogeneously, organised or unorganised. The 
targets the police would keep close watch on were not any specific borders or certain 
kinds of organisations, or any specific segment in the society, but anyone in society 
who might under certain conditions turn from a good resident into a rioter in anywhere. • 
Hong Kong did not have large scale social unrests in the 70s, and parallelly both • 
the Hong Kong Reports and the Police Reports paid little attention and passed few 
explicit comments on social actions in the 70s. I have abeady shown that the 
frequency of social actions in the 1970s is actually higher than that in the 60s. I would 
suggest that the intensity of those few number of events in 50s and 60s stimulated 
overall institutional changes and the numerous minor events in the 70s just help 
institutionalising the established mechanism. Li the police annual reports in the 70s, 
the subsection of 'disturbance' disappeared. A new section of 'demonstration' was 
added to the reports. Some of the other cases of disturbances were not classified but • 
were put here or there in the reports. From 1975 on, proper assembly and • 
demonstration were put under the title of 'public order，(note, not public disorder!). 
We can gather few information from them. To summarise those invited police 
attention produces table 2.8 below. 
It should be noted from the previous table that police attention was shed on a 
wide variety of social unrests in which most of them were domestically-driven actions. 
The police responses to such actions were twofold: either the participants in social 
action were charged with unlawful assembly or they were accused of crimes related to 
general disposal of police powers. • 
• 
* . t • 
•� � 
• • . '" ~ 
•- • 
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Tah]p. 9,R: Sncial Ac-tmns in 1970-^^0 that were Recorded in Official R e p o r t s l 2 7 
Year Particulars Police action  
1970-] 100 students protest on Tiao Yu Tai Island. Not mentioned.  
Students demonstrated for boycotting urban Not mentioned. 
council election.  
100 students staged sit-in demonstration Not mentioned. 
supporting Chinese as official language.  
1971_2 The crowds became unruly in two football 4 persons arrested, 
matches, setting newspaper alight and 
damaging cars.  
One demonstration concerning Tiao Yu Tai 22 persons arrested and guilty  
incident led to disorder. of unlawful assembly.  
1972-3 Whampoo and Tai Koo Dockyard strikes. Not mentioned.  
2 more demonstration on Tiao Yu Tai Isl. Not mentioned.  
Demonstrations involving teachers，salaries. Not mentioned.  
200 Yan Yi villagers demonstrated for early Not mentioned. 
settlement.  
1973-4 Several minor public demonstrations, no 
disturbance.  
1974_5 Relatives of Vietnamese deportees and 33 persons, including 11 
students staged a demonstration at airport reporters, arrested. 
during deportation.  
60 students marched to CGO against telephone Not mentioned.  
charges increases.  
1975-6 Poster campaigns, protest meetings and 
petitions against inflation, no disturbance.  
1976-7 Demands for rehousing boat dwellers from 
Yaumati, complaints about unsanitary 
conditions in older temporary housing areas, 
protests of civil servants for conditions of 
services, small group of extremists drew media 
attention but no disturbance.  
1978-9 Yau Ma Tai boat dwellers preparing to protest 77 persons found guilty of 
for rehousing. unlawful assembly.  
On Lok Tsuen squatters resisted clearance with 24 persons arrested for 
threat o fv io lence . unlawful assembly, assault on 
police, resisting arrest and 
possession of offensive 
weapons.  
Sai Lau Kok residents resisted resumption of 2 persons arrested. 
their buildings for MTR.  
Source: Police Annual Report, various years 
127a ftill list ofthe civil strifes from the end ofW.W.Il to 1980 can be found in appendix I of this paper. 
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2.6 Comparing three modes of criminalisation 
In section 2.4 I have suggested the concept of the 'modes of criminalisation 
against civil strifes' and I alluded to the three identifiable modes, namely, the deport-
mode, the societies-mode and the disorder-mode of criminalisation as seen from the • 
crime trend in Hong Kong. Until now, I have not provided a systematic or precise 
拳 
definition of the these modes of criminalisation against civil strifes. The reason for 
the delay was that I believe the substantive contents of these modes should be 
constructed through empirical evidence. After having reviewed the description of 
civil strifes contained in the official reports, it is time to theorise on the three modes of 
criminalisation. 
The three modes of criminalisation against civil strifes can be organised in the 
following idealtypical scheme: 
• 
Modes Origin of Civil Strifes State Responses Time when 
• gaining maturity 
. m  
Deport from across the border deports 1948-54 
Societies from domestic persecutes on membership 1956-60 
organisations of unauthorised 
organisations  
Disorder from domestic persecutes on individual 1966-67 
individuals and sporadic acts  
The mode of criminalisation constitutes what Strauss called the core code of the • 
present study. I have developed empirically three sub-classes in the core code . l29 
• 
What is left to be done in this stage is to dimensionalise these modes of 
128 I will later differentiate these idealtypical modes into phases such that the changes of each mode can 
be more precisely located. See page 99 and after. 
129struass highlighted six criteria forjudging which is the core code, namely, 1. It must be central when 
relating to other categories; 2. It must appear frequently; 3. It can be easily related to other categories; 4. 
ii has implication for a general theory; 5. The development of it increases density of theoretical 
constructs; 6. lt allows maximum variation to the analysis. See Anselm L Strauss, Qualitative Analvsis 
lor Social Scientists, op cit., p.36. 
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criminalisation, so that the distinction across them and the characters within each 
mode can be better formulated. Dimensionalisation is essential because I am going to 
integrate other theoretical constructs to the concept of 'modes of criminalisation' and 
• 
further new data will be gathered and interpreted under its light. 
To 'criminalise is to divide, to supervise and to penalise. The dividing practice 
of the three modes of criminalisation are sharply different. The deport-mode draws a 
line between who can enter and who should be repelled from the territory. Those who 
are barred from entering the territory or those who are deported from the territory are 
considered not qualified enough to be treated as local residents. Therefore, the 
colonial state in the name of the Hong Kong society as a whole, installed measures to 
prevent the influence of the external transgressors from inflecting Hong Kong, ki 
contrast, the societies-mode draws a line within the society. Distinguishable clusters 
• 
of people are singled out as the targets and they are subject to close supervision, no 
matter if they are triad gangs or trade unions. These clusters are considered 
potentially anti-social and they would be spatially, ethnographically, or 
administratively earmarked. The line is drawn between the normal social member and 
the 'abnormar one. Lastly, the disorder-mode draws a line across individuals. Any 
individual is potentially capable of acting in an unruly manner and sporadically loses 
self-control. Therefore at one side of the line it is the normal and civic social member, 
at the other side we could fmd the temporarily anomic status of the same member. 
These modes of criminalisation against civil strifes can be further compared in 
• 
terms of their supervision mechanism. Physically, the deport-mode pays a lot of 
attention.to border control; administratively, it defines and re-defines through the laws 
the conditions constituting competent residents (while at the same time determining 
‘ the criteria which would lead to the loss of the competence). Physical barriers at the 
borders and the border patrol are the institutional means of supervision. Nationality 
laws, immigration laws and the personal registration system are also relevant. 
To patrol secret or undesirable societies, occasional police searches and raids 
might be effective enough. As a kind of institution, however, the societies-mode calls 
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for an organisation registration system and the power of the authority to re-examine 
the competence of the registered organisations as means to supervision. 
For the disorder-mode, the backbone for supervision would be the intensive 
patrol system, the emergency units and the extensive information network which 
could support a prompt police action to sporadic disorder. Registration for assembly 
or procession could be a part but even licensed public meetings require continual on-
spot supervision. 
Since each mode of criminalisation lays down its specific rules and institutions 
for supervision, the act of breaking the requirements accompanied with the 
supervisory institution itself would invite penalty. Deport-mode penalises those who 
fail to certify their residency. Societies-mode penalises those organisations which are 
unregistered or those which have broken the rules of registration. Disorder-mode 
penalises unauthorised public gatherings while at the same time penalises those 
behavior violating the normatively defined 'good order’ or social well-being. The 
resistance to accept the on-spot direction given by the police also constitutes a crime. 
Penalty is imposed even if the act of violating the supervisory institution itself does 
not inflict any harm or loss on any person or property. 
A specific mode of criminalisation might arise and then decline, but the 
institutional framework it created persists. The 'memory' of the institutional 
experience accumulated in mainly two forms. First is the substantive changes in laws, 
and the other is the policing practice. These two will be separately tackled with in the 
following two chapters. Given the chronological order of the three modes of 
criminalisation in Hong Kong history, I can hypothesize that changes in laws relating 
to criminalising social actions can be grouped chronologically into these three modes. 
The organisational and stylistic changes in law-enforcement should have followed the 
same logic as well. 
Before ending this chapter, let me consider two theoretical problems that have 
been spelt out at the beginning of this chapter. The first problem is the relationship 
between the shifting modes of criminalisation with that of colonial state building. The 
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consecutive changes from deport to societies then to disorder mode was not only 
changes in kinds. Beneath this process(es), the extensiveness and intensity ofpolicing 
also increased during these changes. The interface between the colonial state and • 
society was therefore widened. Basically people and organisations within the whole • . 
territory were subject to this or that kind of police supervision, depending on which 
mode of criminalisation prevailed during the time. However, the fmidamental trend 
was that the colonial state was reaching deeper and deeper into the society as time 
went by and when as the modes changed. In chapter three I will argue that this 
enlarged interface between the state and the society in Hong Kong is an essential part 
of the colonial state building process. 
Another theoretical issue is the relation between the concept of mode of 
criminalisation against civil strifes and the process model of criminalisation derived in . 
chapter one. The post war labor strikes, the double tenth incidents and the 66-67 riots • 
were three most important trauma the colonial government experienced. To these 
trauma, the model of mode of criminalisation can denote how they were defined and 
redefined. The model also sheds light on the relative insufficiency of the criminal 
justice institution. The traumatic experience induced institutional changes in the 
criminal justice system and the essential characteristics of the institutional set-ups can 
be captured through the model. Longitudinally, we also get some ideas about how new 
experience was knitted into some conventional criminal concepts by sketching them to 
cope with the specific novelty of new experience. This sub-process I have termed as . 
the 'convergence' among criminal concepts (e.g., trouble-makers as quasi-triad • 
members, protesters as potential rioters) in chapter one.l30 What are left untouched in 
this chapter are the process of action and reaction and the process of normalisation. 
They will be further investigated in the following two chapters. 
1见1 have constructed a scheme to correlated the modes of criminalisation to the process model in the 
concluding chapter, see table 5.1 for reference. 
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Chapter 3 Evolution of the Institutional Framework 
In Chapter two I argued that the state response to civil strifes through the 
criminal justice system could provide a cutting edge to the understanding of the 
colonial state building process. The three modes of criminalisation, i.e. the deport, 
societies and disorder modes, demonstrate three great divides. They locate which 
cleverages in the society are perceived by the state as the greatest threat to its general 
concem of law and order. In this chapter, I would proceed to detail the relevant 
institutional setup by looking into how the perception was manifested in the legal 
framework in Hong Kong. 
The three modes of criminalisation against civil strifes are stepping stones for us 
to enter into a more general scheme of analysis. We can now proceed to add flesh to 
the conceptual skeleton by sorting out the institutional measures corresponding to the 
modes of criminalisation. The previous chapter has already suggested that there is a 
synchronization of specific modes of criminalisation with civil strife waves that 
peaked before early 1970s. The following survey starts from this backdrop. 
Most Chinese living in Hong Kong before W.W.II took the colony as a stepping 
stone only. They came to Hong Kong for job opportunities or security when there 
were turmoil in the Mainland and returned to their motherland whenever conditions 
permitted. The colonial state therefore faced no need to cultivate any communal 
identity among such a mobile population. It only had to focus narrowly at the small 
circle ofBritish and the naturalized Chinese. 
This picture changed after the war, however. In early 1950s, a physical (and 
political as well) barrier was erected between the border of Hong Kong and China. 
Chinese who had fled to Hong Kong would soon find the new place a permanent 
.二 home. The colonial state then saw the need to accommodate those who were uprooted 
and who awaited assimilation. 
After the war, civil strifes in the colony were perceived by the colonial state as 
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organized around the Chinese national identity. Therefore, the colonial state tried to 
dilute the political implication of these strifes. It tried first to criminalise any attempt 
to associate collective action with Chinese national identity. When failed, it attempted 
to assimilate the non-British Chinese into a newly formed local community under the 
colonial jurisdiction. The boundary between the state and society in Hong Kong was 
therefore being drawn and redrawn and it finally consolidated into a domestic polity 
the scope of which was larger than the Hong Kong British but smaller than a Hong 
Kong nation-state.i3i 
At this juncture, the criminal justice system in Hong Kong played a role. As I 
have argued at the end of last chapter, the most essential character of the criminal 
justice system is its capacity to divide. Division created identity because the crux o f a n 
identity is the mental capacity to recognize the difference between "we" and "they". 
From the angle of the state, the one who heralds social action against the law and 
order of the state is most susceptible to be identified as aliens to the "we-polity". ln 
the following, we will look into how the reach o f the state to the society changed over 
time and how such a change molded the boundary of the "we-polity"of the colonial 
state. 
I took the yearly compiled Ordinance of Hong Kong from 1946 to 1980 as the 
backbone texts for the following analysis. Laws enacted before the World War II will 
also be occasionally quoted when they are necessary for the fullness of the 
arguments.i32 
131 It is generally agreed that the formative years of the Hong Kong home polity should be 
located at the decade before 1960s. 566劉兆佳，“「香港人一」或「中國人」：香港人的身分 
認同1985-1995”，二十一世紀，.no.41, 1997, p.44; and關信基，“香港政治社會的形成”,二 
十一世紀，ibid, p . f ^ 
132 The laws were handled in the following steps. First, the short titles of all ordinances were read 
through. When a law is introduced at the first time the short title is usually informative enough to judge 
if it contains related contents in the light of the three idealtypical modes of criminalisation. For security 
reason, all laws related to creation of disciplinary agencies and those concerning criminal offences and 
criminal procedures are also included in the fu*st round. Second, all amendments of the earmarked 
legislations were followed. Third, every piece of law and its subsequent amendments were read 
through article by article. Two objectives were to be fulfilled during the close scrutiny. At one hand 
irrelevant laws or irrelevant amendments could be identified. At the other hand, open-end memo was 
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Relying on the lawbook as the main text for the following analysis has its own 
risk. Although effort would have been paid to gather official views and intentions on 
the move o f the colonial state in introducing specific ordinances to the legislatures, the 
information so collected is in fact very inadequate. A research through the Hansard 
will show most of the bills introduced to the Legislative Council before early 1970s 
were passed without discussion. The official responsible for introducing the bills 
usually gave some comments but most of these comments were just matter of 
formality. 
Therefore we cannot read too much into the 'intention of the state’ into the 
following analysis. Factors from the larger political context have to be brought into 
the picture in order to supplement this inherent inadequacies and to minimise the risk 
ofmisreading. I will quote relevant official comments regarding the ordinances to be 
studied below whenever they are available and political factors and events having 
immediate relevance to these ordinances will also be highlighted. In case no 
supplementary information can be used to help understanding an ordinance, I will give 
reader only a plain description of the content of the ordinance and its position in 
linking up other ordinances enacted before and after it. 
3.1 The deport-mode 
The very first attempt of the colonial state to introduce a system of deportation 
can be traced back to 1846. Sir Henry Pottinger, the Governor at that time，proposed 
to set up a 'registering committee' to deal with Chinese in Hong Kong. The committee 
was "asked to consider the exclusion of certain undesirable classes of Chinese from 
the colony, registering of boatman and controlling their changes,....and the regulation 
of coolie hire."(italic m i n e p 3 The key elements of deport-mode, namely to 'control' 
taken in a liberal manner for me to suggest to myself any possible implications embedded in the 
readings. Fourth, post hoc supplements were searched for when the previous work suggested some 
places of incompleteness. 
133 G B Endacott, A Historv ofHong Kong, op cit., p.48. 
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and 'regulate' through 'registration' and 'exclusion', could already be found in the 
quotation. Pottinger's attempt, however, was given up because of financial 
• 
consideration of the colonial state. The idea was picked up by his successor Sir J F 
Davies. .When introduced to cover all inhabitants in Hong Kong, British and aliens 
included, the registration system was met with fierce opposition. Sir Davies conceded 
before the pressure of the British inhabitants and launched a registration exercise in 
1844 that applied only to those who could not at that time produce $500 before the 
authority. The registered were by default and in effect applied mainly to C h i n e s e . i 3 4 
The registration system could not be very effective, of course, given the fact that 
� Chinese in Hong Kong kept on moving in and out by all means. Nevertheless it still 
provided an institutional tool for the colonial state to exercise its control over the 
• 
C h i n e s e . i 3 5 
The legal-institutional setup of deportation practice seems to rest on the 
emergency power conferred to the Governor of Hong Kong for most of the time 
before the W.W.II. Besides, Sir Davies introduced a registration system also put 
through an ordinance empowering the Governor to declare martial law during 
emergency. The power was further expanded during the Second Opium War in 1856 
in the Peace Preservation Ordinance which allowed deportation without warrant any 
persons thought to be enemies of the Crown.i36 This piece of law was later replaced 
by the Emergency Regulation Ordinance first made in 1922 and codified in 1931. The 
. • 
power of the Governor given under emergency was said to be widely used to deal with 
any unexpected crisis until it was gradually replaced by other regularised power 
134 ibid., p.55. 
135 Endacott comments that, "[t]he registration ordinance, which in effect applied only to the Chinese 
and was conceived as a police measure to control the movement of population, was administered 
oppressively." Ibid., p.71. 
1兆 Norman J Miners, "The use and abuse of Emergency Powers by the Hong Kong Government", in 




contained in non-emergency ordinances made after the War.^37 
The transition of deporting people with emergency power to regularised . 
authority is not a short story. The Deportation of Aliens Ordinance 1935，the latest • 
piece of legislation pertinent to the deport-mode before the end ofW.W.H, wouM give 
us some ideas about what are the main components of the regularised deport practice. 
In this piece of law, alien was defined broadly as a non-British subject and a British 
subject meant narrowly the people having the British n a t i o n a l i t y . i 3 8 The Governor in 
Council was empowered to initiate a deportation. The court could also recommend 
deportation orders for the convicted aliens subject to the approval of the Govemor in 
C o u n c i l . i 3 9 The conditions for the initiation of deportation were three-fold. First, 
when the aliens had been deported in any other British territories. It meant that • 
essentially such aliens were categorized as unwelcome visitors to British polities. • 
Second, when the aliens had committed any offence. We should note that the nature 
and severity of the offence were not specified, meaning that ail aliens found 
convicted of any offence were liable to being deported. Third, when the Govemor in 
Council considered it to be conductive to the public good to deport anybody.i40 The 
Govemor might at any time，as stipulated in section 4 of the ordinance, issue a warrant 
to arrest and detain any person for fourteen days for investigation. 
Here we are not in a position to judge if the power conferred by the Deportation 
‘ • 
137 ibid., p.56 and after. Miners finds that after every major social unrest there were new initiatives 
brought to the emergency power. These include the enactment of Peace Preservation Ordinance during 
Second Opium War in 1856; its new promulgation after a dockyard strike in 1884; its amendment when 
riots took place in 1911 responding to revolution against Qing dynasty; enactment of the Emergency 
Regulation Ordinance in 1922 and its subsequent codification during the seamen's strike; and its last 
modification in 1950 when the state was faced with post War challenge. Emergency regulations were 
gradually revoked from 1970s on. 
^^^Ordinance ofHong Kong 1935. no.39, s 2. Before 1949，those who were bom in Hong Kong and 
owed allegiance to the crown could be British subjects. Their status became Citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies after the British Mationality Act 1948 was enacted and this status could be 
obtained through registration, descent or naturalization. See Peter Wesley-Smith, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in Hong Kong. 2nd edition, Hong Kong: Longman, 1994，p.327-8. 
139ibid.，s8. 
140ibid. ,s3.bands3.c. . 
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• 
of Aliens Ordinance had been used arbitrarily or not under these loosely defined 
• 
criteria and procedures. I would rather focus on the fact that, although it is not a 
power used under emergency, it was still highly undifferentiated. The power to deport 
an alien resembled a kind of prerogative exercised by the Governor as the delegated 
representative of the British crown. If an institution means a relatively stable and 
explicit practice for the concerned parties to follow, then this piece of law can hardly 
be said as having established any institution to regulate deportation. Because the net 
was cast so wide that the state's response was beyond any rational expectation from 
the point o fv i ew of i t s subjects. Anyone could be a potential deportee. Furthermore, 
the only institutionally identifiable line defining the boundary of the colonial state 
參 
membership was drawn along British subjects. The aliens coming in and out of the 
colony were not considered as having any legitimated claim to the right of abode in 
Hong Kong. The scope of the colonial polity was hence narrowly constructed. 
The feeling of vulnerability underlined the perception of the colonial polity 
during that time. Waves of anti-Britain protests took place in China immediately after 
the end of W.W.IL. In 1948 the confrontation between the colonial government and 
people living in Kowloon Walled City in Hong Kong during a clearance operation 
ignited series of protests in the main cities in China for urging the Chinese authority to 
resume the sovereignty of Hong Kong. Means to suppress this development, 
• 
including coercive suppression of protests，deportation of trouble-makers, bringing 
protesters to the court and banning of seditious publications, had been applied locally 
by the colonial state. It was not until the end of 1948 when the Communist and 
Nationalist were fighting intensively with each other in the Civil War that the colonial 
authority earned a breathing spaceJ4i 
In 1948, the length of residency in Hong Kong was brought into the law. From 
that year on，aliens who could prove themselves as having resided in Hong Kong for 
more than one year before their convictions in court would not be subject to the 
141梁炳華，城寨與中英外交，香港:麒麟，1995，p.146-86. • 
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deportation order issued by the court. While at the same time，the power of the court • 
was strengthened from merely recommending deportation order to the Govemor to 
參 
issuing such order directlyJ42 Added to this change, the Govemor could thereafter 
confine the operation of deportation to certain offences only or to exclude it from 
other offencesJ43 The implications of these changes were clearer in the amendment 
made a year after. 1949 was a salient year in the post war history. The Communist 
take-over in the mainland cast a severe perceived threat to the colonial polity. It was 
the year the British government concluded her year-long debate of whether to give up 
Hong Kong or not. In a memorandum submitted by the Colonial Secretary，it was 
reasoned that Hong Kong was at that time facing three sources of threat, namely, the • 
possible disturbance heralded by leftist trade unions; the influx of refugees and the 
參 
Communist invasion, ln response, a series of new policies were enforced. Among 
them were the closure of the border, the establishment of compulsory registration 
systems and the strengthening of police capacity.i44 Therefore 1949 saw most of the 
laws criminalising civil strifes obtained their prototypes. Regarding deport-mode, 
four pieces of law deserve attention. They are the amendment of the previous 
Deportation of Aliens Ordinance in 1949, the first introduction of the bnmigrant 
Control Ordinance, the Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance and the Registration of 
• ~ Persons Ordinance. Intuitively, the former two govemed the border while the latter • 
two were used for intemal supervision over the population. The four functioned upon • 
individuals as objects for supervision and made up a much more elaborated and 
differentiated network of control when compared to the previous single-minded deport 
practice. 
The 1949 amendment of the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance elaborated the 
new mechanism that was introduced in the previous year. If the original power of 
'^^Deportation of Aliens (Amendment) Ordinance 1948. Ordinance ofHong Kong 1948. no. 58, s 8. 
"3ibid.，sl.8. 
• 
l44Cab 129/32, C.P. 49(39), quoted from余繩武，劉蜀永，廿世紀的香港，前引氣p.l73^. 
• 
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deporting convicted aliens before 1949 seemed liked a crown prerogative, the 
amendment in 1949 delegated the power to the court and other administrative organs. 
A new scheme matching the length of deportation and the length of imprisonment was 
introduced. According to the scheme, the court should simply send those convicted 
out ofHong Kong for a defined duration. Other competent bodies, which was usually 
the Commissioner of Prisons, could also issue deportation order to alien inmates who 
had already served their i m p r i s o n m e n t J 4 5 
Another system was introduced in the 1949 amendment to link up specific 
offences to the deport practice. A schedule of offences were added to the ordinance as 
appendix for which violation of them would lead to harsher deportation treatment 
(that actually could be deportation for life).i46 Offences included in the schedule were 
mainly conventional crimes against property and persons. The schedule corresponded 
to the categories constituting undesirable immigrants which were introduced in the 
same year through the bmiigrant Control Ordinance. The Lnmigrant Control 
Ordinance contained conditions for which in-comers to the colony could be identified 
as undesirable. The criteria aimed to exclude those economically-dependent persons 
from entering Hong Kong. The handicapped, prostitutes, the unemployed and the 
unskilled were the targets to be e x c l u d e d J 4 7 Similar to my former logic that 
conditions for deportee imply reverse conditions of membership, the criteria that 
constitute undesirable immigrants also imply the reverse conditions of residency. 
Although not yet confirmed by laws, an informal practice defining right of residency 
(although in a negative manner) slowly emerged. Unwelcome immigrants were 
barred from entering the territory. Even if they had gained entry (with whatever 
means) to Hong Kong, immediate deportation could be initiated once they were found 
145Deportation of Aliens (Amendment) Ordinance 1949，Ordinance ofHong Kong 1949. no.44, s 8. 
146ibid., schedule two. 
147immigrants Control Ordinance 1949, Ordinance of Hong Kong 1949. no.4, s 11. They included 
those who were diseased, handicapped, not able to support themselves, likely to become vagrants, 
suffering contagious disease and prostitutes. 
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convicting any offences (however minor) under local law. On the other hand, those 
who satisfied the authority to be granted entry to the colony were assumed to be 
entitled to stay if they had proven themselves as law-abiding within certain time limit 
(say, 1 year). They could still be deported. However, only the Govemor could decide 
on the deportation of those people. The Governor's power to deport these people was 
used only under extraordinary circumstance when the routinised practices of court to 
have failed to get rid of the identifiable trouble-makers. Later cases proved that the 
Govemor used his prerogative to deport political activists, bi other words, deportation 
was institutionalized as a judicial practice, while the arbitrariness of the Govemor 
prerogative was severely trimmed. 
]ji the immediate post war years, the differentiation of routinised deport practice 
from the Governor's prerogative had not been completed, ]n the list defining the 
undesirable immigrants of the Lranigrant Control Ordinance, there was a condition for 
preventing those 'suspected of being likely to promote sedition or to cause a 
disturbance of the public tranquillity' from entering Hong Kong. Correspondingly, 
the schedule of offence in the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance incorporated offences 
against Societies Ordinance for which contravention would lead to life long 
deportation. It should be noted that the coverage of the offences against Societies 
Ordinance was much broader than mere triad activities (as the title of the ordinance 
might have implied). The key categories to be criminalised in the Societies Ordinance 
was 'unlawftil societies' in which triad was only a s u b - t y p e J ^ s This broad category 
was designed to include the rightist and leftist Chinese organizations into the net. ki 
this connection the deport-mode and societies-mode found their connecting point. In 
the same vein, conventional criminals and political trouble-makers found themselves 
under the same institutional trap. Grantham, the Govemor at that time, admitted 
frankly that the deport practice was his trump card to get rid ofpolitical a c t i v i s t s J 4 9 
148 see section 3.2 of this chapter. 
149Alexander Grantham,葛量洪回憶錄(Via Port From Hong Kong to Hong Kong},香港：華豐，1984, 
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In the second half of the year 1949，another pair of ordinances were introduced. 
To put it simply, the Immigrants Control Ordinance was aimed at preventing 
undesirable immigrants from entering Hong Kong, the Expulsion of Undesirables 
Ordinance extended the same set of criteria to established similar categories for 
'undesirable residents' who were liable to expulsion. Deportation was used when the 
colonial state considered all non-British subjects as potentially liable to be sent out of 
its boundary. A simple institution to supervise the border sufficed to achieve the 
objective of preventing undesirables from getting into the colony. Mechanism of 
expulsion was introduced when the state saw a new status emerged between British 
subjects and floating aliens. This status included those who were neither British 
subjects nor floating aliens, but enjoyed an informal right of abode because they had 
proved themselves as law-abiding over a certain period of time. New supervisory 
institution was needed to identify the undesirables among this group of people and 
expel them out of the colony. 
The conditions governing undesirable residents were actually similar to those 
which defined undesirable i m m i g r a n t s . i ^ o However, unlike deportation, the expulsion 
of undesirables could not be enforced without an elaborated intemal registration 
system. The Registration of Person Ordinance was introduced in 1949. Before the 
war, Hong Kong had also personal registration. What was new about this Registration 
of Persons Ordinance was its scope and the institutional structure it provisioned. 
Previous registration system covered only Chinese or other aliensJ^i The present one 
p.236-7. The assertion was expressed by Grantham when he was challenged by the PRC premier Zhou 
En-lai in Beijing. 
150Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance 1949，Ordinance of Hong Kong 1949. no.39, s 4. The only 
difference was the condition that those found squatting in the colony could be identified as undesirables. 
Sure it represented only the spatial difference when compared to the control over the border. 
15lGaylord and Traver noted, "throughout much of its history, Hong Kong's legal system has been 
used to control the Chinese population. Among the repressive laws that the police were asked to 
enforce was an ordinance, passed in 1844’ establishing a 'Registry of the Inhabitants of the Island of 
Hong Kong and its Dependencies'..…On November 1844，the government gave notice that the 
ordinance was suspended [because Europeans vehemently protested and Chinese workers staged 
strikes.] Registration as a means of controlling the Chinese continued, however. In January 1845，a 
Census and Registration Office was established to [number] the native population of the colony'. A 
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covered all persons. All but the exempted categories had to register themselves with 
the Commissioner of Registration. Identity cards were issued conveying information 
on personal particulars and employment status. When registered, the applicants had to 
submit photo and fingerprints.i52 Residents then could be physically identified on-
spot by the law-enforcement agencies. This supervisory power then largely developed 
in the following years. When fu"st introduced, the personal registration system was 
designed to intensify control. It can be shown vividly by the fact that the controlling 
agency, that was, the police, was exempted from registration. The Legislative Council 
was given the power to suspend in any time the law by resolution. It seemed that the 
post war personal registration system was not designed as a permanent one at the 
outset. It might be given up when the need to intensify internal control faded out.i53 
Through the new institution, the colonial state could penetrate deeper into the 
Chinese society in Hong Kong. The penetration of the state apparatus into people's 
livelihood was a two-edged sword. In order to define and categorize the population 
for regulation, the state had to differentiate the composition of the population into 
certain segments. The state could no longer hold a simplistic dichotomy of British 
subjects vs. the aliens. The effect produced by the growth of administrative capacity 
and the relevant legal instruments which categorized new elements of the population 
had long term effect in consolidating the de facto right of abode in the colony. An 
Immigration Officer was created in 1949 and he was empowered to issue permit for 
entrance to Hong Kong.^54 An alien was thereafter defined through practice as any 
person who was unable to produce the appropriate permits inside the colony. They 
could be subject to check and interrogation by the Immigration Officer. If the officer 
new ordinance, passed in 1846, was directed specifically at the colony's Chinese population." See Mark 
S Gaylord, Harold Traver, "Colonial Policing and the Demise of British Rule in Hong Kong", 
International Joumal of the Sociology ofLaw. no.23, 1995, p.27. 
152Registration ofPersons Ordinance 1949，Ordinance ofHong Kong 1949. no.37. 
153ibid.,sl5(c). 
154immigrants Control Ordinance 1949，op cit., s 2.1 and s 3. 
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was satisfied that the aliens could be allowed to stay then he could be issued the 
permit. All the permitted aliens had to register themselves to the Registrar of Aliens 
and carried their document of r e g i s t r a t i o n . i 5 5 Although the new laws still contained 
no legal concept of right of abode, the aliens were no longer a homogeneous whole 
but then could be divided into the registered and the unregistered one. Conceptually, 
a new category of permitted residency was introduced between the formal citizenship 
(the British) and the unclassifiable floating aliens. The importance of this informal 
status can be illustrated by the fact that a formal right to abode in Hong Kong, which 
connoted by the status of permanent resident, was created as late as 1987 in which 
non-British Chinese could thereafter enjoy.^56 
Hence the people coming in and out and living in the colony could be classified 
by their susceptibility of being deported or expelled. At one end were the European 
and Chinese British subjects whose allegiance to the United Kingdom were received 
by the colonial state. They feared no threat of deportation or expulsion, ki the middle 
were those who were not considered as undesirables. They were allowed to stay in the 
colony as long as they subject themselves to the supervisory institution of the colonial 
state. At the farthest end we can fmd the deemed undesirables and unwelcome 
immigrants. It they were found staying in Hong Kong, it was only because the 
colonial state had tolerated them, or because the administrative arms of the state had 
not yet reached them. Once they were exposed they could be deported or expelled 
subject to the administrative discretion of the state, ln terms of criminalisation, the 
latter two categories of people were exposed to the risk ofbeing deported if they were 
in any case classified by the state as trouble-makers, ln the Tramway Strikes 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the leftist trade unionists were deported in this 
manner. The colonial state also used border control to cut the links between domestic 
activists and their mainland supporters. As calculated by the leftist activists 
155ibid.，s25. 
156peter Wesley-Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law in Hong Kong, op cit., p.335-6. 
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themselves, more than 60 people in their group were deported during the year 1949 to 
1952. They included leftist trade union members，school principals, teachers and 
a c t o r s . i 5 7 Deporting leftists to mainland and rightist to Taiwan were nothing less than 
usual before m i d - 1 9 5 0 s . i 5 8 
The closure of the border ended the deport practice. The newly established 
communist authority in Mainland enacted her border law in 1950. People having no 
permits were no longer allowed to enter her territory therefore creating new obstacles 
for Hong Kong in deporting undesirable people out of the colony. On the other hand, 
fearing that refugees might influx from Mainland curfew was also declared in the New 
Territories along the border of Hong K o n g . i 5 9 Physical movements across the border 
became much more difficult when compared to the pre-war days. For those who were 
already staying in Hong Kong it seems that they had determined to stay on. The 
community (larger than the original elite British Chinese) of Chinese in Hong Kong 
was emerging. Subsequent changes in the legal framework could chart the 
stabilization of the domestic population, ki 1951, the Governor was endowed with the 
power to rescind the deport orders, thus ended the deport practice as an one-way 
r o a d J 6 0 八 more remarkable change took place in 1955. The deletion of some sub-
sections of the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance confined the use of deportation to and 
only to the scheduled offences. People found guilty of any offences other than those 
scheduled were no longer subjected to be d e p o r t e d . i 6 i At that time the government 
1
57余繩武，劉蜀永，廿世紀的香港，前引書，p.l88. One outspoken event was the Tong Tau Tuen 
Fire hicident. The fire broke out in 1952. A comfort mission was organized in Canton to be coming to 
Hong Kong. A local welcome mission was also formed to greet them. The government sent police to 
prevent the Canton comfort mission from leaving the train from Mainland and the same time conflict 
arose between the police and the local welcome mission. As a result twelve local participants were 
convicted and deported. See ibid., p.188-9. See also A. Grantham,葛量洪回憶錄，op cit., p.203. 
158 see chapter four for details. 
1
59魯言，“邊境宵禁及非法移民政策的回顧”，魯言等著，香港掌故(第三集),香港：廣角鏡， 
1981 , p . l 03 -5 . 
160Deportation of Aliens (Amendment) Ordinance 1951. Ordinance of Hong Kong 1951. no.29. 
161 Deportation of Aliens (Amendment) Ordinance 1955. Ordinance ofHong Kong 1955. no.3. 
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had already found PRC and ROC very reluctant in receiving the deportees. Therefore 
new arrangement for the Governor to rescind the issued deportation order was created 
in which the to-be-deported person could stay in the colony on condition that he 
entered into recognizance before the Magistracy. A year after even the schedule of 
offence was abandoned. The court could no longer attach deportation order to its 
sentencing. The power to deport people again became the administrative prerogative 
of the Governor. From 1949 to 1956，the status of the deport practice went through a 
full circle from being a prerogative power of the Governor to become an extensively 
used institutionalized measure and then back to its ad hoc nature a g a i n J ^ 2 (The whole 
set of laws was finally abandoned in 1971) From 1956 on，the linkage between the 
Societies Ordinance and the deport practice disappeared. Recalled the crime rate 
figure in chapter two, in this year we can see a remarkable decline in number of 
breach of deportation but an extraordinary upsurge in number of convictions in crimes 
against lawful authority. We can now explain this change because in 1956 the deport 
practice was abandoned and gave way to the control over internal organizations. In a 
similar vein, the Expulsion ofUndesirables Ordinance was repealed in 1961.163 
It was not the end of the story for the deport-mode, however. The administrative 
measures for supervision accompanying the deport-mode were actually strengthened 
after the abolition of the deport practice. To put it more precisely, the border check 
and the personal registration system were then getting more differentiated and had 
their own lives since then. An immigration service at the first time in the history of 
the colony appeared as an independent disciplinary force in 1961. The immigration 
service took up the job from the police to keep border check. It was given the power 
to search and arrest suspects having suspicious residential s t a t u s . i 6 4 All of the 
162 Deportation of Aliens (Amendment) Ordinance 1956，Ordinance ofHong Kong 1956. no . l l , 
163 Expulsion ofUndesirables (Repeal) Ordinance, Ordinance ofHong Kong 1961. no.43. 
164 The service was formed by the Immigration Service Ordinance 1961，Ordinance of Hong Kong 
196L no.30. 
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previous laws concerning border control and deportation were eventually collapsed 
into one piece of legislation, that was the knmigration Ordinance in 1971. ki this new 
law, aliens were defined as same as the previous laws but a new category of 'Chinese 
residence' was introduced to identify those who were wholly or partly of Chinese race 
and had been ordinary residents in Hong Kong for more than seven years.i65 Chinese 
residents enjoyed the right to land to Hong Kong. Although they could not guard 
themselves against deportation order issued by the Govemor, in fact they were rarely 
d e p o r t e d . i 6 6 
The differentiation of the immigration service from the police required 
subsequent change in the personal registration system. Frequent amendments of the 
laws were made around 1960-1 to incorporate the new service into the s y s t e m . i 6 7 
After the promulgation of the taunigration Ordinance, the power of the Legislative 
Council to suspend the personal registration system through resolution was annulled, 
signaling a recognition of the permanent need of the s y s t e m J 6 8 xhe registration and 
the ID check, which were introduced at the tum of 1950 to filter out undesirable 
residents by expelling them, became thereafter part of the establishment over a 
stabilized population in 1970. They made possible physical on-spot check by the state 
agency over individuals, while on the other hand they represented a honor and a de 
facto right to be able to stay in Hong Kong. Nothing was more dramatic when we 
compare the Hong Kong residents in the late 1970s to the new influx of Vietnamese 
and Chinese refugees at about that period. In order to let the colonial state to identify 
the latter (the not-yet-institutionalized population) all Hong Kong residents were made 
165 Immigration Ordinance 1971, Ordinance ofHong Kong 1971. no.55. 
166 w S Clarke, "Hong Kong Immigration Control: the Law and the Bureaucratic Maze", Hong Kong 
Law Journal, vol.l6, no.3, 1986，p.350-6. 
167 Three subsequent amendments were made in 1960 and 1961，see Ordinance of Hong Kong 1960 
no. 18 and Ordinance o fHone Kong 1961. no. 19 and 40. 
168 Registration ofPersons (Amendment) Ordinance 1973’ Ordinance ofHong Kong 197^. no.36. 
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to carry their ID cards along with them.i69 The aliens flooding Hong Kong in the post 
war era had been subjected to different stages of checks and classifications but finally 
they were incorporated into the newly-formed home polity of Hong Kong. Their ID 
cards signified their memberships. Now the state set up new rules to prevent other 
'illegal immigrants' from invading the newly-formed home polity. In return, the 
Hong Kong residents had to bear the privilege and stigma of carrying their ID. They 
were now at the same time protected and supervised by the institutionalized colonial 
state. 
3.2 The societies-mode 
We have seen how the process of criminalisation and the evolution of 
"permanent residency" were intentioned in the development of the deport mode. The 
same applies to the societies mode. 
Hong Kong has a very long history of containing Chinese aggregations in forms 
of societies, and triad activities were long ago being associated with the activities of 
these Chinese societies. The very first piece of law for this purpose was illustratively 
titled the Triad and Unlawful Societies O r d i n a n c e . i 7 0 The now well known Societies 
Ordinance was first produced in 1911. From the very first beginning, compulsory 
registration of all societies was a part of it. The purpose of this law was, as argued by 
England, to control ‘the criminal and political activities of various associations' and 
its effect was so-so because 'it failed to give increased control and tended to drive 
some unlawful societies u n d e r g r o u n d . ' ^ ^ i The failure might not be because the 
system of registration failed. Other factors, such as large-scale mobility of the 
169 The responsibility to carry along one's ID card was first created by the Registration of Persons 
(Amendment)CNo.2) Ordinance 1979, Ordinance of Hong Kong 1979. no.51, in which people were 
required to present their ID in certain areas and occasions if requested by police or immigration officers. 
The practice was then extended territory-wide in the Immigration (Amendment)Q^jo.2) Ordinance 1980’ 
Ordinance ofHong Kong 1980. no.62. ‘ 
170 Formulated in 1887，no.8. 
171 Joe England, Industrial Relations and Law in Hong Kong, op cit., p.99. 
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population and the yet undifferentiated government administration, made effective 
supervision through registration not feasible. Anyway, the registration system was 
eventually considered useless by the government and abandoned in 1920.172 i^ the 
1920 edition of the law, a society would become unlawful under two conditions. 
Either it was a triad society or it was declared to be unlawful by the Govemor. The 
Govemor could declare a society unlawful by two further conditions. First when its 
objective was considered incompatible with the peace and good order of the colony. 
Second when its activities caused or incited trouble in China. Albeit having no 
compulsory registration system, the Societies Ordinance was still a powerful tool for 
the government to outlaw undesirable associations. The decision of the Govemor was 
fmal. The law contained no provisions for the condemned societies to appeal against 
the Governor's decision. Society had no channels at all to prove itself lawful before 
the administration or the court. Hence the law provided draconian power for the 
Govemor to dispose according to his own will. The Chinese Seamen's Trade Union, 
which heralded a paralyzing strikes in early 1920s, was outlawed through this way.i73 
Seeing strike activities in Hong Kong were politically contaminated, the colonial state 
also made it part of the Governor's prerogatives under emergency to ban any 
"organisation whatever which in the opinion of the Govemor in Council is used to 
promote a general strike or disorder of any kind or the spread of s e d i t i o n . " i 7 4 
Might be because of the experience of failure during the early years, when the 
registration system was introduced again in the newly consolidated Societies 
Ordinance 1949, it was taken as only a temporary measure. The Legislative Council 
was empowered to abolish it any time through resolution. Moreover, the continuation 
of this new law required yearly rectification from the Council. This measure lasted 
172 Societies Ordinance 1920. 
173 Joe England, Industrial Relations and Law in Hong Kong, op cit., p.l02. 
174 Norman J Miners, "The use and abuse of Emergency Powers by the Hong Kong Government", op 
cit., p.54. ‘ 
94 
for 20 years. It was made a permanent system in 1970 when the Attorney General 
considered ‘it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, it would be unwise to • 
contemplate its l a p s e ' . i 7 5 Between the years 1949 and 1970，the law was amended a 
few times. Every time the amendment added new power either to the law 
enforcement agencies to enter and search premises of societies, or extended the 
original criminal categories to allow more people who were affiliated with the 
societies to fall into the net of criminal liability. Unlike the to and fro of the pre-war 
attempt to supervise societies，the colonial state after the war saw an ever increasing 
need to rely on compulsory registration and continuous supervision to contain the 
Chinese societies from being politicized. 
The Registrar of Societies was the new measure introduced to strengthen the • 
supervision over societies through registration. This Registrar has been nobody else 
but the Commissioner of Police. The involvement of police to fill this post 
demonstrated that societies were understood as the breeding beds of criminal 
behaviors therefore they should be subjected to continuous scrutiny. Beside this, the 
membership to any societies was deemed connected to the crimes committed in the 
name o f the societies. Societies actually could not commit crime but somebody in the 
name of the societies could. If a person committed certain crime in the name of a 
society his crime would be double counted, one for the criminal act itself, another for 
his association with others to commit the crime. The latter liability applied to other . 
members of the societies as well even if they did not by themselves commit any 
criminal act. They were assumed to have the knowledge how the societies were run. 
Hence office-bearer of the societies and other members of the societies had 
responsibility to check their own selves and kept everything about the running of the 
societies in hand to report to police when r e q u e s t e d . i 7 6 
‘75 Hong Kong Hansard 1970/71. Hong Kong Government Printer, p.69. . 
176 The registrar can call for information from any societies at any time. Such information includes 
personal particulars and records of meetings. See Societies Ordinance 1949’ Ordinance o f H n n p Kone 




Throughout the Societies Ordinance (and its subsequent amendments), the most 
frequently mentioned crime was not any crime against person or property, but a crime 
related to an unlawful society. An unlawful society is essentially one that does not 
conform to the supervisory requirements spelt out in the ordinance. Hence we get a 
full circle. The Societies Ordinance was a piece of law aimed at and only at 
supervising societies. Britain itself did not have any law comparable to that in Hong 
Kong.i77 The laws against societies were merely products of the colonial setting. 
Therefore, we will miss the point if we think Societies Ordinance was a • 
supplementary law aimed to contain conventional c r i m e s . i 7 8 it was the instrument for • 
the colonial state to keep an eye on the evolution of Chinese associations. From its 
1949 inauguration edition on, the Societies Ordinance contained three tiers of criminal 
liability. Cutting the linkage between local societies and ‘foreign，groups was the 
main purpose of the original law. Hence the first tier outlawed any societies which 
had connection with organizations from outside the border. Section four of the law 
required all societies to be ‘deemed to be established in the colony even if their 
headquarters situate elsewhere.' By definition non-local societies were akeady 
unlawful. The next section further specified that if a local society was found to be a • 
branch of or was affiliated with groups of a political nature established outside the • 
colony would be unlawful. This was the immediate response to the political scenario 
when the Chinese Civil War ended. Parallel to the deport-mode described above, 
which made unwelcome individuals liable to be deported or expelled by defining them 
177 "As a comparison, it should be noted that in the UK, there is no law requiring registration of all 
associations or making it an offence to form and operate an association without registration with the 
authorities; people can freely associate provided they do not engage in illegal activities", in AHYC, 
"Civil liberties in Hong Kong: freedoms of expression and association", Hong Kong Law Joumal. 
vo.l9, no.l, 1989,p.5. 
178 It is said that the Societies Ordinance, "which has a distinct Hong Kong flavor to it,....is of • . 
importance because it is the principal means of prosecuting triads, their members, and those associated 
with them, simply for their triad activities." See Michael Jackson, "Hong Kong's Principal Criminal 
Ordinances and Common Law Offences", M S Gaylord and Harold Traver, ed., Introduction to Hong 




as undesirable, unwelcome collectivities in the colony could then be dissolved by the 
colonial state. 
The second tier contained an array of criminal offences about participating in the 
activities of an unlawful society. The 1949 edition criminalised those who were in 
charge of the unlawful society, those who had its membership, those who attended its 
meeting and those who provide premises for its activities. Membership to a society 
was proved when one was found to have possession of any booklets or pamphlets • 
about the societies. A few years later those who gave financial support to an unlawful • 
society and those who invited others to join the activities of such society would be 
criminalised. Anybody who were found present in the premises of that society would 
be assumed as being a member to it.i79 The second tier of control was completed in 
the 1957 amendment when officer-bearer of a society was defined as including those 
who take charge of the branches of the society and they were then liable for any 
criminal wrongs of the s o c i e t y . ' ^ o The web of control reached its widest scope in 
terms of the categories of people involved. 
The third tier of control had its starting point in 1957. It focused on how a • 
society, originally registered, was run. Logically and intertemporally, this tier should • 
follow the first two when the government had now a bundle of 'unlawful' societies to 
be regulated. After 1957, any society which tried to exercise influence to conduct and 
manage any school would be rescinded from the registration, hence restricting the 
internal connection network (instead of external) that could be established by any 
s o c i e t y J 8 i This tier was formally and fully installed in 1961. The 1961 amendment 
of the law required all societies to submit their constitutions to the registrar. The 
societies could not change the constitutions by themselves without the registrar's 
參 
� 7 9 Societies (Amendment) Ordinance 1952, Ordinance ofHong Kong 1952. no.3, s 11’ 12A, 12B and 
14.3. ., 
180 Societies (Amendment) Ordinance 1957, Ordinance ofHong Kong 1957. no.31, s 2 and 12E. 
181 Ibid., s 5. 
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approval. The registrar had also the power to check if any activities heralded by the 
societies were contravening to their constitutions or not. A contravention might lead a 
society to be termed unlawful. Following this, no societies could establish any 
branches without a p p r o v a l . i 8 2 Therefore, the police commissioner as registrar could 
have the ability to conduct day-to-day supervision over any potentially troublesome 
organizations and could limit their growth. 
Unlike the institutional setups of the deport-mode, the societies-mode did not 
experience a rise and decline. Throughout the years starting from the end of the 
Second World War, the societies-mode was kept on being strengthened. Despite of 
this fact, the societies-mode had undergone a steady process of normalization. We 
knew the registrar for societies was the commissioner ofpolice. However, practically 
the Special Branch within the police took care of the registration before 1961. The 
Special Branch was responsible for “preventing and detecting subversive activities in 
the colony and for supplying the intelligence necessary to maintain internal security." 
183 The task of supervising societies was taken as part of this responsibility. From 
1962 on, the practice was routinised and hence transferred to the newly established 
licensing section. The Special Branch had been the core body to execute the act of 
criminalising deviant social activists. Some evidence show that, beside the routine 
deportation by the court, the decision to deport trouble-makers depended a lot on the 
judgment of the Branch. Remember that infringing Societies Ordinance was among 
the scheduled offences liable to deportation, the Branch might be the linking 
organization which identified deviant societies and subjected their members to 
expulsion. In 1961 the Expulsion ofUndesirables Ordinance was repealed. This year 
may serve as a good indicator to mark one of the twists from the deport-mode to the 
societies-mode of criminalisation. 
182 Societies (Amendment) Ordinance 1961, Ordinance ofHong Kong 1961. no.28, s 5C and 5F. 
183 In the beginning of 1962, the registration of approved societies was taken up by the licensing 
section from the hand of Special Branch. See Hong Kong Report 1962. p.207. 
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Parallel to the introduction of institutional supervision over societies, another 
system overseeing trade union was also produced. The first Trade Unions and Trade 
Disputes Ordinance was enforced in 1948. Before its enforcement, the act of 
establishing trade union itself was already a criminal offence. This law confirmed the 
necessity of a compulsory registration system of trade unions and at the same time 
provided a legal status for them.i84 Similar to other legal instruments in both deport-
mode and societies-mode, the major component of this law was the establishment of a 
filter that could prevent some politically affiliated organizations from involving into 
trade disputes. Any trade unions, even if they were registered, could not affiliate or 
connect with organizations outside Hong Kong without the consent of the Governor 
(who has never granted such consent). Non-compliance with this requirement would 
tum the registered unions instantly into unlawful s o c i e t i e s . i 8 5 A year later the Illegal 
Strikes and Lock-outs Ordinance was introduced to “prevent strikes and lockouts 
having an object other than or in addition to the furtherance of a trade dispute，”86 
Hence this piece of law could substantively deter any trade unions from turning into 
pressure groups or political groups. These laws were consolidated into the Trade 
Union Registration Ordinance in 1961. Since the treatment against trade unions when 
deemed unlawful were equal to those of unlawful societies and the public order law 
also governed strikes, I would not dwell on the system of control over trade u n i o n s . i 8 7 
184 Therefore the law contained a curious section saying that "the purpose of any trade union shall 
not...be deemed to be unlawful so as to render any member of such trade union liable to criminal 
prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise." See Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance 1948. no.8 
o f l 9 4 8 , s 3 . 
185 ibid, s 10(iv)(l) and s 10 (iv)(2). 
186 Illegal Strikes and Lock-outs Ordinance 1949. no. 16 of 1949, title. 
187 Actually many attention had been drawn to the repressive trade union law in Hong Kong. See Joe 
England, Industrial Relations and Law in Hong Kong, op cit. 
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3.3 The Disorder-mode 
With or without the mobilization of any specific organizations, people may 
assemble publicly. Therefore we can fmd laws defining what constitute the 
appropriate public conduct of a group of people. Not unexpectedly, the earliest law 
governing public meetings and processions was formulated along a racist line. Before 
the formal enactment of the Public Order Ordinance 1948，the law governing conducts 
of public meetings and assemblies was the Regulation of Chinese Ordinance 1888. 
The Chinese community, which was not considered as a part of the Hong Kong polity 
at that time，was governed through the authorized Secretary of Chinese Affairs. The 
Secretary held the household registration of Chinese and headed the Chinese Watch to 
take care of community order. The colonial control of the Chinese community was 
also channeled through the Secretary. Processions and meetings, except traditional 
funerals or marriages, were basically forbidden. The law required that, ‘“no person 
shall organize, equip, or take part in any procession, with or without music, in any 
public street or road in the City of Victoria." And "Chinese shall hold or be present 
at any Chinese public meeting whatever not being a meeting solely for religious 
worship and without a permit under the hand of the g o v e m o r . ' ' i 8 8 
Hence in no way could public gatherings among Chinese be conducted lawfully. 
The harsh restrictions formulated in the Regulation of Chinese Ordinance were copied 
nearly words to words in the Summary Offence Ordinance 1932, making any 
contravention to the above-mentioned restrictions part of the formalized conventional 
c r i m e s . i 8 9 The only change introduced in the latter law was not a change in the 
substantive content of control, but the agent of control. The District Officer and the 
Inspector General of Police gradually replaced the Secretary of Chinese Affairs as the 
arms of the state to reach the Chinese community. 
188 the above quotation see Regulation of Chinese Ordinance 1888. no.3 o f l 8 8 8 , s 23 and s 50. 
189 see Summary Offences Ordinance 1932. no.lO of 1932, s 3.16 and s 3.18 respectively for 
procession and meeting. 
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The introduction of the Public Order Ordinance in 1948 ushered a formal 
recognition of public meetings. The element of race was definitely a core component 
in the pre-1948 versions of the public order laws. These versions were promulgated 
in order to allow the British polity to outlaw Chinese public meetings. In 1948，public 
meeting was recognized as a form of political participation. Public meeting was 
defined as meeting "held for the purpose of matters of public interest or for the 
expression of views on such matters ."^90 it was a big twist indeed, even though 
public meeting as defined in this way might be another attempt of the colonial state to 
subject the public conduct of Chinese to control. The political character (matters of 
public interest and expression of views) of public meetings was recognized but at the 
same time the colonial state through the law tried to prevent any political associations 
from involving into public meetings. Participants of the meetings were not allowed to 
wear uniform signifying any association of political organizations. They were also 
forbidden to promote any political object, or else they would be guilty of an 
o f f e n c e . i 9 i This section arouse some controversy when it was discovered later that it 
was copied from an African jurisdiction where it was used to combat nationalist 
movements. Actually the government frankly acknowledged that the law was made as 
a preventive measure to "curb the activities of political organizations which seek to 
advance their views by f o r c e . " ^ 9 2 Here the political organization which were 
considered as advancing their views by force referred obviously to the organizations 
associated with either the Communists or KMT. It was also argued that the law could 
preserve and strengthen "the right of public meeting of ordinary peaceful c i t i z e n s . " i 9 3 
Curiously enough, throughout the ordinance not a single section positively confirmed 
such a right to meeting. Neither did any sections lay down the conditions for which 
190 Public Order Ordinance 1948. no.59 of 1948, s 2. 
191 ibid, s 3 • 
192 Hong Kong Report 1948. p.96. 
193 ibid. 
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the police could protect or intervene into the conduct of the meetings. Contrary to the 
concept of residual power in the common law, the unspecified part was left to the 
police to intervene when they thought fit. The police could patrol the individuals in 
the meetings to see if they committed any rioting, assault or breach of peace or not.i94 
This specific aspect of police power was not defined in the Public Order Ordinance 
under the light of how meetings could be conducted, but was specified in the 
Summary Offence Ordinance in which no consideration of public meeting as a kind of 
political participation was m e n t i o n e d . i 9 5 Although public meeting was recognized 
implicitly in the law as a mode of political participation, it was not considered as a 
kind of citizen right. It was only understood as an occasion when individual crime 
might take place. Therefore we can hardly infer clearly from this law under what 
conditions a public meeting was lawful and should be protected, or what constituted 
an unlawful meeting. The meeting itself was not an object to be protected or to be 
criminalised. 
Three years later, permit for participants to apply for conducting meetings was 
introduced. Police was given the power to specify the conditions of the permit. 
However still then no objective rules were laid down in the amended ordinance to 
determine exactly what kinds of conditions should be considered and for what reasons 
should the conditions be specified. The permit could also be revoked at any time.i96 
The 1948 edition of Public Order Ordinance and its subsequent amendments 
194 Conduct in meetings was further regulated in the Summarv Offences (Amendment) Ordinance 
1949. no . l l of 1949，s 3.18A, in which any person "in any public place or at any public meeting uses 
threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach ofthe peace" was 
an offence. 
195 for rioting, riotously behavior was defmed as, "every person who behaves in a riotous, noisy or 
disorderly manner, or uses any profane or indecent language or any threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behavior, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace may 
be occasioned, or who makes any speech tending directly or indirectly, whether by inference, 
suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise, to encourage or incite any person to interfere 
with the maintenance of law and order." See Summarv Offences Ordinance 1931. ibid., s 19. 
196 Public Order (Amendmenfl Ordinance 1951. no.2 of 1951, and Public Order (AmendmenO nMo.2) 
Ordinance 1951. no.43 of 1951. 
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contained nothing about "public procession". The legal concept of public procession 
was introduced to Public Order Ordinance in 1967 when the whole piece of law was 
rewritten. 
If the disorder-mode of criminalisation against civil strifes should draw our 
attention to the on-spot control of civil strifes or other social actions, then the previous 
description did not suffice to pinpoint its installation. After the 1951 technical 
amendment to the law, a long silence was observed in the disorder-mode despite the 
fact that large scale turmoil took place in early and mid-1950s. These experiences of 
disturbance did not initiate any changes in the respective laws in disorder-mode. It 
was not until the end of 1966 and 1967 riots when elaboration and frequent 
amendments of the Public Order Ordinance took place. 
Adding to the institution which had laid down the criteria to differentiate 
between desirable or undesirable residents and societies, the 1967 newly consolidated 
Public Order Ordinance provided the third pair of differentiation: the desirable or 
undesirable assemblies. The division was drawn by introducing a licensing system. 
Most of sections in the older version of the public order law which banned political 
organizations from involving in meetings and processions were retained in the 1967 
edition and were rightly put under the sub-title of "control of organization". This part, 
which constituted the first part the 1967 law, also incorporated a new section 
prohibiting display of flags, banners and emblems. It certainly was an immediate 
response to the 1967 riots.i97 
Public meetings and processions (now included) could be conducted if their 
organizers obtained licenses from the Commissioner of Police. An applicant should 
apply for license at least seven days before the commencement of the activities. 
Before the license was issued, announcing any details of the gatherings to the public 
would automatically make the gatherings unlawful. The Commissioner of Police 




could impose any conditions in the license as he thought fit. The licensing system was 
pretty restrictive. But the Attorney General, when explaining this law to the 
Legislative Council, was not pointless in claiming that before the enforcement of this 
law "the grant or refusal of a license is...wholly at the discretion o f the Commissioner. 
Part III of the [Public Order] Bill sets out in much greater detail the circumstances in 
which licenses may be granted to hold public meetings, the way in which they are to 
參 
be applied for and the terms and conditions on which they may be issued.，，i98 
The law also, at the first time，elaborated on the on-spot power of control for 
police to regulate the conduct of any meetings and processions. The police patrolling 
the gatherings could alter any conditions contained in the license at any time and 
disperse the gatherings when a breach of peace took place. A higher ranking police 
officer could simply order a dispersal without condition. These draconian power was 
justified by the recurring threat that any "gatherings of persons can be whipped up into 
a riotous mob" and therefore it should "confer upon responsible police officers 
adequate powers to halt and disperse unruly crowds at any early stage.，，i99 
參 
When three or more persons among the gatherings were acting in a disorder way 
that migkt create a threat of breach of the peace then the assembly would tum into an 
unlawful assembly. When the breach of the peace really took place then the gathering 
� was already a riot.200 
Therefore, adding together, three clusters of conditions defined what was an 
unlawful, or undesirable, meeting or procession. First, it was undesirable when the 
procedures for applying for a license were not complied with. Second when the police 
imposed on-spot order to the gathering persons but was disobeyed. Then when some 
members of the gathering seemed likely or had actually committed a summary offence 
• 
• 
198 Hong Kong Hansard 1967. p.438-9. ., 
199 ibid., p.440. 
200 Public Order Ordinance 1967. ibid, s 18 and s 19. 
104 
ofbreach of peace.20i 
The law invited a lot of criticism. As a response it was amended in 1970 to 
• 
clarify the scope of police power and the degree of criminal liability of the participants. 
Yet the basic system of licensing and the logic of criminalisation summarized above 
remained the same.202 
It should also be noted that, given the particular political nature and the scale of 
the 1967 riots, the colonial state has applied its power under the emergency 
regulations to search and arrest leftist activists and deport some of their leaders back 
to China. Nevertheless the application of the emergency regulations during this 
incident was extraordinary and in no other cases from 1970s onward we can find the 
state use emergency power to tackle social unres t .203 The Public Order Ordinance has 
• 
been since then the main instrument of the state in regulating civil strifes. 
Subsequent amendments of the law in the 1970s only strengthened the power of 
the police to conduct on-spot 'stop and search’ practice, although the motivation of 
this changes might not be an impulse to control public g a t h e r i n g s . 2 0 4 
Real change in the system came in late 1970s, after a few incidents where the 
exercise of police power during public gatherings were severely c r i t i c i z e d . 2 0 5 The 
1980 amendment replaced the licensing system for public meeting with a notification 
system. It made it more difficult for the police to impose ex ante control over 
meetings. A even greater change was the exemption of any meeting from notification 
參 
201 the Attorney General precisely summarized the law as conferring "adequate powers for the 
prevention and control of disorders at all stages, with particular emphasis upon dealing with them as 
early as possible." Hons Kong Hansard 1967. p.442. 
202 Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1970. no.31 of 1970. See also the explanatory note given by 
the Attomey General, Hong Kong Hansard 1970. p.333>41. 
203 Norman J Miners, "The use and abuse of Emergency Powers by the Hong Kong Government", 
op.cit., p.57. 
204 Subsequent amendments see no.24 of 1972, no.20 of 1975, no.27 of 1978. The perceived crisis 
behind these changes seemed to be the upsurge ofjuvenile delinquency. 




with participants fewer than thirty persons. These two added together created a sphere, 
although partial，of freedom for the fellow residents to associate publicly. Regulation 
over procession remained in the old form and did not change in a similar vein until 
1995. The introduction of the licensing system was aimed to rationalize the control ' 
power of police. Yet over time this practice increased the mutual predictability of the 
activists and the police, and provided an arena where implicit bargaining between the 
state and society over more freedom vs. more control took place. 
3.4 Compar ing the Three: the Locus of Change 
After charting the legal changes of the three modes of criminalisation against 
civil strifes respectively, it is time to put them together. Three questions will be asked 
here. First, how can we conceptualize the institutional characters of the previous 
factual account? Second, what was the intertemporal relationship among the three? ' 
Third, how could these legal changes shed light on the changing boundary between 
the colonial state and the society in Hong Kong? 
Further dimensionalisation: phases 
The legal contexts of all three modes of criminalisation against civil strifes 
evolved toward the direction of increasing complexities. However, in order to further 
conceptualize the relationship of changes among them, it does not suffice to focus 
only on the quantitative proliferation of laws under each mode. Keeping in mind that 
we aim to locate the instance of institutionalization of these modes, I would advocate 
a conceptual scheme which is constructed on the basic of the qualitative ' 
differentiation of the legal forms of the three modes. I will argue that we can further 
dimensionalise the modes of criminalisation against civil strifes into phases. The 
yardstick to locate the qualitative changes between one phase and the other is the style 
oflegal control. 
Regarding the style of legal control, Donald Black once advocated a four-fold 




therapeutic style and conciliatory s t y l e . 2 0 6 Classificatory criteria of these styles lie in 
the intensity of coercion used during control. I will collapse the latter three types of 
legal control under one concept: regulatory style, of which the use of coercion is not 
• 
the main tenet for control as stands against the penal style of legal control. Beside, 1 
will add one more dimension to the style of legal control. Intuitively, an institution of 
control can be described in respect of whether it singles out an identifiable group of 
persons targeted for control. In one way, it can take a catch-all approach, which is, the 
targeted group of persons to be controlled is undifferentiated meaning that whoever 
under whatever circumstance could be liable to control and punishment. Otherwise, 
the institution of control can narrow down its focus on some specific group(s) of 
persons in order to effect intensive supervision. The cost o f the latter approach is that 
the control would then be target-specific, meaning that particularistic circumstance 
• 
had to be singled out as premises for the institutions to work. I will denote these two 
different'approaches as an undifferentiated vs specific style of legal control. 
We now have a two by two matrix as follows: 
totensity of coercion: Penal Regulatory 
Identifiable group of 
persons targeted for 
control  
Undifferentiated I . 
Specific • II III 
Among the four boxes, boxes I, II and III could be logically e l a b o r a t e d . 2 0 7 
206 Donald Black, The Behavior of Law, op cit., p.6. 
207 by definition, regulatory style of control requires a specified object because it is a more delicate 
style of control as it depends not on coercion. I therefore cannot conceptualize anything that falls in the 
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• 
Box I: The undifferentiated phase is the phase in which no clear cut legal 
definition for the objects of control is available. Having no differentiated definition of 
the objects of control does not imply that such objects do not exist or are not put under 
controlled. It simply says that the objects cannot be recognized from the general 
disposal of power of the law enforcement agencies. 
Box II: The control phase is the phase when the objects of control are defined 
explicitly. The objects are now entering into legal entities, with definitive attributes 
specified. The introduction of this phase is usually easily be recognized. But its 
completion may not be noticeable. Several rules of thumb can be used. First, the 
definition o f the objects of control is always defined in the negative way. It means the 
attributes produced are used to constitute the "unlawfuhiess" of the objects. Second, 
subsequent changes in this phase expand the scope of control, either through 
redefining the objects so that more categories of people will fall into the definition, or 
peripheral offences are constructed to criminalise those associated with the objects. 
Less important landmark is the attempt to increase the penalty (especially in terms of 
imprisonment) for the above offences. These serve as criteria to locate the beginning 
and end of this phase (but not end of criminalisation). As a general rule, we can 
expect that the number of prosecution during the control phase wili be the highest 
within any modes of criminalisation. 
Box III: While the unlawful objects for control are defined, the other side of the 
coin, the lawful objects (which are also put under control), are usually at the same 
time implied in the legal institution. I will call it the disciplinary phase^^^ when the 
regulation of the implied lawful objects become the focus of law-makings. The laws 
in this phase specify administrative procedures for people to comply with in order to 
distinguish themselves from their unlawful counterparts. The administrative 
remaining box. .. 
208 I use the concept of 'control' when the state underlines conditions penalizing the objects to prevent 
them from acting in such a way as spelt in the conditions, 'disciplinary' when the state specifies what 
conditions the objects should follow accordingly to retain the state's lawful recognition. 
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institution for disciplining the lawftil objects may be the same one as that of 
controlling the unlawful objects. However, it now serves another purpose to provide 
routinised supervision over the boundary between lawfulness and unlawfulness, rather 
than focusing only on the latter. When this phase is completed, we should be able to 
point out clearly under what criteria the objects can make a claim to the state for • 
recognition. 
The forthcoming scheme itself does not assume a sequential relationship among 
the three phases. However, as the following descriptions will show, a locus starting 
from box I to II then to box III as time goes by can be observed if we follow the 
historical development of any one mode of criminalisation against civil strifes in 
Hong Kong. The change from the undifferentiated to specific (and penal to regulatory 
as well) style of control suggests that the institution of legal control is getting more 
and more rational (instrumentally). During the process the institution of control is not 
only sharpened and better defined by law, it is also developing into some kinds of • 
routinised practices. In other words, the control itself is becoming grounded in the • 
society. I will denote the end point of this process as the institutionalizing phase 
which referring to the occasion under which the means of control are accepted by the 
controlled as normalized. The measures of control in tum create some kinds of civic 
duties. People's compliance to these measures is reflexive without their conscious 
association with the original intent of the means of control when introduced. This 
phase is the most difficult one to be identified because it assumes active consent from 
the part of the subjected to accept the state's intrusion into society. It also assumes 
that the state will recognize that people complying to the concerned institution would • 
acquire a legitimated status (as rewards to their compliance). 
參 
ln the immediate post war era, all three modes of criminalisation against civil 
strifes were at the undifferentiated stage. Although aliens could be expelled, societies 
could be dissolved and participants of public gatherings could be charged, no explicit 
criteria for the exercise of such power were provided. Hence the above 
criminalisation was enabled either with the prerogative power of the Govemor, or 
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with the general power of the police. 
Deport-mode and societies-mode entered into the control phase in 1949. The 
life of deport-mode-control-phase was pretty short. Li the year 1955/6 it tumed 
gradually into the disciplinary phase. Specialized immigration law and its 
enforcement service was thereafter created. We can take 1978 to 1980 as the 
beginning of the last institutionalizing phase. From these years on, state power related 
to immigration control was rarely challenged. Hong Kong residents took compliance 
with the immigration law (and the related personal registration system as with) as an 
unquestionable civic duties. 
The societies-mode underwent a similar sequence of change. Its locus of change 
is clearer if we compare it with the deport-mode. ln the deport-mode the 
consolidation of disciplinary phase essentially displaced the control phase, bi the 
societies-mode the two went hand in hand. The proliferation of administrative 
measures governing day-to-day running of lawful societies emerged in around 1956/7 
and they were subsequently consolidated in 1961. bi the deport-mode an 
institutionalizing phase can be more or less identified. Li the societies-mode we 
cannot safely point out when formation of societies becomes a legitimated claim 
recognized by the state. As a result, we may simply take 1961 as the dividing line to 
cut the societies-mode into two broad phases, the control and disciplinary phases. 
The undifferentiated phase of disorder-mode lingered until 1967 when 
unlawfulness of meetings and processions were explicitly defined. Hence it entered 
the control phase. The subsequent amendments to the system in the 1970s were not 
easy to be classified as strengthening of control phase or introduction of disciplinary 
phase. Some kind of a mix actually took place. But we can pick 1980 as a watershed. 
That year the arbitrariness of on-spot power rendered to the police was largely curbed 
and regulated. If we extend our view beyond the year 1980，we can find subsequent 
amendments in the forms of subsidiary regulations governing the running of public 
gatherings. The completion of the disciplinary phase of both societies-mode and 
disorder-mode may be located in early 1990s when they were at that time discussed 
110 
the light of civil r i g h t s . 2 0 9 
Intertemporal relationship and institutional repertoire 
The relationship among the three modes of criminalisation against civil strifes . 
has not been one replacing the other. If we summarize their institutional changes as 
罄 
discussed in the previous section, we can see their relative movements in the 
following table. The columns are divided into blocks denoting twists of phases. I 
have to admit that the boundaries of the blocks are drawn with some arbitrariness. 
However, the relative changes of the three modes of criminalisation against civil 





209 Societies Ordinance was amended in 1993 to abolish the compulsory registration system. A partial 
voluntary notification system was introduced. Public Order Ordinance was amended in 1994 to lift the 
licensing system on processions. 
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Table 3.1: Intertemporal Changes of Three Modes of Criminalisation against Civil 
Strifes 
Year Deport-mode Societies-mode Disorder-mode 
1946 and [undifferentiatedphase] [undifferentiatedphase] [undifferentiated phase] 
before -Any aliens could be deported by -Any Chinese societies and trade -Any public meetings and  
Govemor. unions were unlawful. processions were unlawftjl 
194 7 
1948 [control phase] [Control phase] -Defined undesirable meetings 
-Courts were given power to -Established trade union and their control enforced. 
deport aliens. registration system. 
1949 -Schedule of offences leading to -Established societies 
deportation installed. registration system 
-Defined undesirables and their -Defined undesirable societies 
expulsion enforced. and their control enforced. 
-Established personal registration 
system. 
~ 9 5 0 - l 
1952 -Scope ofcriminaiisation over 
participation to societies 
activities expanded. 
~ 9 5 3 - 4 
1955 -Schedule of deporting offences  
abandoned. 
1956 -Deport power shrunk back to the  
hand of Govemor.  
1957 [disciplinaryphase] -Introduced mechanism for day-
to-day supervision of lawful 
societies. 
~ 1 9 5 8 
~ f 9 5 9 
1960 
1961 -Expulsion of undesirables [disciplinary phase] 
repealed. -Extended mechanism for day-to-
-Established immigration service, day supervision of lawful 
societies and trade unions. 
1962-6 
1967 [control phase] 
-Defined undesirable gatherings. 
... -Licensing system enforced. 
�• 一 -On-spot power of supervision 
provided. 
1968-9 
1970 -Established as permanent  
system. 
1971 -Deportation of aliens ordinance 
repealed. 
-Newly consolidated 
Immigration ordinance enforced. 
~ 7 2 - 8 
1979 -Residents have to carry ID card  
in certain occasions.  
1980 [institutionalizingphase] [disciplinao' phase] 
-Residents have to carry ID card -Notification replaced licensing 
territory-wide. formeetings. 
-Designated places and exempted 
meetings according to number of 
J participants provided. “ 
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The three modes of criminalisation against civil strifes proceeded with different 
paces. The relationship between the deport and societies modes was very close. On 
the contrary the disorder-mode emerged as a distinguishable institution in late 1960s. 
Because these modes evolved with different paces, we can identify different mix of 
modes in different time intervals. If we read the table vertically we can see the change 
from one phase to another within every mode. If we read across the table, then we can 
locate the availability of institutional repertoire, or the mix of different modes, at any 
specific periods. Behaviorally all civil strifes are the same: people gather into groups 
or assemblies, make demands, herald solidarity, challenge the authority, so on and so 
forth. But on the part of the state, any response to such activities has to be channeled 
through some institutional setups. Li the last chapter, we come across how the state 
narrated and framed civil strifes during different periods. Here the institutional 
repertoire refers to the organizational and normative filters through which the state 
reacted to the strifes. 
Between 1948 and 1956 we fmd the disorder-mode undifferentiated while the 
deport-mode and societies-mode moved into the control phase. Therefore, the on-spot 
control of strifes had to depend on the general power of police to stop, search and 
arrest. At the same time no person could claim a right of abode or to assembly. The 
control phase recognized no rights in these respects. Issuing deportation orders was 
an executive act, not ajudicial one. Therefore people could be deported even when no 
substantiated conviction of any offences was found. The total number of people 
deported in this few years was remarkably high. 
Although the number of deportation orders issued in 1955/56 was the highest, 
actually this year already encountered difficulty in enforcing the o r d e r s . 2 i o When the 
control phase of the deport-mode subsided in 1955/56, the following years between 
1956 and 1961 saw a mix of deport-mode-disciplinary-phase with the control phase of 
210 "The policy regarding Deportation of Aliens was reviewed in Jan 1955 and, as a result, deportation 
orders against 2902 persons were rescinded during the year, these persons being allowed to remain in 
the colony." Hong Kong Police Report 1955/56. p.57. 
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societies-mode, while the disorder-mode still remained undifferentiated. If we use the 
number of societies refused to be registered to locate the intensity of the societies-
mode, we can，apart from the early 1950s high peak, see a sudden increase during 
1957-59. 
Table 3.2: Number ofPeople Deported or Expelled 1949-55 
Year Deportation Expuision  
1949 3130 W J 2  
1950/51 3754 ^  
1951/52 4555 ^  
1952/53 521 ^  
1953/54 5422 \ _ m  
1 9 5 4 / 5 5 5 2 9 2 ^  
1955/56 10159 179 
Source: Police Annual Report, various years. 
Merring from the number of deportation orders issued for crimes against 
Societies Ordinance, we can also see that the Societies Ordinance was heavily used 
during the same period despite of the fact that those deportation orders were no longer 
enforceable. 
Year 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 5 
Number ofrefused societies ^ 1 5 0 1 5 7 11 8 2 
Deport orders issued for crimes 4 9 3 3 5 3 3 N A * 3 1 
against Societies Ordinance  
Year 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 8 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 1 
Number of refused societies 6 \J_ ] ^ ^ 0 0 
Deport orders issued for crimes 51 2 9 8 * * 4 9 6 * * - - - — 
against Societies Ordinance  
Police Annual Reports, various years, number of societies refused registration after 1961 that around 0 to 3 per 
year. 
*Data unavailable 
**These are the number of people who received deportation order. Since the deportation no longer enforceable in “ 
large-scale after 1956，most of these people ultimately remained within the colony. 
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From 1961 to 1966，Hong Kong was save of large-scale social actions. The 
societies-mode gradually consolidated into the disciplinary phase in which routinised 
supervision over societies and trade unions was installed. It did not mean that no 
changes took place during this period. Because the disorder-mode was still not 
introduced, during this period the government strengthened the police capacity in 
general term in order to prepare for any serious strifes.211 
The 1966-67 riots activated the control phase of the disorder-mode. Therefore 
from these two years on, the Public Order Ordinance became the core instrument for 
the colonial state to tackle civil s t r i f e s . 2 1 2 Personal and societies registration were 
used to supplement it for which specific person or society could be chased through 
before or after a social action took place. 
From 1980 on, all modes entered either the institutionalizing phase or the 
disciplinary phase. We would expect that in the 1980s regulatory measures had 
replaced prosecution as the dominant strategies to handle social actions. Hong Kong 
in the 1980s was occupied with the issue of the PRC's resumption of sovereignty. 
The political context with which social actions took place was largely different from 
the pre-1980 era. Leaving all the complexities aside, we can see the residents in 
Hong Kong have already identified themselves as members of the Hong Kong home 
polity when faced with the 1997 issue. We can mark the completion of the three 
modes ofcriminalisation at the exact moment ofcompletion of colonial state-building. 
Ironically it was at the same time the de-colonization process began. 
211 see next chapter. 
212 see last chapter, table 2.8. 
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Chapter 4 Civil Strifes and the State Response 
With all the conceptual tools developed in the previous chapters in hand, we can 
now proceed to have a second and closer look at the incidents of civil strife in Hong 
Kong. Through the cursory reading of the official descriptions on these incidents in 
the end of chapter two, we already have some preliminary concepts about how these 
incidents had been defined by the colonial state. Li chapter three, we come across the 
evolution of the institutional setups governing the criminalisation of civil strifes and I 
have proposed a longitudinal scheme of institutional repertoire. Here we will 
concentrate on the dynamics of the process of criminalisation focusing on the actors 
involved in civil strifes. These actors include of course mainly the policing agency 
and the participants of the civil strifes. Again I will not pay attention to the 
idiosyncratic character of these actors. The objective of this survey is to have a better 
description of the process of interaction involved in criminalisation against civil 
strifes. I will use the concept of ‘style of policing' as a relational intermediate to 
capture this process. 
It is beyond my capacity to exhaust all incidents of civil strife during the years 
1946 to 1980. As a compromise, I take the chronological tables o f t h e Wah Kiu Yat 
Po (華橋日幸艮)Yearbook as the indirect source. The earliest Yearbook I managed to 
fmd was published in 1949 and it covered the major events that took place in Hong 
Kong in the year before, that is, 1948. The editors o f t h e Yearbook produced a pretty 
detailed chronology of events they considered salient. Incidents of civil strife hence 
can be located through scanning the Yearbooks from 1949 to 1981. After I have 
located the exact dates of the incidents, I resort to the corresponding pieces of 
newspaper for d e t a i l s . 2 i 3 The data extracted by this indirect means are certainly 
contaminated by the subjective preference of the Wah Kiu Yat Po Yearbook editors. 
213 This strategy is adopted from Benjamin K P Leung, "Collective Violence: a Social-structural 
Analysis", in his Social Issues in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: OUP, 1992, p.143-163. 
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This problem has two sides. The editors might have under-reported some salient 
incidents. I may therefore lose sight of some important data. The editors might also 
have over-reported some trivial incidents because of their subjective preference (I 
perhaps should remind the reader that Wah Kiu Yat Po had been more sympathetic to 
KMT). To minimize undue loss of data on salient incidents, the following remedies 
have been adopted. First, all incidents that are mentioned in the Hong Kong Report 
and Hong Kong Police Report would be included no matter if they are reported in the 
Yearbooks or not. Second, chronology of Wah Kiu Yat Po was measured against 
other documented chronologies of civil strifes or social actions to secure enough 
coverage of the salient incidents.2i4 Over-reporting was eliminated by resorting to 
newspapers other than the Wah Kiu Yat Po (which certainly reported those incidents 
contained in the Yearbook), hi this survey, I took Sing Tao Jih Pao (星島曰報）as a 
countercheck. Therefore, all incidents under survey had been reported by at least two 
well circulated Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong. Through this effort, we can nicely 
locate those incidents which had been widely observed by the public and the colonial 
state. 
I have been using the word 'strifes' casually in the previous chapters. At this 
juncture, we cannot appeal only to common-sense because we have to make choice on 
the border-line cases. Given the objective of the paper, I will use the concept ‘strife' 
to denote the incident in which articulated demand can be more or less identified 
among a group ofparticipants, organized or unorganized, with which state action was 
initiated to either control or criminalise the participants. Defined this way, two related 
classes ofincidents will be excluded in this survey. First, collective violence which is 
totally sporadic, like football hooligans or other mob violence, will not be counted as 
strifes. Second, social actions without confrontation with the state will not be counted 
as well. Violence is not a defining feature of strife in this chapter although in fact it is 




In this chapter, we will come across a factual description ofthese incidents first. 
Then the empirical scheme developed in the previous chapters will be brought forth to 
produce a whole picture. Appendix one contains the chronology of the incidents for 
reference. 
4.1 Incidents under undifferentiated phases 
The Kowloon Walled City bicident in 1948 was not only the first post-W.W.II 
incident in which large number of armed police were deployed to suppress the protest. 
It was also a symbolic case for illuminating the relationship between the colonial state 
and the society. The residents in the Kowloon Walled City were ordered to leave their 
habitats for clearance in 1948. They claimed that they were not subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the colonial state and hence refused to evacuate. Armed police were 
then sent to evict the residents. Conflict arose which resulted in two a r r e s t s . 2 i 5 
Kowloon Walled City was a very particular area in Hong Kong. The colonial state 
considered it as part of the colonial territory but the residents living inside the Walled 
City regarded themselves as Chinese citizens therefore the colonial laws should not 
have reached them. As a result, the incident of eviction was not only a matter of 
housing and resettlement, but also a conflict over recognition of sovereignties. For 
over quite an extended period, the civil strifes participants' refusal of the subjection to 
the colonial state and their implicit allegiance to sovereignties other than Britain 
characterized many salient strifes in Hong Kong, bi chapter two, I argued that before 
late 1960s，the colonial state did not defme civil strifes or social actions as 
endogenously originated problems. We can now see that the participants of civil 
strifes might have shared such a concept as well. The residents of the Kowloon 




colonial state to solve a seemingly eviction problem.2i6 
Although the residents claimed that they should be immune from the colonial 
laws, the arrested persons were anyway tried in the colonial judicial setting. The two • 
arrested resident representatives were charged with provoking people to riots. In the 
court, however, arguments about the question of this specific criminal offence were 
not conducted. The defendants centered their arguments over whether the laws in 
Hong Kong were valid in this case.2i7 They might have tried to use this tactic to 
delay the trial. The prosecutor tried to invalidate this line of argument and headed for 
a speedy trial because he considered delaying the trial would incite more people to • 
join disrupting the public order and even obstructing other police duties. The two 
accused were sentenced to three months' hard labor within ten days after arrest, 
without much dispute being conducted over the applicability of the specific criminal • 
offence (.that was, inciting others to riots) to the circumstance o f th i s incident.2i8 No 
attention was devoted to questions such as what constituted riots, to what extend the 
accused were involved in the strifes, so on and so forth. What really took place on-
spot during the strifes was considered secondary by both sides because the physical 
conflictual behaviour that took place between the protesters and police was 
understood as only an extended phenomenon of a deeper conflict. 
The idea of a ‘deeper conflict' behind the strifes led the colonial state (and the 
protesters as well) to shift their attention away from the scene at which the strifes 
really took place. We have to bear in mind this shift of focus and I will later argue • 
that it took more than twenty years for the conflicting parties to re-focus on the 
216 The residents were told by the delegation from China that they were struggling for the national 
sovereignty. Their uncompromised attitude arose excitement in China and the Chinese people sent 
them infinite sympathy. See 華僑日報,12/1/1948. 
9 1 7 
The defense lawyer argued that this case was vety complicated because it involved the problem of 
territory, sovereignty and jurisdiction. The question of whether the Kowloon Walled City was a 
Chinese or British territory was disputable. See 華僑曰報，14/1/1948. . 
218 The prosecutor argued in the court that this incident should not be "transformed into a political 
question,，while the defense lawyer answered to this attack by saying that "politics should not be an 





conduct of behaviour that took place during strifes. 
Beside the change of focus, the threshold that initiated police intervention 
should also be noted. La the 1948 Kowloon Walled City incident the residents had not 
yet organized any collective actions when the police circumscribed the site for 
eviction and arrested them. More than 250 police equipped with helmets, masks, 
shields, batons, pistols, rifles and tear-gas, which were the standard equipment of 
police before 1970s, were sent in the very early morning to the eviction site in order to 
give a pre-emptive strike to the residents. The fact that the police were heavily armed • 
showed tiiat the police expected a physical confrontation to take place. It was actually 
somehow incorrect to describe the confrontation as a police reaction to strife. The 
strife was expected to be a by-product of a police action which was planned well 
before any strife had really taken place. After the first confrontation, the evicted 
residents established some temporary shelters adjacent to the evicted plant. Within a 
week, the same heavily-armed police force were sent again to clear even the 
temporary shelters which incited another round of confrontation，resulting in six 
persons being injured. The action was again conducted when the residents did not 
have any idea of organizing collective protest or other obstructive m e a s u r e s . 2 i 9 • 
I will hereafter denote this style of action as pre-emptive when the police action 
is designed for a strife-to-be-expected. Police hit at potential protesters to nip the 
strife-to-be-expected at its bud. Cases showed that violent confrontation between 
police and the protesters usually took place and such confrontation was used as 
justification ofpol ice 's pre-emptive move. 
The second social action received wide media coverage was the taxi strike in 
1949. Originally the incident was only a disagreement between the trade union and 
the employer over salary. The taxi drivers sent volunteers to persuade other drivers to 
• 
219華僑€報,13/1/1948. It was reported that the residents actually had heard ofthe police action, but 
they thought the site was essentially cleared and therefore did not believe the police would take'any 
action. We have to bear in mind that in the late 1940s, establishing temporary shelters in space area 
was implicitly allowed by the state. 
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join the strike while the employer kept on recruiting new drivers to dilute the effect of 
strike .220 At the tum of 1948, one volunteer for the drivers was arrested and later 
found convicted of intimidation. The strikers who were responsible for setting up 
picket-line fell into the trap of criminalisation easily because persuading others to join 
the strike did not have a clear border line with threatening others to join.221 
Confrontation between the drivers and the colonial state took place when the 
development of the strike was about to approach the climax. After a long stalemate, 
the drivers and the employer started negotiation in January of 1949. The negotiation 
broke down because the two sides could not compromise on how many drivers on 
strike could retain their jobs. The drivers then commented the breakdown of the 
negotiation in a high-profile manner. The employer was condemned as exploiting the 
interest of the drivers and the public. The drivers also, at the first time, put part of the 
blame on the colonial state. They condemned the government as prejudicial because 
the government did not help solving the problem in a reasonable way. The drivers 
threatened that they would escalate the action and invited other social organizations to 
join t h e m . 2 2 2 These bold words might be uttered for emotional appeal only, but the 
police took them another way round. When the drivers sent a team of volunteers to 
set up picket line on the day after the breakdown of negotiation to persuade other 
drivers to join the strike, more than one hundred armed police were deployed to 
disperse the volunteers. Because peaceful strikes were recognized by laws, the police 
approached the drivers with another excuse. Forty-two drivers were arrested for 
obstruction of street and obstruction of the execution of police duty when they refused 
220 Development ofthe strike see 華僑曰報，16/9/1948，18/9/1948, 21/9/1948, 22/9/1948, 23/9/1948, 
12/11/1948. ‘ 
221 'Intimidation，had been a very arbitrary offence. It is reported that a worker in Kowloon Dairy was , 
convicted of intimidation after he had a open quarrel with the manager over another worker's being late. 




to d i s p e r s e . 223 Once again, we can see the deployment of pre-emptive strategy. When 
the activists presented perceived threat to the state, the latter would not be hesitate to 
nip the social action at its bud. Which law should be used for this purpose was not a 
matter of concern. Any summarily offences that could be used with ease could be used 
then. The drivers then approached the Labor Department to explain to them their 
labor right but of course they could not fmd any resort to protection there. 
The Kowloon Walled City incident and the taxi strike took place when the 
deport-mode and the societies-mode of criminalisation were about to be established. 
In another words, for the time-being, all modes of criminalisation against civil strifes 
were at their undifferentiated phases. Without any explicit institutional repertoire to 
follow, the state responded to strifes or potential strifes with a pre-emptive strategy 
and the full-capacity of police arm force were deployed. The immediate post-war 
colonial state might have perceived that the general condition of the society could 
either situate at any one of two extremes, that were, complete peace or large-scale 
turmoil. Or else we cannot explain why such a cautious attitude was adopted by the 
state to suppress potential strifes. For the part of the participants, their confrontation 
with the state did not initiate their demand for legal protection for conducting social 
actions. Li the case of taxi strike, some queries was cast on the issue of labor right to 
strike but these queries died down shortly after the accused drivers were released on 
bail. 
When the institutional repertoire for criminalising civil strifes gradually emerged, 
the conditions and thresholds which initiated state response to criminalising civil 
strifes changed as well. However, the policing style seemed lingered on even when 
the laws regulating social actions became more and more explicit. We should not 
assume an autonomous synchronization between law making and law enforcement, as 
I will show later in this chapter. 
223 華橋曰報，12/1/1949. All were found convicted and released on $5 bail. 
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4.2 Incidents under deport-mode and societies-mode 
As described in the previous chapter, in 1949 the colonial state founded a bundle 
of laws classifying the identities of the incomers to Hong Kong and registering 
personal and organizational information. The colonial state at that time had an 
obsession with possibility of total break-down of social order. It could be illuminated 
by the frequent riot exercises that were conducted during those years. The riot 
exercises conducted after 1949 combined the personnel from police and the military. 
The dummy riots were actually large scale armed street fights. Police were expected 
to be militarized enough to join the army in handling invasion. Fortunately the 
People's Liberation Army did not cross the Shengzheng River after 1948. Yet the 
effort to militarize the police was not wasted. The Tramway strike in 1950 proved 
that the police had the capacity and determination to suppress undesirable social 
actions with batons and tear-gas. Details of this incident have already been provided 
in chapter two therefore only a few words have to be added here. This incident was a 
turning point in the history of the evolution of criminalisation against civil strifes. 
This case took place when the control phase of deport-mode and societies-mode of 
criminalisation were first installed. The colonial state thereafter tightened up its 
control over societies (and trade unions as well) and kept close supervision over the 
personal data it had on the active unionists. The Tramway Union was no longer 
recognized as a legal counterpart to the management of Tramway after the conflict. 
The management painted the union as a potential conspiracy against the law and order 
of the colony and this positioning won the sympathy of the state. The Tramway 
management successfully prevent any tramway trade unions from obtaining legal 
status for years.224 
224 When asked by the Labor Department to consider recognizing the new Tramway labor union two 
years after the confrontation, the chief manager of the Tramway told the department head that the union 
was too political, not catering for the real welfare of the workers, and “if the company starts negotiating •‘ 
with the present union, then the interest ofthe company and workers will be hurt. The company refused 
to consider recognizing the union is also a responsible step for the interest of the Hong Kong colony. I 




The 1952 Kowloon disturbance was ignited by the mass dissatisfaction induced 
by the preemptive strategy of the police. After a fire that had broken out in Tong Tau 
Estate earlier in that year, a comfort mission form Mainland China planned to come to 
Hong Kong. Large number of people assembled in the Tsimshatsui train station at the 
scheduled time preparing to welcome the mission. When they were told that the 
comfort mission was prevented from entering into Hong Kong by the police, they 
dispersed in anger. During the dispersal, a possibly unintended conflict between the 
dispersing crowd and the transport police triggered a chain reaction ofhostility. Three 
hundred armed police were immediately sent to the scene which led only to larger 
scale violence. Police cars were bumt and the police were not hesitate to suppress the 
crowd with excessive force. Four youngsters were shot with one of them died of 
having six bullets. 
As I have argued before, in the early 1950s, the colonial state was preoccupied 
with the idea that the only origin of disturbance came from across the border. 
Therefore once the government knew that a comfort mission was coming to the 
colony, all police were ordered to cancel their scheduled leaves. They knew, as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, a strife was going to take place. In order to prevent the Hong 
Kong welcome mission from contacting the comfort mission which had been stopped 
at the border, the police even stopped the train heading to Lowu in Fanling and 
compelled all passengers either to get off there or return to T s i m s h a t s u i . 2 2 5 Later in a 
press release, the colonial state blamed the newly formed pro-PRC Federation of 
Trade Unions as not cooperating and it was the non-cooperation that had led to the 
outburst of the riots.226 Twenty-four persons were arrested during the disturbance and 
were charged with breach of peace, assaulting police and riotous behaviour. They 
were tried immediately and sent to hard labor. During the interim, bailing out was not 





fifteen and sixteen r e s p e c t i v e l y 2 2 7 The hunting for trouble-makers did not stop after 
the trial of rioters, bi the same month, three leftist newspapers were charged with 
sedition because they released a commentary from China blaming the colonial state as 
having brutally killed several Chinese r e s i d e n t s . 2 2 8 The police waming that was given 
to leftist trade unions were not empty words. Within months, with the help of the 
societies and personal registration system, large number of leftist union members were 
deported to China without c h a r g e s . 2 2 9 
bi some occasions, we can also find that the police were invited to settle the 
internal conflicts of trade unions. Given the colonial state's obsession, police were 
always ready to hit complaints that some fractions within trade unions were 
politicizing the w o r k e r s . 2 3 0 It was later stated clearly that the police, "in principle will 
not interfere with the freedom of trade unions, and allow them to work within the 
scope of catering workers' welfare. But political activities other than fMie r ing 
workers' welfare will not be tolerated. For example in the recent past, some conflicts 
were induced within trade union for this reason. The police had handled them 
effectively and suppressed them immediately, for the law and order of the s o c i e t y . " 2 3 i 
Can we suggest the threshold of criminalisation for these incidents? La the 
previous section I suggest that the general feeling of insecurity was enough to initiate 
preemptive action of the state. For the above-stated cases, the feeling of insecurity 
227 華僑曰報，4/3/1952, 5/3/1952. 
228 華僑日報，21/3/1952, 18/4/1952, 6/5/1952, 30/6/1952. The three newspaper were found convicted 
of sedition and the court ordered a ban over them for 6 months. The ban was lifted after one month of 
enforcement, possibly under the pressure of Mainland China. 
229 In April, 10 workers involved in WahKuen Plastic Factory strike were deported. In May, 5 union 
members were deported. In July, 14 union members that involved in intra-union conflict with the 
rightist wing were deported. See 華僑曰報，8/5/1952, 12/7/1952，24/7/1952. 
230 As recorded, police were involved in settling intra-union conflict for the Hong Kong Telephone Co., •• 
and the Shanghai Textile Factory and the Textile trade union. The leftist union members were then 
deported. See 華僑曰報，12/5/1952, 7/8/1952, 9/8/1952. 
231 華橋日報，9/8/1952, translation mine. 
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still played a crucial role but it was no longer a general feeling. The feeling of 
insecurity was projected to some specific targets. The police reaction (or action) to 
potential strifes was still pre-emptive but now it was a target-oriented pre-emptive 
strategy. A full scale outburst of social disorder was thought to be able to be 
prevented by this target-oriented pre-emptive strategy. Monitoring troublesome 
organizations and deporting suspicious activists, or in our terminology, the combined 
use of the deport-mode and societies-mode of criminalisation against civil strifes, 
were the backbone of this strategy. Between total peace and total break-up of order, 
there was a new scenario in between. It was the conditional peace with the trouble-
makers kept under surveillance. No wonder why in the previous chapter we noted the 
duty to keep personal registration, societies registration and to prevent subversion 
were taken care by one single section in the police, the Special Branch, in the early 
1950s. 
When monitoring over societies still could not prevent potential collective action 
from taking place, fully armed police would then be deployed to pre-empt the action, 
sometimes even at the cost of transforming possible peaceful collective action into 
violent strifes, ki the 1954 Tramway strike, the union told the public that it was going 
to organize a full scale s t r i k e . 2 3 2 The police responded by expressing a waming to the 
union p u b l i c l y . 2 3 3 The Commissioner ofPolice said the police would not obstruct any 
peaceful strike, but would not tolerate any breach of peace. He also at the same time 
announced that all police had to cancel their leaves in order to handle the Tramway 
strike. However the police action was not planned to protect peaceful strike and 
prevent breach of peace. Large number of police were sent to the venue in which the 
workers were holding meeting for the strike-in-planning. When a few union members 
started distributing pamphlets at the proximity of the venue to other tramway drivers, 
232 The Tramway Union had not yet been legally recognized by the company. See 華僑曰報， • 
14/10/1954. lt was reported that occasional intimidation from the union to other workers took place 
therefore the company refused to take it as legitimated and declined any proposal to negotiate with it. 




the police took action. Their encounter led to a small scale disturbance and eight 
union members were arrested. The police later explained that their prompt action was 
a duly reaction because the distributed pamphlets were not registered in the Secretary 
of Chinese A f f a i r s . 2 3 4 But in fact, the whole plan for the union to organize any strike 
was then aborted by this violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 2 3 5 Half a year later, hundreds of police 
were deployed to suppress another potential strike. The picket-line formed by the 
workers-on-strike in Meiah Factory was broke up. Violence was incited which 
resulted in four injuries and one arrested for assault. The strike was then • 
'prevented'236 • 
At the end of the last section we have talked about the phenomenon of ‘distance，. 
When the modes of criminalisation were still left undifferentiated, social actions and 
collective strifes were not considered as their own right. They were considered as 
derived phenomena from a ‘deeper，conflict between the colonial state and the society. 
During the control phase of the deport- and societies-modes of criminalisation, this 
‘distance，remained unfilled. All controversies about the confrontations centered 
upon the political acceptability of these organizations which had royalty to a state 
other than the colonial one in Hong Kong. It seemed that for the colonial state, a • 
violent confrontation was a better scenario than allowing the political undesirable • 
organizations to herald any successful collective action, even if the latter activities 
might be peaceful. It was simply because the political stand of the participants in 
social action was a more salient condition for the colonial state to determine the 
acceptability of such actions. 
When violent confrontation between protesters and police really took place, the 
protesters were usually charged with riotous behaviour, intimidation or assault. 
However, when trouble-makers were deported before they had committed any one of 
• 
234 華橋日報,2/12/1954. .. 
參 
235 Development ofthe incident, see also 華僑曰報，25/11/1954, 28/11/1954. 
2S6 華橋日報,19/4/1955. 
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the above offences, we cannot say for sure what kind of criminal wrongs should be 
attributed to them. The deport-mode was installed so that the colonial state could 
launch pre-emptive strike, according to some political criteria and not the protesters' 
physical behaviour during the confrontation with the colonial state. Given these 
premises, a militarized police equipped with intelligence work were sufficient for 
tackling the trouble-makers. Special Branch as the backup and the Anti-Riot Squad as 
the front-line were the norm at that time. 
4.3 Incidents under the societies-mode 
The outburst of the 1956 Kowloon disturbance, or the Double-tenth riots, was a 
surprise to the colonial state. It was unexpected and it developed in a speed and style 
the police found incapable of coping with. The British Military had to intervene and 
the first curfew after W.W.II was imposed. The confrontation led to fifty-nine persons 
killed with forty-four of them were killed by police f i r e a r m s . 2 3 7 
Ian Scott took this incident as a missed chance for the colonial state to reform 
itself, 1凡0 radical measures were taken to solve the social and political problems 
which the 1956 riots had revealed. The state remained unreformed; the structure of 
colonial authority stayed in place; and the people continued to be isolated, distant and 
sometimes resentful of their government and the privilege and wealth which it 
represented. The final evidence that this was an inadequate and dangerous response to 
poor social and working conditions came with the riots and disturbances of 1966 and 
1967."238 Scott failed to note that the state had reformed itself, not in calibrating its 
relationship with the society, but in police structure and policing style. To read from 
the lines of the government report of the disturbance, the state actually acknowledged 
the failure of the pre-emptive strategy that had been widely used to prevent 
237 Development o f the incident, see 星島日報，11/10/1956, 12/10/1956, 13/10/1956, 14/10/1956, 
15/10/1956, and 3/1/1957 for the commentary on the report published by the government. 
238 Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis ofLegitimacv in Hong Kong, op cit., p.80. 
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undesirable political organizations from gaining force, "there was no indication of 
any kind prior to October lOth, 1956 that there would be violent anti-Communist 
demonstrations or disturbances on that day.....Exhaustive investigation has not 
revealed the existence of any planning of the disturbances prior to the incident at Li 
Cheng Uk described immediately below; nor is there evidence of collusion with any 
outside age«c_y.，’239(italic mine) Preoccupied with the effectiveness of pre-emptive 
strategy with specific targets, the police suddenly found themselves not knowing how 
to respond to the protest which was spontaneous. The triggering event for the turmoil 
was a petty conflict between the public housing estate manager and the residents in 
Lichenguk over the tearing-down of the Nationalist flags. It might be true that this 
event was later exploited by the Triad-cum-Nationalist organizations. However, the 
police officers and the government officials on spot could not either accommodate the 
protesters or disperse them with resolution before they tumed violent. When violence 
took place and the blackhand behind the turmoil was thought to be identifiable then 
the military capacity of the police was fully employed. The government report 
explained the initial inaction of police as a responsible consideration of the safety of 
residents so that they were hesitate to resort to c o e r c i o n . 2 4 0 Later development of the 
incident proved self-restraint was not a characteristic o f the police at that time. They 
shot rioters to death for throwing stones without hesitation. I would rather suggest 
that a novelty had been presented to the police that inactivated their usual prompt 
action. With pre-emptive strategy the police usually act to rather than react to the 
specific targets. The government admitted in the report that 'lack of any definite 
objective was one of the most important elements in the situation in Kowloon from 
the police point of view. It made it impossible for the police to anticipate the likely 
239 Report on the Riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan. October 10th to 12th. 1956. Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1957，p.5, italic mine. 




targets of mob action or to deploy in advance of any new outbreak of v i o l e n c e . " 2 4 i 
From the 1956 disturbance on, the police were strengthened in terms of their reactive 
power, "there are a number of lessons to be leamt from the sequence of events and 
from which further measures will be considered to improve our equipment for 
handling any similar outbreaks in the future.....two directions in which...improvements 
must be made as soon as possible, - police communications and m o b i l i t y . " 2 4 2 
Because of having no proper preparation during the 1956 disturbance, help was 
• 
asked from the Army and curfew was shortly imposed, hi terms of immediate 
criminalisation, beside those found convicted of conventional offences liked riotous 
behaviour, looting so on and so forth, the largest number of convictions were breach 
of the Curfew Order.243 To impose curfew was a prerogative power of the governor 
under extremity. Its characteristics were the ad hoc basis and the undiscriminating 
restriction on all people within the curfew areas. Remember until now the disorder-
mode remained undifferentiated, that means in terms of institutional repertoire, on-
spot control of the mass had not yet been institutionalized, hnposing curfew was the 
only post-hoc measure that the colonial state could resort to in handling large-scale 
• 
disturbance. 
Although this novelty was present to the state, the state chose the strengthening 
of the existing institutional repertoire as a remedy instead of creating new one. When 
the Societies Ordinance was amended in 1957, two reasons were given by the 
Attorney-General for strengthening the law. The first was that closer monitor on 
societies was considered essential to tackle seditious and criminal activities. The 
second reason, said the A-G, Hong Kong was particularly vulnerable to the activities 
241 ibid, p.5l. • 
242 ibid., p..iv. .. 
243 ibid., p.54, number of people charged for breach of Curfew Order were 1455; for murder, 8; for 
rioting, 367; for looting, 159; for wounding, 1; for triad membership, 181; for possessing arms, 8 and 
breach of deportation order, 16. 
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of unlawful societies, just as the Double-tenth incident had s h o w n . 2 4 4 Within nine 
months after the disturbance, more than one thousand people were arrested for triad 
a c t i v i t i e s . 2 4 5 A joint riot exercise of the Military and the police was held at the end of 
September in 1957, so as to give waming to potential trouble-makers and to rehearse 
the police in handling potential riots.246 During early October, nearly ten thousand 
police were mobilized to guard against any traits of d i s t u r b a n c e . 2 4 7 it was fortunate 
that no disturbance took place inl957 that was similar to that in the previous year. 
But it was unfortunate in another sense, that was, the seemingly peaceful 1957 
reinforced the belief of the colonial state that strengthened monitoring over societies 
and upgraded mobility of police were enough to keep the colony peaceful. 
The following years saw frequent police intervention on various occasions. 
These interventions ranged from conventional control over labor s t r i k e , 2 4 8 new 
confrontation with the New Territories residents,249sporadic d i s o r d e r , 2 5 0 and other 
2 4 4星島日報，4/7/1957. 
245 星島日報，18/9/1957. 
2 4 6星島日報，22/9/1957. 
247 星島日報，2/10/1957. 
248 A conflict took place between police and the workers in Tuenwan Ken Yip Cloth Factory when the 
workers were stating strike. Eleven workers were injured. See 華橋曰報’ 13/7/1958. ln the strike 
heralded by Pao Sing Factory workers, conflict also took place and two workers were arrested for 
breach of peace, see 星島曰報，6/11/1965. The first instance of trade union, the Plantation Union, 
being declared illegal by the government also took place about these years. See 華僑曰報’ 13/5/1959. 
249 The government took control of the Huenyikuk in late 1959 which led to a series of conflict. 
Residents complained of arbitrary arrests and violence took place during election process of Rural 
Committee. See 華僑日報，10/12/1959, 12/10/1959,星島日報，23/5/1960, 25/3/1961, 8/3/1962. 
250 A riot broke out after a football match. One person charged with riot and one police officer injured. 
See 星島日幸艮’ 1/4/1961. Another football match riots took place in 1965 in which nine person were 
arrested and five injured. See 星島日報，4/12/1965. 
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type of social p r o t e s t s . 2 5 i Police were capable of preventing those events from 
spreading into uncontrollable disturbance, but they could not prevent violence from 
taking place. Not every occasion of violence was incited by police intervention, but 
the intervention of the Anti-riot Squad generally escalated the degree of violence. The 
1956 disturbance tumed a pre-emptive strategy with specific targets into a 
strengthened reactive strategy ofsuppressing protests. The general peace experienced 
during 1957 to 1965 was maintained with a heavy-handed policing s t y l e . 2 5 2 And the • 
price had to be paid afterward. • 
The strengthening of police capacity might not be a sufficient response to the 
new social conditions emerged in late 1950s and 1960s. Not only because brutality 
could not be avoided through this reform, but also because the civil strifes in this 
period were more difficult to be understood by the old mode of thought. From the 
examples of civil strifes quoted in the previous paragraph, we shall notice that the 
issue involved in these strifes were exclusively domestic problems. Previously most 
social protests were labor strikes and they could be understood by the union's political 
affiliation. How could we generalize across various participants in strifes liked . 
football hooligans, villagers, customers in a bankrupted bank and evicted residents to • 
single out a common thread running through them? The failure to do this means the 
pre-emptive policing style combined with the societies-mode of criminalisation have 
to subside. A reactive police strategy has to consider a strife as a strife proper. The 
strife may not be anticipated through chasing the activities of trouble-making 
organization. The strife may also evaporate completely after the confrontation that 
leaves no clues for the police to follow on. It is finally this changing nature of social 
251 Rural residents protesting for eviction resulted in five persons charged with breach ofpeace, see 星 
島日幸艮，15/1/1964, 29/1/1964. Another similar incident in Wohapshek, see 星島日報，10/11/1965. • 
Customers of Canton Trust Commercial Bank staged a protest at the Government House and nine were 
arrested, 5〒星島日報，11/5/1965. 
252 A very good case illuminating the extreme caution of the police was the ban imposed on a joint 
school sport show. The Commissioner of Police declared the show, with mere entertaining purpose, as 
illegal because the sponsor had not submitted every details of the contents of every speech and song. 
See 華僑曰報，9/12/1958. 
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protests and civil strifes that brought about the installation of the disorder-mode of 
criminalisation. 
4.4 Incidents under the disorder-mode 
I do not want to spend too many words on the 1966 and 67 riots. First because 
they are well-documented.253 Second because I have already come across them in the 
end of chapter two. I just want to highlight here their relevance in understanding the 
development of the process of interaction between the colonial state and the 
participants in strifes. 
The 1966 riot should be taken as a landmark in terms of forging institutional 
change. The incident started from a voluntary hunger strike protesting rise in fare of 
Star Ferry. The strike attracted large number of people, among them mainly 
youngsters. Police intervention with the enlarging protest ignited confrontations and 
violence. The disturbance spread along the central part of Kowloon and a curfew was 
shortly enforced. The disturbance led to one protester killed by police and numerous 
arrested.254 
We should note how the police had attached to their older mode of policing 
protests and strifes. The hunger striker, So Sau Chuen (^守忠)，was arrested shortly 
for the ridiculous charge of obstruction of street. The arrest aroused wide criticism 
and it was a direct cause of the large scale procession in the following day. A police-
military complex was again mobilized, just like the situation during 1956 disturbance, 
and curfew and firearms were shortly resorted to. However, behind the procession 
there existed no triad societies to be discovered. The police tried very hard to locate 
the 'blackhand' of the incident and referred it explicitly to be Elise Elliott and the 
253 see Ian hntt Political Change and the Crisis ofLeeitimacv in Hong Kong, op cit., p.81-126; John 
Cooper, rnlnnv In Conflict, Hong Kong: Swindon, 1970 ； for official account, see Kowloon . 
Disturbances 1966 Report of Commission of Inquirv. Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1967; 
alternative story see Elsie Elliott, Crusade for Justice. Hong Kong : Heinemann Asia, 1981，p.205-32. ’ 
254 Development ofthe incident, see 星島曰報，from 5/4/1966 to 11/4/1966. 
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Hong Kong Reform Club255 as responsible for the incident. The police somehow 
became hysteria and did not give up every trait implying social deviance among the 
investigated, including interrogation on the participants' private lives and sexual 
p r e f e r e n c e . 2 5 6 The police's over-reaction and the publication of the government 
report were received coldly by the publ ic .257 • 
The police had picked up, as I have argued before, a reactive-suppressive • 
strategy after the 1956 disturbance. The whole exercise was duplicated in 1966 with 
more effectiveness and determination. The disturbance was put down within ten days 
and the casualties were much fewer than those in the 1956 disturbance. However this 
time such prompt action did not eam the police any public credit. During the incident, 
we can for the first time clearly locate social discourse on civil right in Hong Kong. 
So Sau Chuen, when arrested, told the police that he had the freedom to protest. 
Another protester accompanying So condemned the police as having no authority to 
infringe their right and freedom to express public opinion?-^^ Previously, when police • 
power was condemned by the protesters, it was condemned on the ground of 
substantive issues like assisting the employers to suppress workers or allowing the 
rightists to harass the leftists or vice versa. This time the exercise of police power was 
condemned because of its own sake. The protesters said in a tune as if they were 
backed up by an imagined community and entitlements and it was a civil wrong o f the 
255 Elsie Elliott, the later Elsie Tu, was an outspoken Urban Council member and she considered the 
1966 disturbance was a trap to set her up. She was later found contempt of court when she refused to 
reveal the name of her informant to the inquiry committee. The Reform Club was one the few domestic 
pressure group which heralded the public opinion to oppose the fare raise. See Elsie Elliot, Crusade for 
Justice, op cit. • 
256 see anjnteresting discussion in H J Lethbridge, "The Star Ferry Riots and the Issue ofCorruption", 
in his HarH Graft in Hong Kong： Scandal. Corruption, the ICAC. Hnng Knng- n i iP 1985, p.54-81. ， 
257 Few people voluntary attended the open inquiry held by the inquiry committee. When the report 
was published, there was criticism of saying the report as a ‘ready made product'. See 星島日報 
12/5/1966, 22/2/1967. Elsie Elliott, who was condemned by the inquiry committee to be judged . 
‘before the Bar of Public Opinion for censure’’ was reelected as the Urban Council member with the 
highest votes. See Elsie Elliott, Crusade for Justice, op cit., p.224. 
2 5 8星島曰報 , 6 / 4 / 1 9 6 6 . 
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police to step on the right of such community. Some commentators went so far to say 
that if the leftists took this chance to herald large scale protests instead of doing it in 
1967，the Hong Kong Chinese would have joined them instead of supporting the 
colonial regime .259 The suppressive strategy of the state was used in such an effective 
manner in putting down the disturbance but at the same time brought such social 
criticism.from the Chinese community. The political failure of the suppression forced 
the colonial state to review its relationship with the society, hi the end of the official 
review of this disturbance, overall review on public attitude of police, housing and 
health problems, economic recession and unemployment, education and youth 
problem were conducted. If not threatened by the violent riots in 1967, we might have 
expected an earlier arrival of state effort in consolidating the home polity. 
In terms of forging community feeling among Hong Kong Chinese, the 1967 riot 
was not a development of the 1966 one. It was a revival of an older conflict and 
• 
reassertion of an older style of policing. The protesters appealed to an external 
sovereigH (PRC) for support and plotted some terrorism-liked protests. Hundreds of 
local organizations, when given the choice of supporting the colonial regime or PRC, 
showed sympathy to the former .260 The state response to the aftermath of 1966 
disturbance were a larger share of investment in youth service and effort to strengthen 
community feeling. The result of 1967 riot was the addition of a word ‘royal, to the 
title of police and the creation of the Police Tactical Unit.26i Earlier attempt of 
constitutional reform in municipal council was aborted and the Emergency 
Regulations passed during the 1967 riots placed higher priority on social control. The 
• 
259 See “香港動亂與香港前途”,明報月刊，vol 92，no.8, (1967)，p.11-18. 
• 
260 Development of the 1967 riot, see 星島曰報，5/5/1967 for the first incident ofconflict in Kowloon 
Town; 7/5/1967 for the San Pao Kong strife which later became the focus of leftist mobilization. 
12/5/1967 to 12/7/1967, 15/7/1967，16/7/1967, 20/1/1968 for subsequent development of riots' 
13/7/1967，15/7/1967, 17/7/1967，25/7/1967，29/7/1967, 18/8/1967’ 20/8/1967 for police raids oii 
leftist organizations. 
261 Kevin Sinclair, Asia's Finest: an illustrated account of the Roval Honp Kong Pnlir.p, Hong Kong: 
Unicom, 1983’ p.76-86, 133-137. See also 星島曰報，2 7 / 9 / 1 9 6 8 for public announcement of 
establishing the Unit. 
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frustrated police in 1966 became a hero a year after, preventing them from any self-
reflection on the previous policing style. 
Although having the hindrance of 1967 riot, a new style of interaction between 
the law enforcement agency and the protesters anyway emerged during the 1970s. We 
have leamt that the new Public Order Ordinance was promulgated in 1967. However, 
we could find few changes in the policing style immediately after its promulgation. 
After a few confrontations between the police and public light bus drivers in 1969262 
and labor strife in 1970,263 the real turning point came about in 1971. It was the Tiao 
Yu Tai incident. 
The protests against Japanese occupation of the Tiao Yu Tai Islands saw a see-
saw interaction between the protesters and the government. The first organised 
protest on this issue was held in mid February of 1971. It was a small procession of 
about 30 participants marching to the Japanese c o n s u l a t e . 2 6 4 xhe procession was 
peaceful and, quite unexpectedly, no police intervened into the process. However, 
when there were signals that the protest was developing into a larger scale movement, 
the colonial state's instinct to suppress it was initiated. When an assembly was held 
in the Victoria Park in July, criminalisation took place. Police took action against the 
assembled students who were circled by about 2 000 on-lookers. The arrests and the 
violence shed on the basically peaceful protesters agitated others to protest outside the 
park. Small scale disturbance broke out in Causeway Bay and finally 21 protesters 
were arrested. The police later, once again after the 1966 incident, found themselves 
being unwelcome by the public opinion. The universities and the public showed their 
sympathy to the students. The Federation of Student Union, which was the organiser 
of the protest, took the chance to condemn the police power. The Federation claimed 





laws and the students demanded that they should enjoy the right to assembly and the 
freedom of speech . 265 The state responded with a partial concession. Listead of 
amending the laws, four gazetted areas were offered for the use of peaceful 
p r o t e s t s . 2 6 6 On the other hand, the police kept tight control on authorising license to 
protesters or not. An alliance for protecting Tiao Yu Tai announced that they would 
hold a public meeting in the Victoria Park, one of the gazetted area for protest, but had 
applied for a license only two days before the meeting. The Commissioner of Police 
gave an open warning a day before the commencement of the meeting through press 
release that the meeting was unlawful. He also advised ordinary people to keep 
themselves away from Victoria Park on that d a y . 2 6 7 xhe warning had no effect, bi 
order not to confront with the determined protesters, the government conceded again 
by authorising the meeting with an agreement with the protesters that imposed nine 
additional conditions confming how the meeting would be conducted.268 More than 
one thousand people joint the assembly in a peaceful manner. The police took a brand 
new style of policing: that was, they regulated the meeting without carrying pistols 
and batons. The mutual self-restraint proved to be welcome. Even the police 
commissioner described the incident as a good example for how peaceful assembly 
should be conducted.269 
The colonial state did not stop taking such protests as a potential threat. It was 
trying to accommodate itself to a new style of policing which could minimise overt 
confrontation between the government and the protesters. Because it was suspected 







by intelligent work were taken to singled out trouble-makers. Students and staffs 
working in students' publications were occasionally arrested or ‘invited，to the police 
station for assisting i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 2 7 0 The tension mounted up again in mid-1972. A 
student union applied for a procession in Central according to the formal procedures . 
as stipulated in the law. The application was stoutly rejected by the Governor • 
h i m s e l f . 2 7 i The procession proceeded as planned with more than 1 500 protesters 
participated. A surprise to every participant again, the police exercised high degree of 
self-restraint. No violence was used. No confrontation took place. The police only 
gave a warning after the procession that they had taken many photos of the 
participants and were considering charging them. The police stated, for the first time， 
clearly that they did not intervene in with the procession because they knew such 
intervention would lead to counter-effect, that was, d i s t u r b a n c e . 2 7 2 When every 
participant was worrying about the arrivals of summons, the government surprised • 
them subsequently by declaring a week later that the unlawful procession would be • 
tolerated for once. No criminalisation took p l a c e . 2 7 3 
Attonery General emphasized that such toleration would be exercised only once. 
It was not empty word. For the recorded criminalisation of strifes during 1972 to 
1980，all of the participants were accused on the ground that they did not comply to 
the strict requirements as stipulated in the public order law. 
Still then, the change was significant. No large scale violence broke out 
between protesters and police in the 1970s. Such a relatively peaceful interaction was 
brought about by the self-restraint o f the police. The ground for this assertion was the • 
• _^_^__^ ^^ _^_«__^«___ 
270 Eleven person including staffs working in the Secondary-school-student Weekly and activists ofthe 
Tiao Yu Tai event were arrested in a police raid for putting up posters. See 星島日報,20/4/1972， 







fact that the average protesters in Hong Kong did not become remarkably peaceful 
during this period. Sporadic civil violence broke out frequently, although of much 
smaller scale than the disturbance in the 50s and 60s.274 The government did not 
change its attitude of taking protests as potential threat, or else it did not have to 
initiate frequent criminalisation against the participants. The change was a new 
differentiation between sporadic violence and social protest, in which the former was 
tackled by the prompt action of the Police Tactical Unit, the later was regulated to be 
cooled down. Policing strategy for cooling down protesters as observed from the 
incidents recorded included post-hoc criminalisation through summons which can 
avoid direct confrontation during p r o t e s t , 2 7 5 and ex-ante criminalisation by isolating 
the protesters when they have not yet assembled t o g e t h e r . 2 7 6 No matter which 
strategy, the aim was to de-escalate social protests. Such strategies were applicable 
only when the police were given power to take action either before or after protest, 
and at the same time they had the power to regulate the conduct of protest without 
resort to direct violence. These power were provided by the institutional repertoire of 
the disorder-mode of criminalisation. I will denote the policing style during late 
1970s as a de-escalating strategy and it could be used in a pre-emptive or reactive 
manner. 
4.5 Concluding remark 
We have so far come across four kinds of policing strategy in criminalising civil 
strifes, namely, the general pre-emptive strategy, the pre-emptive strategy with 
274 Recorded civil violence can be found in 星島曰報,17/9/1975，between police and public estate 
residents; 29/9/1976 between police and fishermen; 22/5/1977 football hooligans; 26/6/1977 football 
hooligans; 1/9/1979 between police and shop owners; 21/4/1980 between police and old public housing 
estate residents; 15/9/1980 between police and new public housing estate residents. These incidents 
were not counted as strifes as defined in the beginning of this chapter because no articulated demand 
could be observed. 
275 See 星島曰報，1/9/1973，7/7/1973，12/9/1974, 3/10/1978, 20/12/1978 for various incidents. These 
incidents were listed in appendix one. 
276 See 星島日報，7/1/1979, 22/4/1979 for examples. These incidents were also listed in appendix one. 
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specific target, the reactive-suppressive strategy and de-escalating strategy. Although 
I am fond of constructing Weberian idealtypes, these 'strategies' cannot be 
generalized too much. The reason was that pure civil violence and peaceful social 
actions were excluded in this survey and I have no reason to believe that changes in 
policing styles were result of interaction with strifes only but not with these two 
excluded classes of incidents. A complete survey over interaction between policing 
and the society may yield a better formulated general scheme. Therefore I will take 
these four types of policing strategies as unconnected shorthand that can highlight 
policing styles in different periods only. They do not make up an exhaustive scheme 
and do not even provide discrete borderlines among themselves. However, as 
illustrated by the titles of the previous sections, they more or less correspond to the 
three modes of criminalisation against social action. We can put it in the following 
table: 
Phase of Styles of 
Modes Deport Societies Disorder Policing 
/Period  
1946-50 Control Control Undifferentiated Pre-emptive 
1951-56 Control Control Undifferentiated Pre-emptive 
with specific 
target  
1957-61 Disciplinaiy Control Undifferentiated Pre-emptive 
with specific 
target  
1962-66 Disciplinary Disciplinary Undifferentiated Reactive-
suppressive 
1967-71 Disciplinary Disciplinary Control Reactive-
suppressive 
1972-80 Disciplinary Disciplinary Control De-escalating 
The phases of the three modes of criminalisation can be distinguished by 
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discrete piece o f l aw while the point of changes in policing style cannot be located and 
marked with certainty. Therefore in the above table the switch of the former does not 
fit comfortably with the change in the latter. However, even in a vague sense, the 
table exhibits a phenomenon of the policing style lagging behind the changes of • 
modes. It is not surprising. It takes a vote to make a law but much longer time for the 
law-enforcement agency to adopt to new institutional setups. 
More important than the correspondence with the modes of criminalisation, 
identifying the styles of policing can provide us a better understanding of the 
threshold of criminalisation. The first threshold is the moment when the state takes 
action to tackle a strife or potential strife. For pre-emptive strategy, including general 
or target-specific one, the threshold is a perceived threat and an identifiable group to 
be contained. For reactive-suppressive strategy, police initiate action when strife 
really takes place, disregarding the identities of the participants. Finally for the de- • 
escalating strategy，formal compliance to law governing public gatherings is the 
borderline for intervention, either ofpre-emptive or reactive one. 
The second threshold is the legal threshold, which is exactly the severity of 
charge on the participants of strifes. Instead of listing out the offences, we better 
classify them into a few types. The first type of offence is that involves violence, like 
riotous behaviour, intimidation and assault. The protesters will be charged for it when 
confrontation with the police is the norm. It is usually applied when pre-emptive and 
reactive-suppressive strategies were widely used. The second type of offence is the 
deportation offence, which is not strictly an offence at all. As I have said before, • 
deportatipn order can be issued by the executive against those unwelcome residents in 
Hong Kong. We can expect that such criminalisation was used under the pre-emptive 
with specific target strategy, in which activists were deported before or after a strife 
had taken place. The third class of offence refers to those against general disposal of 
police power, like obstructions, resisting police, so on and so forth. Protesters from 
mid-1960s on frequently found themselves charged with such offences. Finally it is 
the offence about infringing formal legal procedures. Charge of unlawful assembly 
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characterized the strifes in 1970s. It obviously accompanied the use of de-escalating 
strategy. Needless to say, the choice of legal threshold was determined largely by the 
availability of the institutional repertoire of the modes of criminalisation, as I have 
already shown in the previous sections. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
It is time to review my present position regarding how much we have got from • 
the discussion in the previous chapters. • 
The questions that I have asked 
This paper started from asking, in a retrospective way, how the institutional 
character of the criminal justice system reacting to social action in Hong Kong 
evolved from the end of World War II to 1980. The talk of ‘evolution' implies that 
the categories of crime against civil strifes have changed over time. I have established 
in chapter one the premise that no criminal categories are universal and given. They 
should be understood as the products of social and political processes. Having argued 
• 
that, the second question one should ask was that how the categories of crime emerged 
and how were they (re)categorized. The pursuit of this question in chapter two 
suggests the historical roots of such categories of crime. I have conceptualized them 
by relational constructs as three modes of criminalisation against civil strifes, namely, 
the deport, societies and disorder modes. Chapter three of this paper was guided by a 
follow-up question about the details of the institutional character of these three modes 
of criminalisation and their relative movement. Could this elaborated concept of 
modes of criminalisation contribute to a better understanding of the incidents of civil 
strifes in Hong Kong? The attempt to answer this question produced chapter four. 
參 
Anselm Strauss once said that doing library work resembles the experience of 
doing field work. When you first enter the 'field', you have only a vague concept of 
what you are looking for. The materials you have managed to gather would suggest 
what following steps you should take provided that you keep on organizing the 
materials and putting them under an elaborated conceptual framework. The 
questions asked, the materials gathered and the conceptual framework formulated are 
interacting dialectically during a continuous process of askings and answerings 
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without a definite e n d i n g . 2 7 7 i did not attempt in this paper to generalize statements 
like ‘theory A is thus supported' or 'hypothesis B is rejected', so on and so forth. All 
• 
the concepts and hypotheses suggested in this paper were exploratory in a sense that 
they would be meaningless if abstracted from the context in which the questions were 
asked.278 i expect this paper could serve to lay down a grounded conceptual 
framework that could capture the most salient characteristics of the research subject, 
and could bridge the gap between dry empirical data and grand but blind theories. 
The lines of inquiry that I have pursued 
The chapters in this paper are organized along two axis. The first axis runs from 
the abstract to the empirical. I have reviewed relevant literature to formulate an 
abstract process model of criminalisation. Then the abstractiveness is lowered one 
level when I in the chapter two cast the broad historical characteristics of Hong Kong 
as a backdrop to construct a general scheme of modes of criminalisation against civil 
strifes. In chapter three and four, empirical data are presented through reviewing the 
legislative changes and the newspaper-clippings regarding civil strifes. The general 
scheme of modes of criminalisation are hence further differentiated into phases with 
their institutional repertoire specified. An attempt to conceptualize policing styles can 
be found in chapter four and the styles of policing are matched, albeit not without 
arbitrariness of interpretation, to the differentiated modes of criminalisation. 
The second axis proceeds from the macro to the micro in terms of the objects 
under investigation. I have picked up a brand of state theory which treats the state as 
the nexus of the continuous processes of organizing and reorganizing the authoritative 
277 see Bamey G Glaser, Anselm L Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory- Strategies fnr 
Qualitative Research, London: Weidenfild and Nicolson, 1968，p.161-184. 
278 I am not sure how can the issue of generalization can be tackled at this stage. For the time being I 
would suggest that the need of figuring out the specificities of the case under study should precede the 
urge to generalize the result to other coming cases. At the bottom of my mind, however, I am actually 




relationships among fellow people. I also probe the question of the relationship 
between the criminal justice system and the state building process in chapter two. The 
model of modes of criminalisation is constructed with the understanding that the most 
salient factor the criminal justice system contributed to state building was the 
boundary-drawing exercise. The criminal justice system draws lines across fellow 
people and such lines provide the state the yardsticks with which responses to social 
actions through criminalisation can be initiated. The criminal justice system, itself 
part of the state structure, serves as a lens to converge attention to the possible 
confrontation between the state and society during civil strifes. In chapter three I look 
into the relevant legal instruments, which are part of the criminal justice system, to 
figure out the institutional bases of the criminalisation against civil strifes. It is 
assumed that the state response to social actions as reflected in the criminal justice 
system would precipitate in the laws. Hence the legislative changes provides 
anchorage to the understanding of the institutional characters which underline the 
interaction between the state and society. At last, the survey in chapter four tries to 
capture the police and the protesters as interacting parties during which processes of 
action and reaction between the state and society could be interpolated. 
I have tried to organize these axis and their respective levels into a consistent 
scheme. However, sometimes too much theorizing will distract the original attention. 
hi the remaining pages, I will try to put together the salient aspects that have been 
highlighted in the previous chapters with a view to arriving at a logical and empirical 
consistency with the help of the general theoretical framework formulated in chapter 
one. 
To reiterate, I have stated that a cyclic model of institutionalization could be 
used to capture the elements involved in the interaction between the criminal justice 
system and social actions. It starts with the identification of trauma as perceived by 
the state. The second element is the processes of definition of situation, under which • 
the state collapses its past experience and the present trauma together to define what 
should it do to the perceived challenge. Then comes the process of action and 
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reaction. The dynamics between the state actor and the protesters sharpens the 
institutional dimension of the conflict. Finally we have the process of redefinition of 
situation and normalization, which are actually the end-game play to round things up. 
The cyclic movement of these five idealtypical processes informs the institutional 
characters of the criminal justice system. 
The post war story 
After the Second World War, the political landscape in China underwent 
dramatic changes within a few years. Hong Kong, geographically and politically 
located at the margin of China, could not keep itself clear from the riddles of such 
changes. Accompanying the post-war influx of refugees, political affiliated groups 
which had their loyalty devoted to polities other than the colonial state steadily 
emerged. On the other hand, Hong Kong was starting to grow into an industrial 
economy at the tum of the 1950s. All these changes created strains to the colonial 
state. 
This paper contends that the colonial state in its pre-war institutional form, 
which had a tendency to segregate itself from the society, was incapable of solving 
the aforesaid strains. The colonial state originally tended to maintain itself aloof of 
the local Chinese community whenever necessary. It was not ready to incorporate 
those alien and politically-affiliated new-comers to the colonial polity. When 
incidents of civil strifes took place after the war, the colonial state put the blame on 
the new-comers as origins of disturbance. 
At this juncture, the criminal justice system in Hong Kong played a specific role. 
It could be used to define the new-comers as source of social disturbance in legal 
terms and thereon new measures were injected to subject the identified people under 
supervision. 
However, I have also stressed that the criminal justice system could not be 
molded arbitrarily. The institutional character of the criminal justice system at time 
frame t-1 can restrain the institutional choice at t. It is so because by default the 
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institutional setup of the criminal justice system is explicitly stated before the eyes of 
public. Measures are also installed to command the actors (the court, the police so on 
and so forth) in the criminal justice system to follow the explicitly stated rules, 
otherwise the criminal justice system would not function at all. 
Therefore, I contend that although the institutional setup of the criminal justice 
system in Hong Kong changed over time, it also exhibited some kinds of continuity 
and intemal consistency iflooked from a birdview angle. 
In this sense, the process model that I have advocated assumes an accumulative 
function which portrays the institutional changes of the criminal justice system 
regarding civil strifes as if the criminal justice system could leam from past 
experience and moved forward. The criminal justice system crepe forward liked a 
creature. 
What kinds of experience the criminal justice system had leamt and in what 
direction had it been moving from the end ofW.W.II until early 1980s in Hong Kong? 
The changes of the three modes of criminalisation against civil strifes suggests 
the following directions of changes: (a) the colonial state interpreted civil strifes as 
imported problems but it gradually accepted hat it should be treated as intemal 
problems, (b) the colonial state first tried to link civil strifes with some specific 
segments of the population but it finally understood them as a diffused phenomenon 
and were somehow unpredictable, (c) the colonial state responded to civil strifes first 
with heavy-handed suppression but it gradually developed mechanism to keep them 
under elaborated supervision and therefore a reconciliatory approach was adopted. 
The institutional setup of the criminal justice system changed correspondingly: 
(a) border control and deportation gave way to an elaborated system of intemal 
supervision for preventing strifes, (b) intelligence works focused on personal and 
organizational entities were displaced by prompt and tactful police reactions to react 
to strifes, (c) undifferentiated and brutal violence poured on the protesters were 
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substituted by differentiated and procedural supervision of p r o t e s t e r s . 2 7 9 
I have also argued that, paralleling these changes, the boundary of the colonial 
state and the explicit definition of ‘citizen, (which were actually two sides of the same 
coin) underwent similar changes as well. The main current was running from an 
exclusive to an inclusive colonial state: (a) during the period of deport-mode (about 
1946 to 1956), the colonial state included only the British subjects, it tolerated law-
abiding Chinese to stay but subjected them to the potential threat of being expelled, 
(b) during the period of societies-mode (about 1956-1967), the colonial state stopped 
deporting aliens in large scale. It distinguished carefully between acceptable Chinese 
aggregations and those which were considered having political loyalties devoted 
elsewhere. Chinese were allowed to develop their groupings and collective identity if 
they proved themselves law-abiding, (c) during the disorder-mode (about 1967 to 
now), the colonial state seldom cast doubt on the legitimacy of permanent residence 
enjoyed by the Chinese in Hong Kong. The institutional linkage that matched strifes 
to some specific organizations blurred. All subjects, British or non-British subjects, 
were started to be treated on the same footing. Hong Kong Chinese have acquired full 
membership to the Hong Kong community. 
History would not be so neatly organized. I have suggested, with the concept of 
modes and its sub-concept of phases in chapter three, different mix among phases of 
the modes of criminalisation against civil strifes. Different mix at different time 
provided different institutional repertoire for the colonial state to use. However, to 
paint with bold brush, the end game of the evolution of criminalisation as observed at 
the beginning of 1980s was the dawn of de-criminalisation of social protests. Well 
before the introduction of elected elements to the colonial state in 1982, social 
protests on condition that they had not developed into uncontrollable strifes, were 
treated in a manner as if the protesters had a ‘right, to express t h e m s e l v e s . 2 8 0 xhis 
279 substantive details of such statements please refer to chapter three ofthis paper. 
280 details please refer to the conclusion of chapter four. 
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active tolerance of social protests on the part of the state implies an informal 
recognition of the right to participation in political affairs. From that time on we can 
• 
really distinguish between protests (as political participation) and strifes (as threats to 
law and order). 
The scheme of the processes of institutional changes 
Here we can substantiate the cyclic process model. 
The following table summarizes, with some risk of over-simplification, the 
cyclic processes involved in the three modes of criminalisation. 
Table 5.1: The Processes Involved in the Modes of Criminalisation.  





Perceived Influx of politically The politically The origins of the 
Trauma affiliated refugees affiliated strifes taking place 
from late 1940s on. immigrants resided from 1966 and on 
They were said to in Hong Kong and seemed un-
be responsible for consolidated into identifiable and 
the strifes taking identifiable sporadic. Wide 
place before mid- groupings. Their varieties ofpeople, 
1950s. internal rivalries including the poor, 
and competition the youngsters, • 
were said to be students and social 
• responsible for the workers involved in 
strifes taking place social protests, 
from mid-1950s to 
shortly before 
1966. 






Defmition of Strifes were Strifes were Strifes were 
Situation initiated by factors motivated by sometimes self-
extemal to Hong politically affiliated motivated. 
Kong. groups having their 
bases in Hong 
Kong. 
� Degree of Trouble-makers Problem Whoever staged 
severity as were expelled from organizations were protests in public 
reflected by the the colony even closely monitored. place were ‘ 
' threshold' for they have Raids and searches prosecuted. 
• 
state action committed no and sometimes 
crimes. prosecutions were 
conducted if they 
involved in politics. 
(II) Institutional The legal The legal The legal 
novelty instruments for instruments for instruments for 
identifying trouble- identifying trouble- regulating protests 
making immigrants making societies were not 
were not were not differentiated. • 
differentiated. differentiated. 
• 
(III) Specific The legal definition The legal definition The conduct of 
novelty as of undesirable oftriad activities protesters were 
reflected by use residents was was sketched to regulated through 
of 'convergence' sketched to cover cover political summary offenses, 








Action and Pre-emptive strike Pre-emptive strike Reactive but 
Reaction282 widely used. with specific target suppressive strike 
widely used. widely used. 
Redeftnition of 
Situation 
® Summing up Hong Kong was a Hong Kong was Hong Kong had 
the story peaceful city. Civil industrializing. intemal strains. 
strifes could be Civil strifes could Civil strifes could 
avoided if be avoided if the be avoided if such 
undesirable people political groups strains could be 
were prevented were barred from released through 
from entering Hong intervening in the proper channels. 
Kong. economic 
processes. 
(II) Follow-up Laws registering Laws registering Laws licensing and 
actions and expelling in- and regulating regulating protests 
comers to Hong societies and trade were to be 
Kong were to be unions were to be promulgated, 
promulgated. promulgated. 
Normalization Personal Societies Protests within 
registration registration boundary of laws 
routinized. routinized. accepted. Police 
capacity reinforced. 
The forty years of evolution of the criminal justice system regarding social 
actions or civil strifes are organized here as three lopes of processes. I am not 
suggesting that these three lopes follow one and other neatly. However, I am really 
arguing that these three lopes are distinguishable and they have their dominance 
within the different periods during the post war history ofHong Kong. 
282 The attributes across this row were concluded from the discussion in chapter four. 
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What is the relevance of all these findings to the present? 
Their relevance to the present is that they can highlight the parameters and 
important factors affecting the future development of the criminal justice system in 
terms o f h o w social actions would be classified and reacted to. 
Some agenda have akeady been set. Fierce discussions have been going on 
how should laws like the Public Order Ordinance, the Societies Ordinance and the 
future nationality law be formulated or amended. I would suggest that behind such 
kind of discussion, another round of exercise that redefmes what is permissible and 
what is not is undergoing. The Hong Kong government, changing from a colonial 
• 
state to a local government of the Chinese state, is subject to new values and new 
external constraints. In this paper, I have been all along arguing that the evolution of 
the criminal justice system has a lot to do with the state building process. Li the future 
Special Administration Region of Hong Kong, who is a citizen and under what 
conditions will a resident be deprived of citizenship? Which kinds of aggregation are 
allowed and why they should be dissolved? What kinds of and for what reasons will 
protests not be considered as threats to the state and therefore tolerated? Questions 
like these cannot be answered adequately without reference to the renewed state 
building process. For the time being, I would like to leave these questions open-ended. 
• 
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Appendix : Civil Strifes in Hong Kong 1948-1980 
Date Event 
5/1/48 Kowloon Walled City Licident. First round confrontation. 250 strong police 
sent to evict the residents there. Two residents representatives arrested and 
later sent to hard labor imprisonment. 
12/1/48 Kowloon Walled City ticident. Second round confrontation. 100 strong 
police sent to clear the temporary shelters of the evicted residents. Six 
residents injured. No prosecution reported. 
11/1/49 Taxi strike. 100 strong police sent to disperse taxi driver volunteers in strike. 
42 driver volunteers for picketing were arrested and found guilty of 
obstruction street and police's execution ofduty. 
1/3/52 Kowloon disturbance. Police sent to prevent comfort mission from China 
from entering and welcome mission from leaving Hong Kong. Disturbance 
broke out in Tsimshatsui among assembled people. 15 persons injured. 60 
arrested for riotous behavior, assault police and breach ofpeace. 
11/5/52 Confrontation among union members in Hong Kong Telephone Co. Police 
invited to intervene. 1 person injured. 
6/8/52 Confrontation among union members in Shanghai Sewing Union. Police 
invited to intervene. 42 workers arrested but later released. 
8/8/52 Confrontation among union members in Textile Union. Police intervened 
and no arrest made. 
1/7/54 Tramway strike. 31 leftist trade union members were fired by Tramway Co. 
A strike was staged. Police sent to disperse the strike. 
1/12/54 Tramway strike. 100 strong police sent to disperse trade union members 
during their meeting for planning forthcoming strikes. 8 workers arrested. 
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18/4/55 Mei ah Factory strike. Hundreds of police sent to disperse picket line of 
workers-on-strike. 4 workers injured. 1 arrested for assault. 
10/10/5 Double-tenth Disturbance. Riots broke out in West Kowloon protesting 
6 against tearing ofROC national flags. Curfew imposed. 
29/7/58 Kuen Yip Cloth Factory. Police sent to supervise negotiation between 
workers and management. Confrontations between workers and police broke 
out when police forced into the factory. 11 injured. 
24/3/61 Yuen Long Rural Committee election. Confrontation took place between 
candidate supporters. Police sent to disperse the crowd. 
7/3/62 Yuen Long wooden huts clearance led to confrontation between residents 
and police. About 20 arrested for assault. 
22/4/63 North Point wooden huts clearance led to confrontation between police and 
reporters when the later were ordered to leave. 
14/1/64 Yuen Long government resumption of land. Residents protested against the 
remedy. 100 strong police sent to disperse the protest. 5 persons arrested for 
breach of peace. 
10/5/65 Customers in bankrupted Canton Trust protested before Government House. 
200 strong police sent to disperse the crowd with 9 persons arrested. 
5/11/65 Po Sing Factory strike. 100 strong police sent to disperse the picket line of 
strikers. 2 workers arrested for breach ofpeace. 
9/11/65 Wo Hop Shek residents protested against compulsory resumption of land. 
200 strong police sent to suppress the protest. 
5/4/66 Hunger-striker protesting Star Ferry fare increase arrested by police for 
obstructing street. Large scale protests took place in Kowloon. 
Confrontation between police and protesters broke out and curfew was 
shortly imposed. 
154 
7/4/67 Two former participants in 1966 protest staged a match to moum the death of 
another prominent participant. They were arrested for obstruction of street 
and police. 
4/5/67 Kowloon Walled City clearance. 4 residents protesting with Mao's work in 
their hands were arrested for breach of peace. 
6/5/67 Confrontation broke out between police and San Po Kong Plastic Flower 
Factoty workers who were on strike. Hundreds ofpolice sent to keep order. 
21 workers arrested for unlawfiil assembly. 
11/5/67 Riots broke out in San Po Kong when police were sent to disperse the 
protesting workers. Curfew was shortly enforced. Subsequent rioting led 
until the end of the year, 
2/3/68 8 hawkers protesting outside Shek Kip Mei police station for an earlier 
arrested woman hawker were arrested for unlawftil assembly, breach of 
peace and assault. 
5/3/68 A group of people protesting against police charge of a 9-seat taxi were 
dispersed by 80 strong police. 9 persons were arrested with unlawftil 
assembly and resisting arrest. 
7/3/68 Confrontation between Yuen Long villagers and police led to 1 person 
arrested forjoining intimidating assembly. 
12/1/69 A group of people protesting against the water equipment in Kwai Chung 
new estates tumed violent and were dispersed by police. 3 persons arrested. 
27/9/69 Nearly 5 hundred people protesting charge on public light bus in Yuen Long 
were dispersed by police. 15 drivers were charged with unlawful assembly 
and resisting police. 
13/6/70 Tai Tung Sewing Factory strike. Police sent to break through the picket line 
of strikers. 3 workers injured and 10 arrested for obstructing street and 
police. 
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7/7/71 Tiao You Tai incident. Students in protest were dispersed by police. 21 
persons were arrested for unlawful assembly. 
16/7/71 Residents protesting against clearance in Tong Tau estate were dispersed by 
police. 5 residents charged ofbreach of peace and assault. 
5/9/72 Yan Yi estate residents protested against clearance and staged a silent strike 
outside City Hall. 700 strong police sent to disperse the protesters. 117 
residents arrested for unlawful assembly and obstructing street. 
1/9/73 21 persons who had join an earlier assembly protesting against corruption 
were charged with summons for unlawful assembly. 
7/9/73 12 persons joined an assembly protesting against corruption were charged 
with summons for unlawful assembly. 
12/9/74 9 persons charged with court order for joining a protest in San Po Kong for 
anti-inflation and unemployment. They were charged with using loud-hailer, 
putting up poster and banner without authorization. 
3/10/78 4 former employees of a bankrupted television company were summoned for 
charge ofjoining unlawful assembly. 
20/12/7 48 persons were charged of unlawful assembly after they had staged a protest 
8 before US counsel for resumption ofUS-PRC diplomacy. 
7/1/79 76 persons were charged of unlawful assembly when they were on the way to 
protest for resettlement o fYau Ma Tei boat residents. 
22/4/79 7 members of a pro-Trotsky group were arrested when they were on the way 
to stage a protest in Victoria Part for their former participation in a protest 
before China News Agency. 
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